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ABSTRACT
This study describes, analyzes, and evaluates the 
speaking of Thurgood Marshall as Solicitor General of the 
United States from 1965-1967, before general audiences and 
audiences consisting of lawyers and law students. This 
period represents an important period in the speaker's life 
when his services as a speaker outside the courtroom 
exceeded earlier years. Further, these were times of crises 
in this nation.
The study includes chapters on Marshall's background 
and other influences, development of the Negro's struggle 
for equality and justice, analysis of general audiences and 
audiences of lawyers and law students, occasions, and 
analyses of speeches about equality and justice under law 
for all Americans. Concentrating upon five representative 
speeches, an appraisal is made of the overall effectiveness 
of the man and his speaking.
The study suggests that as a man whose work 
symbolized and spearheaded the struggle of millions of 
Americans, especially blacks, for equality and justice under 
law for more than a quarter of a century, Marshall was 
eminently qualified to speak on the subjects and to the 
audiences he addressed. The application of rhetorical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
principles was evident in each speech. Evaluation of the 
speaker's logical appeals from a rhetorical point of view 
indicates that effective arguments and sound reasoning 
contributed significantly to his overall effectiveness. 
Marshall's oratory essentially focused on themes dealing 
with equal rights and justice and may be characterized 
generally as rhetoric advocating reform. Like other great 
orators, Marshall came forward to address recurring crises 
in American society and asserted humanitarian and 
equalitarian principles to motivate others to ensure con­
stitutional guarantees for all Americans.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
The Honorable Thurgood Marshall served as United 
States Solicitor General from 1965-1967. He brought to the 
office of U. S. Solicitor General more than twenty years of 
experience as legal defense counsel of the National Associa­
tion for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and four 
years on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. As lawyer for the NAACP, he earned the title "Mr. 
Civil Rights. In 1967 he was appointed the first black 
Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court.
Further, Marshall received nationwide recognition for 
his legal victories before the United States Supreme Court, 
which included the banning of white primaries in the South, 
the exclusion of restrictive housing covenants, the outlawing 
of Jim Crow restrictions in interstate travel and the historic 
Brown V. Topeka Board of Education (1954) case. He argued 
thirty-two civil rights cases before the Supreme Court and 
won twenty-nine, culminating his career as NAACP Defense 
Counsel with the 1954 decision on segregation in education.
^Arna Bontemps, 100 years of Negro Freedom (New 
Dodd, Mead and Company, 1961), p. 249.
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Marshall commands respect as a man with incisive 
knowledge of constitutional law and the ability to trans­
form constitutional law into realities. After taking his 
oath as the thirty-third Solicitor General of che United 
States, he remarked: "Let me take this opportunity to
reaffirm my deep faith in this nation and to pledge that I 
shall ever be mindful of my obligation to the Constitution 
and to the goal of equal justice under the law.
Purpose
Essentially, scholars have written about Marshall's 
legal career and his speechmaking in the courtroom. It 
appears that his public address outside of the courtroom has 
been largely ignored. Hence this writer seeks to explore 
an important facet of his speechmaking on occasions other 
than those before the court. Further, this study purports 
to examine and to investigate from a rhetorical point of 
view the principal line of thought or theme— equality and 
justice under the law for all— utilized by Marshall in five 
selected speeches delivered while he held the position of 
Solicitor General of the United States. In this connection, 
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden explain: "Instead of attempt­
ing to evaluate an entire speaking career covering a lifetime 
and hundreds of appearances, the critic may limit his
Time, September 8, 1967, p. 16.
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3investigation of a man's oratory to a period, phase, a line 
of thought or even a single characteristic such as invention, 
persuasive appeals, or language patterns."^
The study is undertaken for the purpose of achieving 
a better understanding of Marshall's public address during 
the period from 1965-1967. This period was selected 
because it represents an important era when numerous crucial 
issues related to civil rights were prevalent. During this 
period Marshall was frequently invited to address law and 
professional audiences about current problems and concerns 
related to inequalities and injustices to minorities in 
America. Finally, these years immediately preceded his 
appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Significance of the Problem
This study centers upon addresses that dealt with 
ideas which "make a difference in the run of human 
affairs. The principal significance of this study rests 
in the fact that the critic attempts to forge beyond the 
superficial aspects of rhetoric and to probe the basic ideas 
the speaker used repeatedly to foster his line of argument.
Another important factor which contributes to the 
significance of the problem focuses on speeches dealing with
^Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W. 
Braden, Speech Criticism (2d ed.; New York: Ronald Press
Company, 1970), p. 312.
"^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 398.
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4elements which are characteristic of great public address. 
Thonssen/ Baird and Braden note that demonstrative oratory 
deals "with noble themes, universal doctrines, and expres­
sions of man's higher aspirations."  ^ These authors also 
note that "grand themes derive from momentous events, 
actual or impending; [and] great speeches translate those 
themes into catalogs of proposed a c t i o n . T h e  writer seeks 
to examine these elements of rhetoric "for their contribu­
tion to the persuasive efficacy of whole.
Rhetoricians recommend an approach to speeches of 
great men "as indicating the great subjects and occasions of 
our political history and the spirit and motives of the 
great leaders of that h i s t o r y . C o n c e r n i n g  the twentieth 
century, it has been asserted that "great leaders are men 
of eloquent speech and an understanding of their lives and 
speeches is essential to a true conception of our political 
growth and s e n t i m e n t s . M a r i e  H. Nichols remarks, "Great 
speeches reveal man at the intellectual crossroads of his 
public life. They are responses to situations that man has
^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 398.
^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 392.
^Marie Kathryn Hochmuth, ed., A History and Criti­
cism of American Public Address, Volume III (New York : 
Russell and Russell, 1955), p. 21.
^Marie Hochmuth Nichols, ^etoric and Criticism 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967),
p. 52.
^Nichols, p. 57.
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had to confront rather than to flee."^^ Another significant 
aspect can be found in the efforts to determine and to 
evaluate Marshall's interpretation in the public speech 
situation of the world around him and the methods he 
employed to communicate the same to his generation.
Method
The method employed in the study of five selected
speeches by Marshall is based essentially on Aristotelian
standards. The type of criticism is judicial since it seeks
to combine the analytic and synthetic approaches with
another crucial component of evaluating and interpreting the
results. The judicial approach is best explained by
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden as follows:
It reconstructs a speech situation with fidelity 
to the fact; it examines this situation carefully 
in the light of the interaction of speaker, 
audience, subject and occasion ; it interprets the 
data with an eye to determining the effect of the 
speech; it formulates a judgment in the light of the 
philosophical-historical-literary-logical-ethical 
constituents of the inquiry; and it appraises tte 
entire event by assigning it comparative rank in the 
total enterprise of speaking.
Related Studies
Previous studies of the oratory of Thurgood Marshall 
have dealt with his legal career in general and his legal
^Nichols, p. 64.
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arguments before the Supreme Court in particular. For 
example, Jamye Coleman Williams wrote a dissertation 
entitled, "A Rhetorical Analysis of Thurgood Marshall’s 
Arguments Before the Supreme Court in the Public School 
Controversy" and Randall W. Bland authored a book covering 
Marshall's entire legal career. However, there are no 
studies which focus specifically on the subject matter 
treated in this work.
Organization
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden make two observations 
that influenced the organization of this study. First, they 
note that
rhetoric, to quote Aristotle, is the "faculty of 
discovering all the possible means of persuasion in 
any subject." In other words, rhetoric is an 
instrument by which a speaker can, through the apt 
use of certain "lines of argument," make an adjust­
ment to a situation composed of himself, his audi­
ence, his subject, and the occasion. The impact of 
these four forces in a social setting gives rise to 
a certain effect or outcome, the understanding of 
which concerns the critic. Consequently, to know 
and to evaluate the outcome of a speech necessitates 
knowing as much as can be determined about each of 
the constituents of the speech situation. So 
canons of oratorical criticism cannot properly be 
divorced from considerations relating to speaker, 
audience, subject, and occasion.
Secondly, these authors maintain that the critic of oratory 
"must delve deeply into the past if he is to understand the 
The critic is reminded of the necessity of
^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7being "sensitively flexible to ideas and trends that con­
tinuously shape and re-shape our patterns of thought and 
culture.
In this connection. Chapter I consists of informa­
tion about the problem, its importance, the method of 
approach, related studies, organization of this study and 
sources of the speeches. Chapter II discusses Marshall's 
background, training, experience, and other factors, 
accounting for the speaker's skill. Chapter III deals with 
socio-political context of the times. Chapters IV and V 
contain rhetorical analyses of five speeches— 1) Address at 
the White House Conference on Civil Rights; 2) Address at 
Indianapolis Housing Conference; 3) "The Constitution and 
Social Change ;" 4) Law Day Address (University of Miami, 
Florida); and 5) "Law and the Quest for Equality." These 
five speeches will be divided into two categories— those 
delivered to general or lay audiences and those delivered to 
audiences largely made up of members of the legal profes­
sion. The speeches will be analyzed in terms of the nature 
of the occasion and audience, organization or structure, the 
premises, and use of logical, emotional, and ethical appeals. 
Chapter VI deals with the style and delivery and the overall 
effectiveness. Chapter VII attempts to synthesize and draw 
conclusions based on the previous analyses.
14,Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 17.
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Some of the speeches studies are printed in the 
Congressional Record. Others are printed in law review 
journals. Several speeches were supplied by the Department 
of Justice. When two or more written accounts of the same 
speech appear in several reliable sources in their entirety, 
each text is almost identical. It should be noted that any 
difference between the texts rests largely in the format 
but not in the basic content.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II
MARSHALL'S BACKGROUND AND OTHER INFLUENCES
In order to analyze speeches, the critic must examine 
factors in the speaker's life which contributed to his 
development as a speaker. With this in mind, the writer 
focuses on pertinent facts about Marshall's background and 
experiences which reflect on his speechmaking, specifically 
considering Marshall's family background, education, speech 
training, legal career and philosophy, and personal charac­
teristics .
Family Background
Thoroughgood Marshall, the younger son of William 
and Norma Marshall, was born July 2, 1908 in Baltimore, 
Maryland. He was named for his paternal grandfather, "a 
freeman of Maryland"^ and a "rough and tough sailorman. 
However, as a second grader, Marshall shortened his name to 
"Thurgood" because he "got tired of spelling all that.
^Randall W. Bland, Private Pressure on Public Law 
(Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1973),
p. 3.
^"The Tension of Change," Time, September 19, 1955,
p. 24 .
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Marshall's individualism, courageousness, and strong
convictions can probably be traced back to some of his
ancestors, For example, he told an interviewer about his
great-grandfather who as a small boy was brought from the
Congo to Maryland by a big-game hunter:
The fellow made his objections to slavery so widely 
known that the master called him in one day and 
told him: "Look, I brought you here so I guess I
can't shoot you— as you deserve. On the other hand, 
I can't, with a clear conscience, sell anyone as 
vicious as you to another slaveholder. So, I'm 
going to set you free— on one condition. Get the 
hell out of this country and never come back."
Marshall added, "And that . . .  is the only time Massuh
didn't get an argument from the old boy."'^ However, as the
record goes he did not leave the country; he settled down a
couple of miles away, raised his family, lived there until
his death, and nobody ever laid a hand on him.^
Some biographers imply that Marshall probably
inherited his concern for equal justice and human dignity.
For example, Isaac 0. B. [Olive Branch] Williams, his
maternal grandfather, spoke out "fearlessly against police
brutality involving a Negro at a civic mass meeting held in
Baltimore in the 1970's.
'Tush-Tush' Job,” New York Times Magazine, August 22, 1965,
p. 68.
Jamye Coleman williams, "A Rhetorical Analysis of 
Thurgood Marshall's Arguments Before the Supreme Court in 
the Public School Segregation Controversy" (PhD dissertation, 
Ohio State University, 1955), p. 73.
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According to family legend, Williams was a sailor 
who returned from his seafaring adventures with money. He 
opened up a grocery store in Baltimore and "bought a house 
next to a white man who turned surley and mean" but who 
changed his attitude one day when a mutual fence needed 
repair and suggested that he and Williams accomplish the 
task together: "After all," said the white man, "we belong
to the same church and are going to the same heaven." 
However, remembering the slight he had received, Williams 
turned down the olive branch. "I'd rather go to hell," he 
snapped.  ^ Also, Marshall's grandmother, on his father's 
side, is remembered for strong determination and uncompro­
mising defense of her rights that she demonstrated when the 
utility company wanted to place a light pole in her front 
yard: "She just took her chair out to the spot and parked
herself there, day after day, until they gave up and put 
it someplace else."®
Other forces that influenced Marshall can probably 
be attributed to his home and his immediate family. One 
source notes "The Marshalls lived a happy, comfortable life. 
Compared to the lives of Negroes in neighborhoods south and
Lewis H. Fenderson, Thurgood Marshall Fighter for 
Justice (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969),
D. 23.
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east of them, it was very comfortable indeed."^ His parents 
have been described as "intelligent and strongly anti- 
segregationist"^® and they encouraged him to get the best 
education possible.
His mother, a school teacher, closely supervised his 
academic endeavors. From her he probably learned restraint 
and moderation. It has been observed that "as a teacher, 
she was among the aristocrats of Negro Baltimore and her 
feelings about white-Negro relationships were balanced and 
moderated by her sense of service and leadership among her 
own people.
His father, a dining car worker and later chief 
steward of a Baltimore country club, apparently taught him 
to defend his beliefs verbally and physically. For 
example, his father has been described as a man with the 
"tendency to disputation." Further, Marshall's father "had 
great faith in facts and devoted much of his free time to 
assembling data which he used to challenge the logic of 
even the most commonly accepted concepts. Nothing was taken 
for g r a n t e d . S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  Marshall "enjoyed arguing 
with his father, who had a habit of challenging the most
New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1958), p. 316.
^®Zion, p. 68.
^^"The Tension of Change," p. 26.
^^Bland, p. 4.
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innocent-sounding statements and forcing him to think 
through many things he would otherwise have taken for 
g r a n t e d . O n  the other hand, the senior Marshall told him 
to fight when confronted by racial slurs. For example, he 
said; "If anyone calls you a nigger, you not only got my
permission to fight him— you got my order to fight.
During an interview, Marshall pondered how his 
father had influenced his choice of law as a profession:
"He never told me to become a lawyer, but he turned me 
into one. He did it by teaching me to argue, by challeng­
ing my logic on every point, by making me prove every 
statement I made."^^ One biographer reports, "There was 
nothing he [William Marshall] liked better than to attend 
a trial in a courtroom when he had an afternoon off and he 
seldom missed reading about law cases in the papers.
Further, it appears that William Marshall "wished that one 
of his sons could be a lawyer; sometimes he told Thurgood 
that . . .  he would make a good advocate.
The aforementioned facts probably represent dominant
forces which influenced, directly or indirectly, the 
development of Marshall's dedication to the principles of 
equality and justice and his speaking ability.
^^Fenderson, p. 25.
^^"The Tension of Change," p. 24.
News and World Report, June 26, 1967, p. 12.
^^Fenderson, p. 25. ^^Fenderson, p. 27.
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Education and Speech Training
Marshall attended elementary and high schools of 
Baltimore. His grades were not impressive although "he was 
endowed with more than a normal supply of intellectual 
c u r i o s i t y . O n  numerous occasions he was punished for 
misconduct. The principal repeatedly required him to spend 
long hours in the basement of the school studying the Con­
stitution. Marshall recalls in one interview that by 
graduation he had memorized the entire document. Possibly, 
this experience eventually blossomed into his dynamic 
career as a constitutional lawyer.
In 1926, Marshall entered Lincoln University, in 
Pennsylvania, which has been described as one of the half 
dozen really choice colleges for Negroes; a good school, 
more strict for learning than most; and staffed almost 
exclusively with Princeton men.^^ At Lincoln, he studied 
pre-dentistry but found it b o r i n g . D u r i n g  his sophomore 
year, Marshall began to relish "the thrill of learning 
under competent instructors and— as a member of the 
Forensic Society— the challenge of debate.
Marshall appears to have been developing a direct- 
tion and commitment characteristic of other Lincoln
^^Redding, p. 316. l^Ibid. 
^"^Fenderson, pp. 32-33.
^^Redding, p. 317.
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students. Describing Lincoln men of this period, one writer 
observes that "beneath the selfish ambitions projected in 
their boastful dreams blazed a furious zeal for the concept 
of racial equality, burned a bitter hatred of injustice, 
smoldered a lava flow of race consciousness that alternately 
anguished and exalted t h e m . O f  the experiences that 
affected his speaking were Marshall's activities as a 
debater.
As a member of the debate team, Marshall dedicated 
many hours of the day "preparing his speeches— looking up 
facts with which to overwhelm the opposition." Obviously, 
Marshall was proud of his endeavors. In a letter to his 
father, he wrote, "If I were taking debate for credit, I 
would be the biggest honor student they ever had around 
here." His oratorical efforts were commended by his father 
with great pride. In Baltimore, William Marshall assured 
the other members of the family; "He's learning just as 
much, if not more, by having to prepare all those speeches 
than he'd ever learn just to pass an exam. You know 
Thurgood— he is thorough. And good, come to think of it. 
I'll bet he's darn good. ^
In keeping with his father's prediction, Marshall 
distinguished himself as a speaker during formal debates
22Ibid.
^^Fenderson, p. 33.
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as well as in informal speech situations. For example, it 
is a matter of record that in formal debate he was a for­
midable opponent. On less formal occasions, he exhibited 
effectiveness as a persuasive speaker:
One night . . . there was a football rally in 
the auditorium. Lincoln had lost every game but 
one since the season opened, and had hoped that a 
little school spirit might change the team's luck. 
Thurgood jumped up on the stage and delivered a 
twenty-minute speech which brought the house down 
with cheers, shouts, and piercing whistles. Later, 
he claimed total credit for the tie game played by 
Lincoln that weekend.
Later, during the semester, Marshall attacked 
inequality and injustice by direct confrontation. For 
example, he and five other Lincoln University students suc­
cessfully desegregated the local motion picture theatre when 
they proceeded to sit in the section for whites and ignored 
requests to take seats for Negroes in the balcony. Follow­
ing this incident, Marshall wrote his father: "The amazing
thing was, when we were leaving we just walked out with all 
those other people and they didn't even look at us— at 
least as far as I know. I'm not sure I like being invisible, 
but maybe it's better than being put to shame and not able 
to respect yourself.
At Lincoln, Marshall developed race consciousness 
combined with a love for reading. For example, many lengthy 
"bull sessions" focused on the successes of prominent Negroes
24,
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like Paul Roberson and the literary acclaim received by 
Negro poets and writers of the late twenties. Also Marshall 
engaged in an intensive program, reading "all the books by 
or about Negroes he could lay his hands on. Sociology, 
history, fiction, and poetry were pouring from the press in 
unbelievable quantity. He read Julia Peterkin and Carl Van 
Vechten and was skeptical. He read Jerome Dowd's The 
American Negro and felt changed. He read Carter Woodson's 
The Negro in American History and was uplifted. He read Du
Bois."26
According to most reports, his marriage to Vivian 
Burney during his junior year at Lincoln "became a stabiliz­
ing influence on his activities [and] inspired in him an 
academic zeal."2^ Evidence supports the fact that as a 
senior his academic achievement was excellent, and he 
became a superior debater in the Forensic Society. Perhaps, 
these facts account for his discarding the idea of a 
career in dentistry and deciding to pursue law studies.
Graduating cum laude with a bachelor of arts degree 
in the humanities, Marshall submitted application to the 
"all white" University of Maryland Law School. When his 
application was rejected, he enrolled in the law school at 
Howard University in Washington, D.C., a law school
26Redding, p. 318. 27g2and, p. 5.
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"thoroughly dedicated to the enlargement of the Negro's 
civil rights.
At Howard University, he was tutored by many 
scholars and renowned professors. To understand the nature 
of Marshall's law instruction, we must also appraise the 
philosophy of an administration by Negroes who were begin­
ning to assume direction of higher education for Negroes.
The record reveals the following:
Howard University was experiencing a regenera­
tion. Its first Negro president, Mordecai Johnson, 
had set out willfully to destroy the reputation 
for social glamor that, while it brought the 
university a kind of prestige, had sapped its 
intellectual and spiritual vitality for half a 
century. A man of vision, and tremendous drive.
Dr. Johnson was one of those Negroes who believed 
that the ferment of the times, the shifting patterns 
of thought and behavior, the skeptical inquiry and 
rebellion of the middle class intellectual against 
the old dogmas, loosening of conventions, the to- 
hell-with-it disillusionment of the masses— in 
short, the change, the doubt, the fear and chaos 
that characterized the great depression— presented 
an opportunity for the social reparation of the 
Negro, if only the Negro would seize it. Johnson 
believed that the business of education was to 
incite beneficial change and to help solve the 
problems that change brings. An institution of 
learning, while it protected the good and valuable 
in older traditions, must at the same time encourage 
that "higher individualism" that constantly makes 
for new and greater v a l u e s . 29
Equally important were the teachers responsible for 
Marshall's training as a law student. Dr. Mordicai Johnson 
selected for Howard University's faculty persons of similar 
convictions and of "undeniable intellectual stature." For
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example, Alain Locke, "the spiritual father of the Negro 
renaissance," taught philosophy; Franklin Frazier was in 
sociology; E. E. Just taught the natural sciences; Rayford 
Logan taught history; Ralph Bunche was in government and 
politics; and in the law school were Charles Houston,
William Hastie, and James Nabrit.^*^
As a law student, Marshall came under the influence 
of Professor William Hastie, graduate of Harvard Law School 
and former editor of the Harvard Review, who "devoted his 
efforts to students with the most potential." R. L . Bland 
reports, "In 1930 his most promising student was Thurgood 
Marshall." Later, Marshall and his former teacher served as 
legal defense counsels for the NAACP. It should be noted 
also that Hastie became the first Negro governor of the 
Virgin Islands; in 1937 he became the first Negro appointed 
to a Federal Court of Appeals in Philadelphia.^^
Perhaps the most important influence on Marshall's 
legal training was Dean Charles Hamilton Houston, practic­
ing attorney for six years and Howard law professor for 
fifteen years, who has been described as follows:
A brilliant lawyer who had been a Phi Beta Kappa 
at Amherst had obtained his law degree from 
Harvard. . . .  A dedicated worker and activist in 
the newly mobilized civil-rights movement, the dean 
was also a member of the NAACP. Houston felt that 
Negro lawyers should be social engineers, and he 
attempted to make Howard the production center for 
the new breed of Negro lawyer.
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Substaiitial evidence supports the fact that Dean Houston 
was Marshall's mentor in law school. Houston "taught his 
protégé the strategy of using existing laws to defeat racial 
discrimination" and he encouraged Marshall "to know the law 
thoroughly." Marshall recalled in an interview: "I heard
law books were to dig in; so I dug, very deep."^^
An important influence upon Marshall's speaking 
should be mentioned. At Howard, he had the opportunity to 
continue speechmaking in the Moot Court held in the Howard 
Law Library. Since Hastie, Nabrit, and Houston frequently 
represented the NAACP in civil rights cases, "Howard Law 
[School] had become a kind of legal laboratory, where offi­
cials of the NAACP met with faculty and some of the 
brighter students" to determine courtroom strategies against 
racial inequalities.^^ Also, Marshall frequently observed 
distinguished lawyers presenting cases to the Supreme 
Court. It has been reported that "John W. Davis . . . one 
of the most brilliant lawyers of his time" became 
"Marshall's hero" while he was studying law at Howard. 
Additionally, it is said that Marshall "skipped classes to 
go to the Supreme Court whenever Davis was arguing a 
c a s e . M a r s h a l l ' s  active participation, dedication, and 
diligence in Moot Court earned respect from his instructors
^^Redding, p. 320.
(1966), CXII, No. 32, A985-A986.
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and fellow students. At the same time, he was being
observed by leaders of the NAACP. For example, Walter White,
then chief executive of the NAACP, recalled Marshall's
vibrancy, confidence, and sagacity during these sessions:
A lanky, brash young senior law student who was 
always present. I used to wonder at his presence 
and sometimes was amazed at his assertiveness in 
challenging positions [taken] by Charlie [Houston] 
and the other lawyers. But I soon learned of his 
great value to the case in doing everything he was 
asked, from research on obscure legal opinions to 
foraging for coffee and s a n d w i c h e s . 35
Marshall's formal legal training at Howard terminated 
when he graduated in 1933 as valedictorian. Perhaps of 
greater importance in the making of the Marshall the advo­
cate is the fact that his close relationship with Houston 
continued long after graduation.
Legal Career and Ideology
Following his graduation from Howard, Marshall's
commitment to the campaign for human rights and equal
justice crystalized as he began private practice in
Baltimore. Economic depression made clients and fees
scarce. But Marshall appeared to be a dedicated lawyer with
a mission. Saunders Redding writes:
His clients were poor in everything except frus­
trated rage at the injustices of dispossessions, 
evictions, police brutality, and excessive 
penalties for offenses. Marshall, who had "learned
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what rights were," threw himself into these cases 
with a zeal that the prospect of large fees could 
not possibly have stimulated. He took many of 
them without the slightest expectation of fees. He 
became known in Baltimore and the surrounding 
county as the "little man's lawyer." He became 
known as a crusader in the war for human rights.
Of seemingly importance to Marshall's development as 
a speaker were his experiences assisting Charles Houston 
who had become special counsel of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). This posi­
tion required that Marshall devote "all of his time and 
intelligence to the kind of legal work he loved" and enabled 
him to join "an organized, cooperative effort to attain 
ends which, he felt, must no longer be compromised." Houston 
admitted to Marshall that this job "would also mean 
exhausted patience, discouragement, privation, and even 
physical danger." Disregarding this fact and that he would 
receive only a meager salary, "Marshall accepted with 
a l a c r i t y . A s  the record goes, Marshall "worked eighteen 
to twenty hours a day" and "traveled fifty thousand miles 
a year.
As an NAACP attorney and later Director-Counsel 
[in the 1930s, it was probably the most demanding legal 
post in the c o u n t r y ] , M a r s h a l l  spoke frequently to NAACP 
members and other groups interested in alleviating racial
^^Redding, p. 328. ^^Redding, p. 321.
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discrimination and injustice. However, it seems that his 
acclaimed and most effective speaking took place in the 
courts of many states where he defended successfully most 
cases involving black Americans and other minorities or poor 
people whose constitutional rights had been threatened or 
denied. "In one Southern court after another, local, state, 
and federal— thirteen times in five years— he argued that 
'injury results to the human personality subjecting or sub­
jected to' civil inequalities."^®
It appears appropriate to discuss some instances of 
Marshall's "matchless years of experience in civil law" and 
proficiency in the courts which probably confirmed his 
belief that the equalitarian concepts embodied in the 
Declaration of Independence and that the constitutional pro­
hibition of distinctions based on race and color must 
become a reality.
Marshall's legal career afforded many opportunities 
to attack inequalities and discrimination in many areas, 
particularly in educational opportunities. Historians note 
that "the very first brief prepared by Marshall in his new 
job was in a suit brought against the University of Missouri 
to admit a Negro to the law school." In this particular 
case, Lloyd Gaines applied for but was denied admission to 
the university "on the grounds that a state provision to 
finance the graduate and professional training of Negroes
^®Redding, p. 328. ^^Redding, p. 327.
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in schools outside of the state constituted equality."
Since lower courts had upheld the state's position that to 
admit a Negro to the University of Missouri was "contrary 
to the constitution, laws and public policy of the State, 
the case was taken to the Supreme Court. About the argument 
and the decision. Redding comments :
Marshall based his argument squarely on that 
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment which forbids 
the state to deny any person under its jurisdiction 
equal protection of the laws. The United States 
Supreme Court was asked to decide on the appli­
cability of this clause to the case at hand. On 
December 12, 1938, it ruled six to two that 
"equality of education must be provided within the 
borders of the state." It was a broad decision 
that not only reaffirmed an earlier opinion that 
"separation (of the races) is legal only when it 
provides equality between the races," but opened the 
way for legal action to compel the equalization of 
school funds, teachers' salaries, and school 
facilities of all k i n d s . ^3
As the NAACP's defense counsel, Marshall partici­
pated in more than fifty cases arguing twenty-nine of the 
thirty-two cases before the Supreme Court and winning all 
but three and culminating in the landmark decision of 1954—  
Brown V. Topeka Board of Education. Regarding the outcome 
of this last case, it has been said: "On Monday, May 17,
1954, the Supreme Court handed down its epochal decision.
'We cannot turn back the clock to 1868 . . . when the 
(Fourteenth) Amendment was adopted or even to 1896, when 
Plessy V. Ferguson was written. . . .  We conclude that in
43Redding, pp. 322-323.
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the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but 
equal' has no place.' Further, it has been remarked 
that Marshall set a unique record in the historic Brown 
case since he opposed for the first time the late John Davis, 
the undisputed Dean of Constitutional law and won. ^
Marshall's many victories against injustice have 
been acknowledged by numerous sources. For example, one 
source enumerates other areas :
Thurgood Marshall stood with Authurine Lucy at 
the closed doors of the University of Alabama to 
give her the legal support enabling her to enter 
it. He attacked the fortress of Central High 
School in Arkansas with the Little Rock Nine, those 
nine brave Negro children who became the first 
blacks to enter that high school. He charged 
through the South before the triumphs of the late 
Martin Luther King, arguing, convincing, crusading 
for first-class citizenship for black Americans, 
shooting down with his fiery legal ammunition the 
"colored" signs in public washrooms, classrooms, 
restaurants, buses and trolley cars. He demanded 
and got an end to segregation in jails, on juries 
and in other long sacred forts of lily­
whiteness .46
It should be added that these victories can be largely 
accredited to legal prowess but equally important is the 
fact that Marshall and his staff exhibited unusual percep­
tion. For example, Loren Miller writes :
Before the Mayflower: A
History of the Negro in America~1619 - 1964 (Baltimore, 
Maryland: Penguin Books, 1966), pp. 311-312.
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Judicial interpretations change as the social 
climate changes. Vast changes, far beyond the 
ability of any man to foresee in 1930, were to 
sweep over the United States, and the world, in the 
area of race relations, in the . . . decades after 
1930. Old ideas perished, and new and revolutionary 
concepts replaced them. An appreciable part of the 
genius of the NAACP lawyers lay in their ability to 
take them at their flood and translate them into 
constitutional concepts palatable to Supreme Court 
justices, who were . . . propelled in new direc­
tions by social change and architects of that 
change. NAACP lawyers could not have won the con­
stitutional victories that lay ahead of them without 
their technical and legal skills, even in the con­
text of the changing climate of the times. But with 
the greatest of skill and preparation, they could 
not have prevailed in an unchanged climate or in a 
closed society.47
Similarly, Jamye Williams comments on strategy in the Brown
Marshall and his colleagues recognized that on 
their side, in addition to the law, was the neces­
sity of preserving in the eyes of the world the 
prestige of the United States as a democracy. They 
were also aware that world conditions— the striving 
for freedom of colored peoples all over the world—  
were a mitigating factor. Not to be overlooked were 
the social and economic changes in the structure of 
American society— "the felt necessities of the 
time."48
Another observation seems to summarize Marshall's accom­
plishments during this period in his career: "Thurgood
Marshall's contributions to the amelioration of the Negroes' 
lot, and, through them, to the causes of civil rights, in
Loren Miller, The Petitioners: The Story of the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Negro (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1966), p. 261.
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general, have been unquestionably significant. Both as a 
symbol and as a legal tactician, his work is crucial, 
particularly in the 1940's and the 1950's. Especially his 
strategy in the Brown case, and its antecedent events, 
looms giant.
Concerning his stature during the sixties, it has 
been noted that Thurgood Marshall was the symbol of hope 
of this age. He was also the bulldozer of the Negro 
revolution of the sixties. By influencing almost single- 
handedly crucial parts of the constitutional law of the 
land, Marshall cleared away the legal rubble and placed 
Negroes within striking distance of their goals.
Perhaps, the following represents an enlightening 
comment on his legal victories as an NAACP lawyer and their 
impact on society:
The opinions in these cases define the consti­
tutional rights of the Negro as a citizen. In 
addition, they broaden the interpretation of 
constitutional rights for all citizens and extend 
civil liberties for whites as well as Negroes.
The activity of the lawyers acting for the 
NAACP has added to the body of law on civil rights 
for all Americans. The association by pressing 
these cases, has brought nearer to realization the 
ideal embodied in the quotation engraved over the 
Supreme Court in Washington, D.C.: "Equal Justice
Under Law."
While it may be true that laws and constitu­
tions do not act to right wrong and overturn estab­
lished folkways overnight, it is also true that the 
reaffirmation of these principles of democracy 
build a body of public opinion in which rights and
^Bland, p. 116.
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privileges of citizenship may be enjoyed, and in 
which the more brazen as well as the more sophis­
ticated attempts at deprivation may be halted.50
In 1961 Marshall left his position with the NAACP.
He was appointed by President John F. Kennedy to a 
Federal Judgeship to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Commenting on Marshall's career, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 
remarked that "Marshall had been the leading figure in the 
legal strategy of civil rights; and his elevation to the 
federal judiciary therefore implied a recognition of the 
merits of his cause as well as of his own qualities."51 As 
a federal judge, Marshall received his share of criticism.
In response, his supporters replied that Marshall was 
studying matters between tax law and admiralty law in order 
to prepare himself thoroughly for his appointment to the 
Office of Solicitor General of the United States. Regarding 
his judgeship, one comment is worthy of mention; "One 
wishes to be fair. Freshman judges are not assigned to 
milestone cases. The most luminous judicial mind would be 
hard put to shine in most of the cases that were assigned to 
Marshall for opinions. The best that can be said is that 
Marshall dutifully did his work." Further and perhaps sig­
nificantly, the record shows that "in four years none of 
Marshall's ninety-eight opinions for the majority was
^^Thurgood Marshall, "Equal Justice Under Law,"
The Crisis, 40:201, July 1, 1939.
^^Bland, p. 119.
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In
fact/ "some became law.
After four years as a federal judge, Marshall was 
nominated Solicitor General of the United States. In this 
position he was the government's chief lav;yer before the 
Supreme Court: he determined the cases to be taken before
the Supreme Court; and he was the third-ranking official in 
the Department of Justice. As Solicitor General, "He was 
. . . largely responsible for making policy, deciding what 
particular arguments to make, what to give up to the 
opposition and sometimes even to decide when the government 
came out second best. Also, the Supreme Court relied 
'heavily' upon Marshall for accurate explanation of legal 
problems.
The following comment summarizes Marshall's perfor­
mance as Solicitor General: "Between 1965 and 1967
Marshall argued nineteen cases for the government before the 
Supreme Court of the United States and was victorious in all 
but five. As Solicitor, the areas of constitutional law 
with which Marshall was chiefly concerned were those of 
civil rights and the use of listening devices on the part of 
federal law enforcement o f f i c e r s . S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  Marshall
^^Bland, p. 129.
^^Zion, p. 69.
^^Fenderson, p. 116. ^^Bland, p. 133.
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prepared briefs and argued cases dealing with Negroes'
rights to participate completely in the electoral process.
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965; but in 1966
South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the Voting Rights Act. The Solicitor
General headed the team writing the brief for South
Carolina v. Katzenbach. Regarding his endeavors in this
case, it has been reported:
Pleading that the bill of complaint be dismissed, 
Marshall in written argument contended that the 
1965 Act was a proper application of the Fifteenth 
Amendment. He noted that Congress is not confined 
by its express powers merely to allow the courts 
the authority to strike down state laws in viola­
tion of the Amendment, but that it may take positive 
action as well. This . . .  is "a necessary 
corollary" of the regulatory function of legisla­
tion. The Solicitor General pointed out that 
neither Article I, Section 2, of the original Con­
stitution nor the Seventeenth Amendment confers on 
the state the absolute authority to grant or 
withhold the franchise on any conditions it wished.
As far as doing so on the basis of race or color, 
Marshall concluded that the Constitution expressly 
forbids such action. [Following oral argument by 
the Attorney General of the United States, the 
Supreme Court dismissed the bill of complaint.]^®
Marshall presented oral argument in another case
involving voters' rights. This case— Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections— dealt with "state imposition of poll
taxes in local elections." According to reliable sources,
Marshall asserted that "the poll-tax requirement was a denial
of the 'equal protection of the laws' of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Further, it has been said:
°Bland, p. 139.
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Marshall reasoned that those portions of the Con­
stitution referring to "the Qualifications 
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch 
of the State Legislature" do not confer on the 
states the unbridled license to exclude any citizen 
from the electoral process that it may choose at 
any given time. In conclusion, the Solicitor 
General pointed out that both Sections 1 and 5 
invest some authority in Congress to regulate state 
voting qualifications and thereby prove that state 
prerogatives in these motives may be subjected to 
justifiable restrictions.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court responded to Marshall's argu­
ment favorably. It decided that the Virginia requirement 
represented "a violation of the equal-protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment."57
Marshall successfully argued not only civil rights 
cases but also cases involving labor-management relations, 
internal revenue violations, corporate structures, etc.^® It 
appears that Marshall's performance impressed President 
Johnson. Nominating Marshall Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in 1967, Johnson remarked: 
"He is the best qualified by training and by valuable 
service to the country."59
The record shows that reaction to Marshall's nomina­
tion to the Supreme Court was "overwhelming and, for the 
most part, favorable. Legal scholars and associates 
praised his ability. For example. Page Keeton, Dean of
^^Editorial, "Supreme Court Justice Thurgood 
Marshall," Negro History Bulletin, October, 1967, p. 4.
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University of Oklahoma Law School, said: "Thurgood Marshall
was an outstanding trial attorney and was well qualified for 
the position." G. Theodore Mitau, Chancellor of the 
Minnesota State College System, said: "I would say he was
uniquely qualified for the a p p o i n t m e n t . H i s  appointment 
was "hailed" by NAACP Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins, 
Marshall's longtime associate in the fight for equality and 
justice, as "a highly significant and well-merited appoint­
ment." Wilkins continued:
The appointment . . .  is a tribute to Mr. 
Marshall's brilliant performance as the nation's 
foremost civil-rights lawyer. It is also an indi­
cation that leadership in the fight for freedom is 
no bar to high public office.
The veteran civil rights attorney . . . carries 
to his new position extraordinary experience in the 
federal courts, a wealth of knowledge of federal 
procedures, and a breadth of understanding rare 
even among the country's most outstanding and suc­
cessful lawyers. This understanding will help to 
make him a good judge for all Americans of whatever 
race or station.
He carries, also, the good wishes of his 
legion of friends and admirers, including 20,000,000 
Negro Americans whose aspirations for first class 
citizenship he voiced so eloquently in his plead­
ings and victories at the bar.
Those of us who have been privileged to work 
with him for more than two decades in the struggle 
for human rights and dignity will miss his dedica­
tion, his wise counsel, and his unflagging devotion 
and courage. Our loss is the nation's gain in 
which all of us have a s h a r e . 62
°-^Bland, p. 152.
"Marshall Nomination Hailed by Wilkins," The 
Crisis, 62:559, November, 1961.
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Finally, another of Marshall's associates wrote :
Marshall, in the large, is as well trained and 
qualified for the Court as have been most appoint­
ments to that body. . . . Marshall had long and 
successful experience in the handling of cases 
before the Court itself and in constitutional law 
generally. This put him above the rank and file of 
most appointments. His qualifications, in turn, 
might be rated below those of the great legal 
scholars and learned judges who have in the past on 
occasion been appointed— say Holmes, or Frankfurter. 
Don't forget, though, that [John] Marshall, Taney, 
Jackson, and Brandeis were all political lawyers 
with no prior former judicial experience. And they 
turned out to be among the greatest.63
Personality and Physical Traits
Authorities in the field of rhetorical criticism
remind us that
the speaker's voice, diction, gestures and other 
visual and auditory elements are highly revealing. 
The audience sizes up the speaker's total impression 
as tactful, sincere, friendly, pleasant, honest, or 
. . .  as pugnacious, indifferent, ignorant, 
insincere. These traits describe not only the 
speaker's character as he impresses his listeners 
and observers, but in the long run, the genuineness 
of the man or w o m a n . 64
In person, Thurgood Marshall is a man of striking 
appearance, physically large ("6 ft. 2 in., 210 lbs.") 
Photographs taken in the sixties reveal Marshall as tall, 
handsome and well-groomed. National Review notes, "He is an
63b
^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 452.
•^Bland, p. 153. 
64„
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«66affable, out-going, and highly attractive human being.
On the other hand. Time Magazine in 1955 reports that "his 
tense personality reflects the tensions on his job and his 
time and his nation. And, somehow, also, his personality 
reflects the symmetry of the Constitution he serves and 
e x p o u n d s . E v e n  as a student, Marshall has been des­
cribed as follows;
Once he began to discover himself, a fundamental 
integrity fixed the abiding elements of his charac­
ter in a pattern which, though still incomplete, 
could scarcely be mistaken. . . .  He was not only 
honest but frank to the point of insult. He had a 
natural affinity for the underdog, for arguing the 
unpopular side ("just to exercise his brains"), and 
for fighting against the odds. He would one day 
be satisfied with nothing less than complete dedi­
cation. Without willing it or intending it, he 
would one day find composed within himself a pride 
and passion of race and a shame and hatred of 
racial inequality that marked him a "new Negro.
One psychologist friend characterizes Marshall as "a deli­
cate balance of turmoils.
Other aspects of Marshall's appearance and person­
ality seem significant. His distinguished and commanding 
presence often impressed his contemporaries. For example, 
Eric Sevaried, who heard Marshall on numerous occasions.
James J. Kilpatrick, "The Term's End," National 
Review, July 25, 1967, p. 804.
^^"The Tension of Change," p. 24.
68^Redding, p. 318.
69..The Tension of Change," p. 24.
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commented : "What stayed with me, what was to be impressive
. . .  in his every expression and gesture, one was made 
conscious of the presence of an American, period.
Early in his legal career, Marshall began "to take 
on with certitude and passion his race's role as the 
catalyst in the slow-working moral chemistry of America.
For example, it has been reported :
Thurgood Marshall's feeling of love and awe 
for the Constitution is exceeded only by his 
love and awe toward his clients, the Negroes, and 
especially Negroes of the South and the border 
states, who, facing threats of firing or beating or 
even death, continue to sign the legal petitions 
and complaints that must be the starting point of 
Marshall's cases from the slum and the cotton field 
to the high and technical levels of the Supreme 
Court.
Of these local NAACP lawyers in the South, 
Marshall says: "There isn't a threat known to men
that they do not receive. They're never out from 
under pressure. I don't think I could take it for 
a week. The possibility of violent death for them 
and their families is something they've learned to 
live with like a man learns to sleep with a sore 
arm."72
Speaking to persons attending the 1948 Annual NAACP Confer­
ence in Kansas City, Missouri, June 23, 1948, Marshall seems 
to project similar confidence and zeal. At one point during
U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall 
to Be Solicitor General of the United States, Hearing, 8 9th 
Congress, 1st Sess., July 29, 1965 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1965), p. 9.
^^Redding, p. 321.
"The Tension of Change," p. 23.
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the speech Marshall said: "But we believe that we people
in the United States have the tools to make democracy work. 
We have our votes. We have the various arms of govern­
ment. . . . Behind all of these, we have the Constitution 
of the United States to serve as a democratic frame of 
reference for the efforts of all of us. . . . Finally, 
Marshall asserted: "We can discharge this obligation only
by dedicating our daily actions at home, in the shop, in 
the office, in our churches, in our schools, and in our 
social life to the fundamental American democratic princi­
ples of removing every semblance of racial and religious 
distinctions from every aspect of American life.
Making other occasional speeches, Marshall seems to 
be remembered as a man familiar with inequality and 
injustice who believed "that the equalitarian concepts 
embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the consti­
tutional proscription of distinctions based on race and 
color should be made to apply. For example, addressing
the Forty-fifth Annual Convention of the NAACP in Dallas, 
Texas, on June 30, 1954, Marshall discussed the Supreme
Thurgood Marshall, "Restrictive Covenants and the 
Segregation Picture” (Address before the thirty-ninth 
annual conference of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, Kansas City, Missouri,
June 23, 1948), p. 11. (Mimeographed.)
^'^Marshall, "Restrictive Covenants and the Segre­
gation Picture," p. 13.
^^Redding, p. 327.
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Court decision of May 17 that found school segregation laws 
in Kansas, Delaware, Virginia, and South Carolina unconsti­
tutional . He added :
Compulsory racial segregation is not only immoral 
and illegal, it is now un-American. What does this 
mean? It means that if the law of the land is 
followed in good faith, every American can now move 
about in his community without the threat of being 
penalized by racial segregation statutes. It means 
good Americans can decide for themselves whether they 
want to or do not want to associate with other 
Americans. It merely means that we are getting back 
to the bedrock of democracy, the necessity for pre­
serving and protecting the equality of man— the 
equality of the i n d i v i d u a l .7b
In keeping with some social utility principles and conveying
his firmest convictions, Marshall continued:
The effect of this decision [Brown] in world 
politics today has been tremendous andbeyond the 
expectation of anyone. Every nation except Russia 
and her satellites has commented most favorably upon 
these decisions. The decisions have been heralded 
as a new hope for democracy and have been generally 
accepted as such. But these same countries are 
watching most carefully to see what implementation 
will come from local school boards in the several 
southern states now that the law has been made 
clear to them. The movement toward implementation 
of the law of the land reveals many bright spots 
and many dark ones. I, for one, do not intend to 
waste my time or the NAACP ' s time in debating back 
and forth statements made by some politicians of the 
South who have repeatedly demonstrated that solely 
for political ambitions they not only put themselves 
above the law of the land, but are willing to wreck 
the land, if necessary, in order to get re-elected.
We have too much work to do to spend our time on 
people who have no faith in the American tradition.
^^Thurgood Marshall, "Address by Thurgood Marshall, 
NAACP Special Counsel" (Address before the forty-fifth 
annual convention of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, Dallas, Texas, June 30,
1954), p. 2.
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or who interpret that tradition selfishly in the 
narrow terms of their own convenience and personal 
or provincial racial bigotry. Nor do I believe we 
should waste too much time on the few Negroes in 
the country who might have been so indoctrinated by 
these politicians or by their long oppression, as 
to actually believe that they are better off as 
second-class citizens than as 100 percent Americans. 
Rather, I think we should spend our time on working 
with men of goodwill who have faith in our govern­
ment, faith in our democracy and are willing to 
work out their salvation within the framework of the 
law of the land. Fortunately for our nation, this 
latter group constitutes the vast majority that has 
enabled us to survive every national crisis of
d a t e . 7 7
Marshall's experiences in the courtroom as well as 
other public speaking probably equipped him to use appro­
priate bodily action to reinforce his ideas. For example, 
on numerous occasions during the fifties and sixties, he 
spoke to college students, teachers' organizations, and 
other groups throughout the country. Frequently, people 
addressed in Louisiana remark that he maintained good eye 
contact, varied his pitch, rate, volume, and quality appro­
priately, and used a variety of gestures and movements to 
emphasize his ideas.
Having dedicated most of his life to the practice 
and administration of justice and to acquiring a thorough 
knowledge of the Constitution, it is not surprising that 
Marshall was selected to attend the 1961 Kenya Constitutional 
Convention in London, England. Following this experience, 
Marshall remarked that he was "going to understand our
77Ibid.
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problems in the USA . . . better than before." Similar 
experiences confirm confidence of the nation's highest offi­
cials in Marshall's dedication to democratic principles and 
his competence as a communicator. For example, he was 
President John Kennedy's personal representative at the 
independence ceremonies in Sierra Leone in Africa, and he 
was head of the United States delegation to the Third United 
Nations Congress in S t o c k h o l m . L a t e r ,  having earned the 
President's respect. President Kennedy nominated him for 
appointment to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. During 
the hearings Senator Kenneth Keaton of New York declared 
high esteem for Marshall: "Rarely does a man, regardless of
race, earn the kind of professional and personal respect 
that has come to Thurgood Marshall. He has helped shape 
some of the most important legal advances of the decade in 
the field of civil rights.
Marshall was acclaimed for his forensic speaking as 
Director-Counsel for the NAACP. He argued successfully 
hundreds of cases dealing with civil rights and segregation 
which earned for him the label "Mr. Civil R i g h t s " a n d  "Mr. 
Desegregation."®^ Further, it is generally agreed that "the
Solicitor General of the United States," Negro History 
Bulletin, January, 1966, p. 85.
®^Bland, p. 7.
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name indelibly stamped on this victory [the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in the Brown v. Topeka Board of 
Education case holding segregated schools contrary to the 
Fourteenth Amendment] is Thurgood Marshall."®^ One 
historian adds that "to Negroes of the rank and file he 
represents what folk heroes have represented immemorially: 
the ability to outwit, outscore, and eventually overcome 
forces of entrenched and organized oppression. . . .  He 
has accomplished this without becoming pompous or thinking 
himself too i m p o r t a n t . A l s o ,  for his numerous courtroom 
victories he was extolled "in legal circles as a lawyer's 
lawyer— an ideal person to represent the government and the 
people.
Others observing Marshall in the courtroom suggest 
the intelligibility and the flexibility of his voice. For 
example, it is stated that "in a calm, moving voice, he 
poured out his innermost beliefs regarding segregation." 
Also, his "superb control" seems o b v i o u s . O n  the other 
hand, the following remark is made about Marshall's vocal 
skills in a different setting: "He is at his sincerest and
loudest (and that is very sincere and quite loud) in 
declaring that he is only one of millions, white and Negro,
82„The Tension of Change," p. 23.
York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1961), p. 249.
85.Fenderson, p. 91.
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whose courage^ sweat, skill, imagination, and common sense 
made the victory p o s s i b l e . O t h e r s  have suggested 
Marshall's exceptional vocal skills in the courtroom as well 
as in other speaking situations. For example, National 
Review reports that in the court he was "brilliant" and 
"articulate."87 Eric Sevaried comments that Marshall was 
"impressive and humbling . . .  in everything [he] said.
Time Magazine disclosed that he argued the law in "meticu­
lously scholarly tones" and "he has an equally comfortable 
drawling Negro dialect.
Following a personal interview, John Dorsey wrote an 
article about Marshall which was printed in The Baltimore 
Sun of February 20, 1966. In part, Dorsey provides impor­
tant testimony about Marshall's vocal qualities and his 
ability to adjust voice to audience and situation. For 
example, Marshall's voice as Solicitor General is described 
as follows: "He represents his positions before the
Supreme Court with simple eloquence and in distinguished 
tones that bear no trace of the Negro accent he puts on in 
less formal situations." The interviewer continues: "One
86„
1967, p. 18.
The Tension of Change," p. 23.
^^Bland, p. 117.
^^"The Supreme Court Negro Justice," Time, June 23,
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of Marshall's chief assets in dealing with frightened and 
doubtful plaintiffs in civil rights cases in the Deep South 
was his adjustable Negro accent, which grew more and more 
pronounced the farther south he went. It made others feel 
at home and confident in his presence.
Marshall's vocal variety and the unique nature of 
his personality led one interviewer to make the following 
observation: "He is a big man . . . with a voice that can
be soft or raucous, manners that can be rude or gentle or 
courtly, and an emotional pattern that swings him like a pen­
dulum from serious to absurb. His dignity can slide easily 
into arrogance and his humility into self-abasement, but 
not for long. Humor— his own— brings him back to center. 
Another description confirms his sense of humor but more 
importantly adds other dimensions:
What he was amounted to a yeasty mixture of brash 
assertiveness, a sharp and sportive sense of humor, 
an instinct for people, an amused irreverence for 
the "solemn finer things of life," and mercenary 
ambitiousness. At forty-five he retained his 
sense of humor and his gregariousness, but all else 
changed. At forty-five he had defended in a hundred 
courts of law the finest concepts of human dignity 
and equality of civil rights, had won twelve of 
fourteen cases on issues before the highest court 
in the land, and was everywhere acknowledged to be 
the leading civil rights lawyer of his time.52
U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 32, A985-A986.
^^"The Tension of Change," p. 24.
^^Redding, p. 315.
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One example of Marshall's brashness combined with 
other factors which contributed to his effectiveness as a 
speaker has been included in the account of an incident in 
Austin, Texas. As the record shows, Marshall traveled to 
Dallas, Texas, to investigate a case involving the assault 
of a Negro physician who had attempted to assume jury duty 
in accordance with a summons he had received. After 
gathering the facts pertaining to this case, Marshall went 
to Austin unannounced and secured a conference with Governor 
James Allred. What transpired is significant; "The 
governor at first seemed offended by such brashness, but he 
soon got over it. Marshall neither looked nor sounded like 
an agitator. He talked to the governor with quiet sincer­
ity. His whole, somewhat easygoing manner bespoke the 
belief that a reasonable man will be moved by reason. With­
in the hour Allred 'ordered out the Texas Rangers to defend 
the right of Negroes to jury service.
Marshall's supporters and detractors commend his 
alert, powerful mind and his scholarly traits. Evidence 
supports the fact that Marshall the scholar could be found 
"reading, noting, thinking, remembering— late into the 
night almost every night." Also, Marshall has been des­
cribed as "a sound, conscientious, imaginative legal 
scholar." Many persons remark that "what he decides to do
93'Redding, p. 323.
"The Tension of Change," p. 24.
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about a thousand practical legal questions will interact
powerfully with the decisions and attitudes of other men of
similar and quite different and opposite views.
Marshall's preparation for his appearances in court
was intensive and extensive. For example, one writer
comments on the five years of endeavors and collaboration
preceding the victorious decision in the Brown v. Board of
Education case:
This included not only lower-court hearings attack­
ing inequalities in the salaries of Negro teachers, 
in educational opportunities, in employment, in 
travel accommodations, and in the exercise of the 
ballot— thus establishing precedents and erecting 
a body of confirmable opinion item by item; but it 
also included periodic conclaves the likes of which 
had never before been convened for such purpose.
For days at a time, year after year, social 
scientists, psychologists, historians, legal 
experts, and educators— white and colored, and all 
volunteers— met in New York to wrestle with every 
aspect of the problem that Marshall and his staff 
thought likely to be raised in the courts of law. 
Less frequently, in the days just before an actual 
hearing, the staff of NAACP lawyers . . . would 
hold moot court in the Howard Law School Library, 
with faculty members acting as judges. "They're 
going to try everything in the book," Marshall said, 
referring to the opposition. "Our job is to stay 
ahead of them."
But even keeping up with "them" required 
tremendous emotional, intellectual, and sheer 
physical e n e r g y . 96
Some references to Marshall's forensic ability, made 
by his associates, appear to document his persuasiveness.
For example, it has been noted: "Normally a person who
speaks in italics, Marshall, once in the courtroom, has been
^^"The Tension of Change," p. 23. 
^^Redding, pp. 327-328.
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described . . .  as a persuader who has often taken the oppo­
sition off guard and, in Langston Hughes' words, 'has moved 
many a judge to search his conscience and come up with 
decisions he probably did not know he had in him.'" After 
observing Marshall's skillful courtroom tactics, Francis X. 
Eeytagh, Jr., who worked under Marshall during his tenure 
as Solicitor General, remarked: He is an effective lawyer
because he has common sense and good instinct for facts. 
Similarly, it has been reported that judges and lawyers were 
not only impressed by "his logic, his knowledge of the con­
stitutional rights, and his determined but gentlemanly 
manner" but also by his "convincing and persuasive words.
Some other comments have been made about Marshall's 
presentations as Solicitor General of the United States.
One historian describes his style as follows:
In this court [the Supreme Court of the 
United States], where most would talk nervously, 
Marshall was completely ease. His style was just 
right for the elegance of the room. . . .
Marshall's performance here would be quiet when 
compared with the explosive civil rights battles he 
had fought earlier for the NAACP, but the emotional 
power would be the same.
He was presenting a case involving protection, 
equal rights, equal opportunity— the kind he was 
familiar with— but there was no yelling, no wild 
gesturing. His argument was strong but respectful 
as he asked the Supreme Court to let the government 
bring federal criminal charges against persons 
accused of two civil rights slayings. . . . Marshall 
won the case.
^^Bland, p.
^^Fenderson, p. 100. ^^Fenderson, p. 117.
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Apparently, the strength of his belief in equal 
justice increased over a period of time. For example, 
before becoming an NAACP lawyer and engaging in private prac­
tice, it was his custom to represent clients without charge. 
It has been said that these experiences, along with many 
others as a criminal lawyer, probably furnished the founda­
tion for Marshall's continuing commitment to protecting the 
rights of the accused. Further, it seems to have afforded 
him opportunities to develop his forensic speaking. More 
importantly, it enables one to understand other facets of 
his character. In another instance during an interview in 
1955, Marshall— "the man at the vortex of the Negro issue 
in the U. S."— revealed his staunch conviction regarding the 
systematic remedy of the problem of inequality: "Failure
to achieve an orderly solution of the Negro problem would 
be— and this Thurgood Marshall feels deeply— much more than 
defeat for the Negro. It would be a failure at the very 
core of the American genius— its capacity for forms strong 
and shrewd enough to withstand the tensions of change.
After taking oath of office of Solicitor General in 
1965, Marshall's comments reveal another dimension of his 
character. However, his comments, during the Senate Hearings 
[probably in response to the opposition but for the benefit 
of all], seem to merit attention. Marshall said:
"The Tension of Change," p. 23.
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I know of no reason that would prevent me from doing 
the best job I could and my background as an advo­
cate usually on the defendant's side, and while on 
the Court [shows that] I have participated in every 
type of case that comes before the Federal 
Courts. . . .
I'm an advocate. . . . And personal emotions 
one way or the other, once you become an advocate, 
that is it. . . . I am certain that there is no 
possible reason that I could have to not adequately 
represent this government which is, after all, my 
Government, just as it is all of our Government.101
F. X. Beytagh, Marshall's assistant from August 1966
until Marshall became Supreme Court Associate Justice,
reveals interesting facts about Marshall's personality and
insight into the nature of the man;
The office operated in a relaxed and easygoing 
manner, reflecting his personality, and the 
quality of the work done . . . was extremely good, 
not departing in this respect from the high stand­
ards set b y . . .  Cox and his predecessors. In oral 
argument Marshall was very effective in cases in 
which he had a distinct interest, less so in others. 
. . .  He can be tough with those who oppose or 
cross him. . . .  In fact, in many respects he 
reminded me of . . . former Chief Justice Earl 
Warren. He has a real concern for people and a 
distrust of large institutions that depersonalize 
life. He is an example of a minority group member 
attaining success in his chosen profession by 
working within the system while trying to change, 
and actually changing it. . . .102
In 1967, Marshall received the ultimate reward for
devoted service in the fight for justice and equality in
the United States and for his exceptional abilities as a
constitutional lawyer. When he nominated Thurgood Marshall
to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
^^^Bland, p. 130. ^^^Bland, p. 150.
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United States, President Johnson said: "I believe he
earned that appointment. He deserves the appointment. He 
is the best qualified. . . .  I believe it is the right 
thing to do, the right time to do it, the right man and the 
right place." Continuing the President asserted: "I
believe he has already earned his place in history, but I 
think it will be greatly enhanced by his service on the 
Court."103
After taking oath, Marshall said, "Let me take this 
opportunity to reaffirm my deep faith in this nation and to 
pledge that I shall ever be mindful of my obligation to the 
Constitution and to the goal of equal justice under law."104 
In response to Marshall's new status, one source comments 
about Marshall's future role:
Thurgood Marshall has been dedicated to the 
practice and the administration of justice and his 
life's work shows that he has played not only a 
leading role in past years but that a quiet and 
pertinent role will be played in his new appointment 
manifesting always his high standard of legal 
ability, an intellectual acumen, a high code of 
ethics, clear reasoning and hard work— all of which 
he has practiced through the years. These charac­
teristics have been demonstrated in his years as an 
attorney and a judge, dedicated to the highest 
American ideals of constitutionalism. He will be 
a justice who believes that the American people.
lO^Biand, p. 151.
104"^ith Another 'Liberal' on High Court," U. S . 
News and World Report, September 11, 1967, p. 21.
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ultimately, will follow the law as interpreted by
the Supreme Court.105
Marshall possesses the physical attractiveness 
which contemporary audiences deem essential. Further, his 
disposition is sometimes easygoing and charming and at other 
times serious, sensitive, and tense. Perhaps, more 
importantly, his associates and other observers contend that 
Marshall is qualified to speak about equal justice.
Marshall states his views in forcible, lucid language while 
manifesting "intrinsic goodness and honesty, sound judgment, 
and interest in the well-being of the audience. . ., which 
induce listeners to approve the arguments given in a 
s p e e c h . A p p a r e n t l y ,  Marshall's fondness for and famil­
iarity with literature, his knowledge of the Constitution 
combined with concern for people which earned his reputation 
as a "strict but always human expert on the Constitution" 
along with his personal and professional experiences and his 
eagerness for work characterized as thorough and systematic 
represent the powerful sources of his stature as a contem­
porary orator.
^Editorial, "Supreme Court Justice Thurgood 
Marshall," Negro History Bulletin, October, 1967, p. 5.
^^^Winston Lamont Brembeck and William S. Howell, 
Persuasion: A Means of Social Control (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), pp. 244-245.
"^Fenderson, p. 118.
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CHAPTER III
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGRO'S 
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
Public address functions within the framework of a 
social and political milieu. Therefore, the critic must 
understand the historical trends that gave rise to the 
speech. Study of these forces enables the critic to under­
stand the specific events in its relation to the whole of 
which it is a part.^
This chapter reviews pertinent issues and events pre­
ceding and influencing Thurgood Marshall's speaking. In 
general, it seems appropriate to focus on the nature of 
inequality and injustice for American Negroes and to examine 
the forces which contributed to the progress made toward 
equality for all in the twentieth century, especially during 
the forties, fifties, and sixties. The response of the 
three branches of the federal government— legislative, exe­
cutive, and judicial— will be addressed. Special emphasis 
will be placed on the United States Supreme Court's involve­
ment and the legal steps taken by the NAACP to eliminate 
inequality and injustice in some of the major areas in which
Braden, Speech Criticism (2d ed.; New York: Ronald 
Press Company, 1570), p. 353.
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civil rights problems occur; i.e., employment, voting, edu­
cation, housing, criminal justice, etc.
The following data provide an overview of the denial 
of equality and justice for Negroes which contributed sig­
nificantly to the status of human rights and probably gave 
rise to Marshall's speeches from 1965 to 1967. For several 
decades prior to the mid-sixties, Marshall directed the 
NAACP's legal strategy to promote equal rights for all 
Americans and federal government, particularly the Supreme 
Court, took actions or made decisions which broadened the 
constitutional significance of our national commitment to 
equality. Morroe Berger remarks that in the three decades 
since 1937 the Supreme Court "has been telling the nation, 
especially the South, that the Negro must be treated in 
accordance with the professions of equality and justice which 
underlie the basic law by which we govern ourselves.
Accordingly, this discussion will not dwell unneces­
sarily on the inequities of the past. On the other hand, 
attention will be given to events and circumstances which are 
important to an understanding of the present.
The origin of the quest for equality in America dates 
back to the time Thomas Jefferson wrote that "all men are 
created equal." The framers of the Declaration of Indepen­
dence acknowledged "certain inalienable rights."
Morroe Berger, Equality by Statute: The Revolution
in Civil Rights (Rev. ed.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday
and Company, Inc., 1967), p. 147.
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Scholars seem to agree that the history of the guest 
for equality and justice by Negroes and other minorities in 
America closely parallels the development of our country. 
These conditions were influenced greatly by the economic, 
scientific, and political climate of the time.
Historically, the Negro's struggle for equality can 
be traced back to events long before the Civil War to "the 
peculiar institution of slavery," a most "outrageous form 
of human exploitation."^ One historian remarks, "Men 
learned that they could gain practical advantages from an 
unequal distribution of rights and from transgressions upon 
the liberties of others.^
For almost two hundred years, the Negro brought to 
America in bondage was enslaved by law. Historical facts 
provide some evidence;
During this decade [the 1660s], various statutes 
provided that Negroes were to be slaves for life, 
that the child was to inherit the condition of the 
mother. . . . [Years later] statutes [were added] 
to define clearly the nature of slaves as property, 
to confer upon the masters the required discipli­
nary power, to enact the codes by which the slaves' 
movements were subjected to public control, and to 
give them a peculiar position in the courts of 
law. . . .  By the eighteenth century color had 
become not only evidence of slavery but also a 
badge of degradation. Thus the master class, for 
its own purposes, wrote chattel slavery, the caste 
system, and color prejudice into American custom 
and law.5
^Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: 
Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1956), p. viii.
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E. Franklin Frazier suggests that the law reinforced the
status of the Negro during the seventeenth century:
The fact that Negroes were an alien race bearing 
distinctive physical marks was, doubtless, the basis 
for differential treatment from the beginning and 
later facilitated their enslavement. But it was not 
due solely to difference in race that Negro slavery 
grew and finally supplanted white servitude. There 
were powerful economic factors, such as the demand 
for a cheap labor supply, that decided the fate of 
the Negro. Court decisions and statutes only gave 
legal sanction to customary practices or what was 
becoming an established fact.®
During the late eighteenth century, the American 
revolutionaries expressed their concept of the government and 
the governed in the Declaration of Independence. It should 
be noted: "With the ratification of the first ten amend­
ments to the Constitution, in 1791, an American Bill of
Rights became part of the law of the land. The Bill of
Rights specifies particular rights that the federal govern­
ment may not violate. In spite of such legal guarantees, 
however, many groups of Americans have felt obliged to pro­
test on behalf of their own r i g h t s . R e g a r d i n g  arguments of 
this period, John Hope Franklin makes the following obser­
vation:
The real point at issue was twofold: The first was
whether slaves should be treated as property or men.
If they were men. Gouverneur Morris had said to
^E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro in the United States 
(Rev. ed.; Toronto : McMillan Company, 1957), p. 22.
^Jack R. Fraenkel, The Struggle for Human Rights 
(New York: Random House, Inc., 1975), p. 16.
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the Constitutional Convention, then make them citi­
zens and let them vote. The view of Virginia's 
George Mason and his supporters prevailed, however, 
and the Constitution did nothing to indicate that 
blacks were equal to others in the enjoyment of 
their rights.
The second point was whether blacks who were 
free should be treated as other free persons. In 
the first fifty years of the nation's history the 
dominant view was that they should not be. In the 
South free Negroes were nothing less than pariahs, 
while in the North they were an oppressed and under­
privileged minority. Even if men did not violate 
the Constitution in maintaining slavery, they clearly 
violated it in denying full citizenship rights to 
free blacks.
The revolutionary dream of equality of all 
peoples was deferred by necessity, as the Founding 
Fathers saw it, of protecting the inviolability of 
property and maintaining a stable social order. It 
was also deferred because of the pervasive view that 
a man not only had to be free, but also white, in 
order to enjoy equality or even to aspire to 
it.8
During the nineteenth century, slavery appeared 
beyond the original southern states since the Constitution 
did not prohibit the same but rather left the matter of 
slavery up to the discretion of the individual states. 
Significantly, the Supreme Court decision in the Dred Scott 
case "gave judicial sanction to the pro-slavery doctrine 
that the peculiar institution could not be excluded from any 
of the territories of the United States.
®John Hope Franklin, Racial Equality in America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 34-
35.
^Stampp, p. 26.
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The Civil War, President Lincoln's Emancipation 
Proclamation, and Civil War Amendments were expected to 
guarantee equality for Negroes. However, historians note 
that denial of equality and justice for Negroes continued 
for many years after the Emancipation Proclamation. For 
example, Stampp remarks, succinctly: "Racist doctrines did
not die with slavery.
Unlike others who came to America seeking freedom the 
Negro was brought to America to be a servant and eventually 
became a slave. Slavery existed for more than two hundred 
years prior to the Civil War and the Emancipation Proclama­
tion. The Reconstruction Era has been called a "crucial 
period in the Negro's struggle for equality." Writing about 
"Five Myths of the Reconstruction Era," William S.
McFeely comments :
During this twelve-year period from 1865 to 1877 
some former slaves became independent farmers; 
state conventions in which black men served as 
active delegates drew up liberal constitutions ; 
black people gained the vote; and colored politi­
cians participated in the governing of the South 
and the nation as judges, state legislators, con­
gressmen, and senators. The legal base for equality, 
erected during Reconstruction, remained, although 
much of what these men helped build upon it was 
later torn down. The Fourteenth Amendment, in 
defining the rights of all citizens, brought the 
word equal into the Constitution, and the Fifteenth 
[Amendment] forthrightly acknowledged what divided 
the nation by declaring that no man should be denied
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
his vote "on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude. " H
In the opinion of many Americans, Reconstruction did 
not succeed. For example in 1901 W.E.B. DuBois, speaking 
about Reconstruction, said, "For this much all men know: 
despite compromise, war, and struggle, the Negro is not 
f r e e . M c F e e l y  adds: "Race can separate us; it does not
have to, but at the close of Reconstruction it did. By 
force in Mississippi and with mocking and frightened prose 
from Maine, black people were forced to live in a second and 
shadowed land. America said no to the equality that black 
Americans and some white Americans, as well, wanted and 
worked to achieve.
The late nineteenth century represents a period of 
disappointment and defeat in the Negro's quest for equal 
rights. In large part. Supreme Court actions appear to have 
contributed to these circumstances. For example, it has 
been noted:
During the last three decades of the nineteenth 
century, the United States Supreme Court, responding 
to the temper of the times, made a series of deci­
sions adverse to Negro rights— decisions that helped 
reconcile North and South at the expense of the 
Negro. For instance, in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 
the Court established the separate but equal doctrine 
and two years later, in Williams v. Mississippi, it
^^William S. McFeely, "The Hidden Freedman: Five
Myths in the Reconstruction Era," The Black Experience in 
America, eds. James C. Curtis and Lewis L. Gould (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1970), p. 69.
^^McFeely, p. 70. l%cFeely, p. 86.
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approved the Mississippi plan for depriving Negroes 
of the franchise. Added to the court-approved 
legislation that deprived Negroes of rights and 
freedom was the widespread use of extralegal coer­
cion to keep the Negro "in his place.
While the case of Plessy v. Ferguson [a landmark constitu­
tional decision of this period] pertained only to segregation 
in railroad coaches, its effect extended through many areas 
and gave legal sanction and impetus to Jim Crow legislation 
adopted in all southern and some northern states.
It would indeed be harsh to blame Reconstruction or 
the abandonment of related efforts or any single occurrence 
for the legacy of racial problems confronting America at the 
turn of the century and even later into the twentieth 
century. In 1944 Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish economist, 
examined the status of the Negro in the United States in a 
book entitled An American Dilemna. He perceived this dilemna 
as a basic conflict between the abiding faith of white 
Americans in their creed of liberty and justice for all and 
the positive knowledge that they were denying this demo­
cratic heritage to the N e g r o . W r i t i n g  The Negro in 
American Life, Rayford Logan comments about how American
Leonard Broom and Norval D. Glenn, Transformation 
of the Negro American (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1965), p. 6.
^^Lerone Bennett, Before the Mayflower: A History
of the Negro in America 1619-1964 (Rev. éd.; Chicago: 
Johnson Publishing Company, Inc., 1964), pp. 232-233.
Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1944), pp. 88-89.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
ideals and government at the beginning of the twentieth 
century detained equal rights for Negroes; "Both major par­
ties had decided that American principles of justice, liberty 
and democracy did not have to be applied alike to white men 
and to Negroes. The United States had emerged as a 'world 
power, ' but at home it was faithless to its own basic prin­
ciples as far as nine million black citizens were con­
cerned. In general, by 1900 the white supremacy doctrine
of the South did not meet any significant disapproval and the 
political and economic life of the American Negro was 
adversely affected by the conditions that persisted. For 
instance, Benjamin Quarels describes the years following 
Reconstruction as "the decades of disappointment." Quarles 
adds: "Increasingly there had been a merging of the southern
and the national image of the Negro. . . . The idea that 
certain races were naturally inferior became more tenaciously 
held than ever. The belief that the Anglo-Saxons were 
superior to other races waxed in the 1890 * s . C o n t i n u i n g  
Quarels notes that "politically . . . the experiences of 
Reconstruction led the Negro to look to the national govern­
ment rather than to the states for protection." In
Thought: The Nadir 1877-1901 (New York: The Dial Press,
Inc., 1954), p. 96.
Benjamin Quarels, The Negro in the Making of 
America (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964), p. 148.
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particular, Negroes residing in the South were denied the 
right to take part in politics by "local self-government."^^
Role of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People
The early years of the twentieth century represented 
an era of rigorous struggle for the working class and par­
ticularly for Negroes. During this period, it seems that 
monopoly capital was pursuing its ruthless course, seizing 
the natural wealth of the country, rapidly expanding the 
industrial system, reaping unprecedented profits, and sub­
mitting the workers of the field and factory to ever 
sharper exploitation. Accordingly, Negroes seemed to have 
"suffered the most in these years of deprivation, oppres­
sion, and struggle." For instance, one source reports;
The Negro people suffered from the most acute forms 
of exploitation and terror. They were shamelessly 
robbed as sharecroppers; they were stripped of the 
right to vote; they were systematically insulted 
by Jim Crow; they were barred from industry, and 
when they did get jobs they had to work for half of 
what a white man got in the North for similar work; 
they were crowded into filthy ghettos ; they were 
thrown into jails and onto the medieval chain gangs 
by the thousands for the most trivial offenses, real 
or imaginary. And over their whole life hung the 
constant menace of sudden, brutal death from their
oppressors 20
There was evidence of widespread savagery during these 
years at the hands of ordinary white persons. But more
Quarels, p. 149.
^°William Z. Foster, The Negro People in American 
History (New York: International Publishers, 1954),
pp. 419-420.
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significantly, documentation exists that persons in charge 
of law enforcement endorsed or participated in these bru­
talities. For example, it has been reported :
Between 1900 and 1914 there were recorded no less 
than 1079 Negroes brutally murdered by armed mobs. 
They were hanged, burned, shot, slashed to pieces 
and dragged to death behind automobiles. No feroc­
ity was too terrible. . . . Men, women, and 
children met this terrible fate, usually upon the 
slightest pretext. Of course, no lynchers were ever 
punished for their terrible deeds. The lynchings 
were usually carried out with the full knowledge and 
consent, and sometimes with the actual participation, 
of the local authorities.
Further, it is revealed that a greater number of Negroes 
were murdered by individual southerners than by lynchings 
and pogroms; i.e., "armed white men, sure of immunity from 
prosecution, shoot down unarmed Negroes for even the 
slightest offense to their tender white supremacist sus­
ceptibilities . "
Also, at the turn of the century the Negro resided 
in an American society that "casually and unquestioningly 
accepted the concept of Negro inferiority." Other charac­
teristics of the American society at this time include :
A white society that could so totally and cavalierly 
reject the rights of nine million black citizens 
was able to employ forceful repression at will. 
Negroes were victimized in the race riots of 1898 in 
Wilmington, North Carolina, of 1900 in New York 
City, and of 1906 in Atlanta. These brutalities 
were repeated in the Springfield, Illinois, race riot 
of 1908, the East St. Louis, Illinois, riot of 1917,
■•■Foster, pp. 420-421.
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and the wanton destruction of Negro life and pro­
perty in two dozen cities in 19 1 9.22
Historians agree that these so-called "race riots" were "in 
actuality . . . deliberately planned, organized attacks 
against the Negro people by armed white thugs in the service 
of the planter-monopolist [group].
In short, the status of equal rights for American 
Negroes reached its lowest and most depressed point in the 
early years of the twentieth century. According to one his­
torian, "The last decade of the nineteenth century and the 
opening of the twentieth century marked the nadir of the 
Negro's status in American society."24
These dramatic and violent conditions coupled with 
indifference and insensitivity on the part of local, state, 
and federal governments probably served as sufficient moti­
vation for Negroes to conclude that they must determine new 
methods to solve the problems of inequality and injustice.
In all likelihood, these circumstances led to the assembly of 
Negroes in 1905 for the Niagara Conference [a forerunner of 
the NAACP]. The purpose of Niagara Conference or Movement 
was "to organize for determined and aggressive action in
The
Black Experience in America, eds. James C. Curtis and Lewis 
L. Gould (Austin: University of Texas, 1970), pp. 146-
147.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in order to secure full citizenship."^^ Significantly, it
has been observed:
In face of such repression and brutality the American 
Negro was almost defendless. Stripped of his 
political and civil rights, he had no ready means 
to effect redress; confronted with segregated, 
inferior educational facilities at all levels and 
with discriminatory employment, he lacked much of 
the broad knowledge and financial resources neces­
sary to mobilize an effective attack upon racial 
injustices. What he desperately needed was a 
national organization sufficiently powerful to call 
into play the most concerned and alert interests 
within the black and white communities and marshall 
these talents and resources to achieve r e f o r m . 26
Accordingly, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was organized in 1809
with the following original purpose: "To uplift the Negro
men and women of this country by securing for them the
complete enjoyment of their rights as citizens, justice in
the courts, and equal opportunity in every economic.
The
NAACP's Annual Report of 1912 announced the organization's 
"programmatic objectives that included an assault upon 
lynching, disfranchisement, educational inequality, dis­
crimination in public accommodations, and racial employment 
inequities.
John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A
A History of Negro Americans (3d ed. ; New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1967), p. 445.
R. L. Jack, History of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (Boston: Meador Publish-
ing Company, 1943), p. 7.
^^Zangrando, p. 149.
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At this moment in the history of the nation, the 
NAACP seems to have assumed leadership in the struggle for 
equality and justice. Commenting on the role and the stra­
tegy of the NAACP, one source noted;
From the outset, the NAACP sought to effect change 
by educating the public and its politicians to the 
need for and wisdom of reform, by lobbying for 
corrective legislation, by securing favorable court 
decisions, and by shaping a nationwide organization 
through which the black man, with interested white 
persons, could work for fundamental reforms. In 
so doing, the NAACP became and remained the major 
voice of the Negro protest movement down to the late 
1950*s .29
In the 1930s the NAACP was able to accelerate and 
enhance the effectiveness of its legal drive to secure 
equal rights for American Negroes. Some of the significant 
factors contributing to the new thrust is explained, in 
part, by Loren Miller:
The National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People has reached the age of majority. 
The NAACP was 21 years old in 1930, under the able 
and clever leadership of Walter White, a master 
salesman of equality cast in the mold of Madison 
Avenue. The urban Negro middle class was solidly 
enlisted under its banner and its influence had 
reached down into the ranks of the more privileged 
workmen. Negro newspapers, now widely read, 
rallied their readers behind the NAACP program, and 
the organization had branches in every important 
city and town in the nation.
In 1930, the NAACP made a historic decision, 
hardly noticed at the time. It decided to launch 
a "large scale, widespread, dramatic campaign to 
give the Southern Negro his constitutional 
rights, his political and civil equality . ._. and 
to give the Negroes equal rights in the public 
schools, in the voting booths, on the railroads
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and on juries in every state where they are at 
present denied them, and the right to own and 
occupy real property." There was nothing new in 
those objectives. What was new and very important 
was the decision to use the courts to achieve the 
objectives and to put major emphasis on planned and 
orderly litigation.30
Another pertinent factor was the receipt of a sizable amount
of money received from Charles Garland who had rejected an
inheritance of more than a million dollars. These funds
enabled the NAACP to plan a coordinated legal campaign and
to employ a special counsel. It has been noted by one
The NAACP hired Charles Hamilton Houston, a 
brilliant, tough-minded young graduate of Amherst 
and Harvard University. Houston had a vision.
Negro lawyers, he felt, should be "social 
engineers. " As vice dean of the Howard University 
Law School he had attempted to make Howard the 
"West Point of Negro leadership." He had 
encouraged brilliant teachers like William Henry 
Hastie and promising students like Thurgood 
Marshall. Now, as a special counsel of the NAACP, 
he planned a hedge-hopping campaign. Starting 
with the " soft underbelly" of Jim Crow— graduate 
schools— he planned to take.case after case to 
the Supreme Court.
And so it began. The first case— filed on 
March 15, 1933, against the University of North 
Carolina— was lost on a technicality. In 1935, 
however, Thurgood Marshall persuaded the Maryland 
Court of Appeals to order the state university to 
admit Donald Murray. The next year— on December 8, 
in Montgomery County, Maryland— the NAACP began ^ its 
long and generally successful campaign to equalize 
teachers' salaries.
^°Loren Miller, The Petitioners; The Story of the 
Supreme Court of the United States and the Negro (New York; 
The World Publishers Company, 1966), p. 258.
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Throughout the thirties, NAACP lawyers—  
Marshall, Houston, Hastie and others— leapfrogged 
across the country, arguing the subtleties of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. They won a great many cases, 
but they didn't get rid of Jim Crow. After losing 
a case, a state would simply set up an inferior law 
or journalism school at the Negro state college.
One day in 1945, Houston's successor and protégé, 
Thurgood Marshall, decided that the time had come to 
"go for the whole hog."32
It is probably meaningful at this point to mention
that the determination of the NAACP to utilize the courts
proficiently in its intensified crusade for equality was
not a fanciful one. Noting the necessity of this plan.
Miller remarks:
The program was national in scope and purpose, and 
Congress was so thoroughly dominated by southern 
Democrats through the seniority system for 
committee chairmanships in both houses and the 
filibuster privilege in the Senate that there was 
no hope for passage of civil rights legislation.
A democratic chief executive could, or would, 
undertake only a minimum of racial reforms, in the 
light of the political necessity of keeping 
southern Democrats pacified and willing partici­
pants in the delicately balanced South-Labor- 
Negro political alliance upon which his power 
rested. Republican presidents were so beguiled 
with the hope of breaking the Solid South that 
they, too, were unwilling to favor the Negro's 
demands. There was no place to go except to the 
courts.33
It is generally believed that "the Court by process of 
interpretation could restore the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments to their pristine glory and thus strike 
off the shackles of second-class citizenship."^'^
^^Bennett, p. 303. ^^Miller, p. 259. 
^"^Miller, p. 260.
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Some of the early legal victories of the NAACP 
addressed inequities in voting, housing, and criminal 
justice. To combat voting problems, for example, in Guinn 
V. United States (1915), an NAACP lawyer argued that the 
"Grandfather Clause" in state constitutions violated the 
Fifteenth Amendment. Subsequently, the Supreme Court 
"declared the grandfather clauses in the Maryland and 
Oklahoma constitutions to be repugnant to the Fifteenth 
Amendment and therefore null and v o i d . A n o t h e r  example 
dealt with the denial of the right of a Negro resident of 
El Paso, Texas, to participate in a Democratic Party elec­
tion. In Nixon v. Herndon, NAACP lawyers failed to win 
favorable decisions in lower courts but won appeal to the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that the "white 
primary" law was invalid and violated the "equal protection" 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  ^^
Similarly, the NAACP experienced success in litiga­
tion regarding racial discrimination in housing. In the 
case of Buchanan v. Waverly (1917), the Supreme Court 
declared unconstitutional the Louisville, Kentucky, ordi­
nance "because it interfered with the rights of an owner to 
dispose of his property." Also, the NAACP addressed the 
matter of protecting people accused of crime. What has been
^^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 447.
^^Randall W. Bland, Private Pressure on Public Law; 
The Legal Career of Justice Thurgood Marshall (Port 
Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1973), p. 15.
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described as "a notorious example of injustice emanating from 
mob action" took place in Elaine, Arkansas. This case Moore 
V. Dempsey (1923) was taken to the Supreme Court by the 
NAACP legal staff. Following arguments, including one that 
defendant did not receive a fair trial because Negroes were 
excluded from juries, the Supreme Court ordered a new trial. 
In fact, speaking for the majority. Justice Holmes stated 
that the previous trial had been "held in a hostile atmos­
phere of fear and hate, was inherently unfair and resulted 
in a denial of due process of law as protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
It seems desirable that the remaining discussion of 
the NAACP's legal campaign should point out cases litigated, 
in general, emphasizing those argued by Thurgood Marshall.
Marshall, an Assistant Special Counsel of the 
NAACP and later as Special Counsel and Director-Counsel of 
the NAACP legal staff, participated actively in the NAACP's 
campaign to gain equality and justice. A few examples 
suggest Marshall's involvement. The initial brief prepared 
by Marshall as a new Assistant Special Counsel was "of 
great importance to the legal arm of the NAACP because it 
was employed in the first case involving education brought 
before the Supreme Court by the Association." In Missouri 
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada (1938), the NAACP's lawyers relied 
on Marshall's brief, basing their argument solely on section
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one of the Fourteenth Amendment which forbids a state to 
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro­
tection of the laws." Randall Bland notes:
Since Missouri had no separate and equal law school 
for the Negroes of its community, and having 
admitted that Gaines was otherwise eligible for 
admission, acceptance was requisite by the force 
of the Constitution. . . .  On December 12, 1938, 
the Court held that Gaines must be allowed to 
attend the Law School of the state in the absence 
of a comparable Negro institution. In a 7-2 deci­
sion . . . [the Court] nullified Missouri’s out-of- 
state plan.38
In keeping with the plans to intensify its legal 
campaign, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund was 
established on October 11, 1939. The following purposes 
were cited in the charter: "To render free legal aid to
Negroes who suffer legal injustice because of their race or 
color and cannot afford to employ legal assistance; To seek 
and promote educational opportunities denied to Negroes 
because of their race or color; To conduct research and 
publish information on educational facilities and 
inequalities furnished for Negroes out of public funds and 
on the status of the Negro in American life.
Parenthetically, it probably should be added that 
the charter also stipulated that the Fund’s activities as 
distinguished from those of the NAACP would not directly 
exert pressure or lobby to influence legislation. On the 
other hand, evidence supports the fact that "the Fund
^^Bland, pp. 21-22. ^^Bland, p. 23.
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lawyers fully intended to use the courts as a 'forum for the 
purpose of educating the public* on any form of discrimina­
tion." For example,- one source observes that, while 
addressing discrimination in housing, Marshall asserted that 
"the only method of counteracting this vicious practice is 
by means of educating the general public, from which juries 
are chosen, to the plight of the Negro." Thus, it seems 
that the Fund's activities might indirectly contribute to 
improved legislative actions through the responses of "an 
aroused and informed public.
In 1940, Thurgood Marshall was selected for the 
newly created position of Director-Counsel, "the top legal 
officer of the Legal Defense and Educational Fund." In 
this position, he assumed the responsibility for "planning 
the strategy to be used in the courts and for coordinating 
the entire legal program." He explained his duties as 
Director-Counsel as follows : "The board charges me with
the responsibility of keeping the work within the policy 
adopted by the board moving along, with general supervisory 
powers over the staff [six full-time lawyers who lived in 
New York but who could be assigned to places in other 
states] and the other people working for us.
Many sources comment on the effectiveness of 
Marshall and his staff, which yielded significant progress
41Bland, p. 24.
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in the NAACP's pursuit of equality. For example, one source 
reveals :
Marshall served in this capacity for twenty- 
one years. Most major cases in the field of civil 
rights were handled by the Fund during this 
period, and the Director-Counsel was to a large 
degree responsible for its successes and failures.
. . . Marshall argued thirty-two cases and assisted 
in preparing the briefs in eleven others brought 
before the Court. . . .  Of the cases he argued, 
four were lost, one was dismissed for lack of a sub­
stantial federal question, and twenty-seven were 
substantive v i c t o r i e s . "^ 2
Perhaps a few of the notable cases handled by 
Marshall and his staff should be included, since the out­
come relieved some of the inequality and injustice plaguing 
Negro Americans. For instance, in the area of political 
rights, history records the fact that as late as the 1940s 
many states denied Negroes the right to serve on juries. 
Gunnar Myrdal notes the following: "In numerous cases the
exclusion of Negroes from grand and petit juries has been 
challenged by NAACP lawyers, and the Association shares in 
establishing precedents by which the principle is now 
firmly established that the exclusion of Negroes from jury 
service is a denial of equal protection of laws guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.""^^ More 
specifically, in The Lonesome Road, Saunders Redding writes: 
"But that right [of Negroes to serve on juries] had to be
42Ibid. ^^Myrdal, pp. 828-829.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
protected time after time in state after state until at last, 
in 1943, Marshall won certification of it from a Supreme 
Court decision that held the exclusion of Negroes from jury 
rolls in violation of the due-process clause, and therefore 
unconstitutional."
In the area of securing voting rights, the Smith v. 
Allwright (1944) case provides an excellent example. Con­
cerning the Smith case Paul G. Kauper in Civil Rights and 
the Constitution writes:
. V. Allwright [case] . . . must be regarded as
a very significant one, not only in terms of a 
dilution of the state action restriction, but also 
in terms of the effective protection of the Negro's 
right to vote. Here the Supreme Court held that 
Negroes could not lawfully be excluded from parti­
cipation in the Democratic primary in the State of 
Texas. In prior cases the Court had held that if 
exclusion occurred as a result of state law or as a 
result of grant of authority by state law to the 
executive committee of the party, this was exclusion 
by action of state law and was invalid under the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments [e.g., Nixon v. 
Herndon, 1924 and Nixon v. Condon, 1932] . On the 
other hand, the Court held that the exclusion of 
Negroes occurred as a result of action by the state 
convention, this was a private action that was not 
governed by these constitutional restrictions 
[e.g., Grovey v. Townsend, 1935]. In Smith v. 
Allwright, however, the Court rejected all these 
distinctions and found that because of the signi­
ficance of the party primary in the total election 
process, a process for which the state had to 
assume total responsibility, the party’s action 
could no longer be characterized as private action.
A later decision involving the so-called Jaybird 
party in Texas pushed the idea still further in 
finding that a party caucus preceding a primary also 
was subject to the constitutional rule of
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nondiscrimination [e.g., Terry v. Adams, 1953]. 
Similar decisions elsewhere emphasize the idea that, 
apart from any consideration whether the primary is 
conclusive in determining the final result, the 
necessary interrelationship between the primary and 
the election and the integration of the primary with 
a public aspect that brings constitutional limita­
tions into play.5
This broad concept of state action has served a most impor­
tant function as part of the total movement for securing 
equal rights for Negroes.
Marshall and W. J. Durham of Sherman, Texas, "were 
primarily responsible for writing the brief" and they argued 
the landmark case of Smith v. Allwright before the Supreme 
Court. Among other points, the brief emphasized: "The
Constitution and laws of the United States as construed by 
the United States v. Classic prohibit interference by 
respondents with petitioner's right to vote in Texas Demo­
cratic primaries." Subsequently, the Court's decision with 
only one dissenting vote, "completely embraced the argument 
made by the Legal Defense Lawyers." Regarding the decision 
in Smith, Justice Stanley noted:
When primaries become a part of the machinery for 
choosing officials, state and national, as they have 
here, the same tests to deteznaine the character of 
discrimination or abridgement should be applied to 
the primary as are applied to the general election. 
If the state requires a certain electoral proce­
dure, prescribes a general election ballot made up 
of party nominees so chosen and limits the choice 
of the electorate in general elections for state 
offices, practically speaking, to those whose names 
appear on such a ballot, it endorses, adopts and
^^Paul G. Kauper, Civil Liberties and the Constitu­
tion (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1962),
pp. 160-161.
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enforces the discrimination against Negroes, prac­
ticed by a party entrusted by Texas law with the 
determination of the qualifications of participants 
in the primary. This is state action within the 
meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment.46
Also, to ensure equal rights in the political processes NAACP 
lawyers, including Thurgood Marshall, argued the Rice v. 
Elmore case. It probably should be mentioned that "in a 
1947 class-action case, George Elmore sought injunctive 
relief to enjoin Clay Rice and other election officials in 
South Carolina from denying to Negro electors the right to 
vote in the Democratic Primary." Again the NAACP lawyers 
were successful since the decision handed down by the 
federal district court in 1948 said, in part: "When this
country is taking the lead in maintaining the democratic 
process and attempting to show to the world that the Ameri­
can government and the American way of life is the fairest 
and the best . . .  it is time for South Carolina to rejoin 
the Union. . . . Racial distinctions cannot exist in the 
machinery that selects the officers and lawmakers of the 
United States." Following an appeal to Fourth Circuit 
Court in the Rice case, the decision of the district court 
was reaffirmed, in part, as follows:
An essential feature of our form of government is 
the right of the citizen to participate in the 
governmental process. The political philosophy of 
the Declaration of Independence is that governments 
derive their just powers from the consent of the
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governed. . . . The disfranchised can never speak 
with the same force as those who are able to vote 
. . . there can be no question that such denial 
amounts to a denial of the constitutional rights of 
the Negro and we think it is equally clear that 
those who participate in the denial are exercising 
state power to that end, since the primary is used 
in connection with the general election in the 
selection of state officers.
Ultimately, "Rice petitioned for a grant of certiorari from
the Supreme Court," but "the Court denied certiorari, thus
in effect upholding the prior decisions of the lower federal
courts.
The area of interstate transportation was another
area which NAACP lawyers addressed in the pursuit of equal
rights for Negroes. Reportedly, Thurgood Marshall brought
Morgan v. Virginia before the Supreme Court in 1946, in "the
first case involving segregation in interstate transportation
presented by the NAACP before the Supreme Court of the United
S t a t e s . T h e  Court's favorable decision probably best
confirms the effectiveness of arguments and evidence
Marshall presented. In this connection it has been noted
that in a 7-1 decision "the Court agreed with both the
sense and the point of Marshall's argument." Additionally,
the opinion of the Court stated:
As no state law can reach beyond its own border nor 
bar transportation of passengers across its bound­
aries, diverse seating requirements for races in 
interstate journeys result. As there is no federal 
act dealing with the separation of races in inter­
state transportation, we must decide the validity of 
this Virginia statute on the challenge that it
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interferes with commerce, as a matter of balance 
between the exercise of the local police power and 
the need for national uniformity in the regulations 
for interstate travel. It seems clear to us that 
seating arrangements for the different races in 
interstate motor travel require a single, uniform 
rule to promote and protect national travel. Con­
sequently, we hold the Virginia statute in contro­
versy invalid.
Perhaps one of the stickiest areas that demanded the
attention of NAACP lawyers dealt with equality in the
housing for all Americans. In the forties "the only case
planned solely by the Legal Defense and Educational Fund
was McGhee v. Sipes." Commenting on Marshall's strategy in
the McGhee case, Randall Bland stated:
In addition to showing the social and economic 
evils resulting from state enforcement of racial 
contracts in this class-action case, Marshall opted 
for two other tactics in this case: First, to
demonstrate legally . . . that enforcement of 
restrictive agreements by state courts was clearly 
state action and, as such, violated "equal protec­
tion of the laws" protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment; and second, to make apparent to the 
Court the widespread support for the Negro cause 
by having a large number of interested groups file 
amicus curiae briefs, and by focusing attention on 
the problem in journals and law review studies.
Two cases— Shelley v. Kraemer and McGhee v. Sipes
(1948)— afford suitable instances. Presenting the Shelley
case, the NAACP was aided by the Department of Justice, the
National Lawyers League Guild, the Civil Rights Department
of the Grand Lodge of Elks, among others. The Supreme Court
"made constitutional history" accordingly: "With three
justices not participating, a unanimous court . . . ruled
50Bland, p. 52.
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that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants designed 
to exclude persons as inhabitants of residential areas on 
the basis of race or color is state action and, as such, a 
denial of equal p r o t e c t i o n . T h e  Court's decision in the 
McGhee case was similar since the Court held that "the 
enforcement of such a covenant by state courts was a viola­
tion of 'equal protection of the laws' under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
Addressing the Annual NAACP Conference on June 23, 
1948, Marshall's topic was "Restrictive Covenants and the 
Segregation Picture." Referring to a 1948 Supreme Court 
decision regarding discrimination in housing, he quotes from 
the ruling: "Freedom from discrimination by the States in
the enjoyment of property rights was among the basic objec­
tives sought to be effectuated by the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. That such discrimination has occurred 
in these cases is clear. Because of the race or color of 
these petitioners they have been denied rights or ownership 
or occupancy enjoyed as a matter of course by other citizens 
of different race or color." Continuing in the same 
address, Marshall evaluates the success of litigation and 
the impact of the Court's decision while asserting the 
necessity for preservation of this venture and the
Robert J. Harris, The Quest for Equality: The Con­
stitution, Congress, and the Supreme Court (Baton Rouge : 
Louisiana State University Press, 1960), p. 116.
^^Bland, p. 57.
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accelerated of other efforts to secure equality in housing: 
"This statement sums up a big victory in a long fight 
against segregated housing. It did not and will not destroy 
segregated housing. It is our job to protect the effect of 
this decision and to push forward the total destruction of 
not only segregation in housing, but all forms of segrega­
tion in American life.
Writing about the legal career of Thurgood Marshall, 
Randall Bland summarizes the endeavors of the NAACP's Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund from 1945 to 1955 as follows:
During this period the legal arm of the NAACP, 
under Marshall's direction, extracted from the 
federal courts in general— and the Supreme Court 
in particular— a number of decisions with great 
constitutional importance, especially in the field 
of education. Although the Legal Defense Fund 
made considerable gains by having nullified dis­
crimination in transportation, exclusion from 
primary elections, state enforcement of restrictive 
covenants, and segregation of tax-supported recrea­
tion facilities, its greatest victory came with the 
tearing down of the wall of segregation in public 
schools. Beginning with Sipuel v. University of 
Oklahoma (332 U.S. 631 (1948), and ending with 
Brown V. Board of Education (349 U.S. 294 (1955), 
the legal staff of the NAACP brought eighteen 
education cases before the Supreme Court. 
Eventually, they found the Court willing, not only 
to end segregation in state colleges and upper- 
level institutions, but to declare the "separate 
but equal" concept unconstitutional in elementary 
education as w e l l . 54
Thurgood Marshall, "Restrictive Covenants and the 
Segregation Picture" (Address before the thirty-ninth 
annual conference of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, Kansas City, Missouri,
June 23, 1948), p. 1.
^^Bland, p. 57.
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It seems desirable to discuss several important cases 
dealing with securing equality in education which Marshall 
and his staff argued successfully before the Supreme Court. 
Perhaps, of significance are three cases— Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954) , Bolling v. Sharpe (1954), and Brown v. 
Board of Education (1955)— for two reasons: first, they
culminated a decade of litigation involving numerous cases; 
and second, the Court's historic decisions represented an 
era in constitutional law which seemed to pave the way for 
progress toward making the goal of equality for all 
Americans a reality. Regarding the Brown decision, Alan P. 
Grimes remarks : "Not since the Dred Scott case of nearly a
century before had any Supreme Court case held such a 
momentous import for the future of American N e g r o e s . H e  
adds : With the destruction of the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' in Brown v. Board of Education, a milestone was 
passed in American constitutional h i s t o r y . A l s o ,  Jack 
Greenberg makes the following comment concerning School 
Segregation cases:
The best-known constitutional prescript of 
this generation is that of Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954) which, resting on the Fourteenth 
Amendment's equal protection clause, held "that in 
the field of public education the doctrine of 
'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educa­
tional facilities are inherently unequal." Less
^^Alan P. Grimes, Equality in America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 75.
^^Grimes, p. 77.
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publicized but of wider legal import are the com­
panion words of Bolling v. Sharpe (1954), the 
District of Columbia School Segregation decision, 
which involved the Fifth Amendment's due process 
clause. It said: "Liberty under the law extends
to the full range of conduct which the individual 
is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted 
except for a proper governmental objective. 
Segregation in public education is not reasonably 
related to any proper governmental o b j e c t i v e . " 5 7
Reliable sources frequently assert that the Supreme 
Court decisions which guaranteed equal rights for Negroes 
in many aspects of American life met vigorous opposition 
in some quarters. It seems that southern states, in partic­
ular, devised schemes to delay enforcement of laws related 
to school desegregation. Although opposition was not 
always successful, it did seem to retard the advancement of 
equality for Negroes. Consequently, the Supreme Court in 
Brown V. Board of Education (1955) directed district courts 
to "take such proceedings and enter such orders and 
decrees . . .  as are necessary" to ensure that Negro 
children were admitted to public schools on a racially non- 
discriminatory basis with all deliberate speed. The 
principle features of the Court's opinion provided:
All provisions of federal, state, or local 
law must yield to this (holding of the School 
Cases) principle.
Full implementation of these constitutional 
principles may require solution of varied local 
school problems.
. . . the courts will require that the 
defendants make a prompt and reasonable start
^^Jack Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 213-
214.
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toward compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling.
Once such a start has been made, the courts 
may find that additional time is necessary to carry 
out the ruling in an effective manner.
The burden rests upon the defendants to 
establish that such time is necessary in the public 
interest and is consistent with good faith com­
pliance at the earliest practicable date.
Continuing, the Court stated that "it should go without
saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles
cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement
with t h e m . A l t h o u g h  the remedy offered by the Court
differed from that presented by the NAACP, Marshall expressed
some optimism:
The decision was a good one. The Court has 
reaffirmed its pronouncement that segregation is 
unconstitutional and throughout the opinion stress 
is placed upon the necessity for full compliance 
at the earliest practicable date. Delays may be 
occasioned by various devices. This would result 
in any case. We can be sure that desegregation 
will take place throughout the United States—  
tomorrow in some places, the day after in others 
and many, many moons hence in some, but it will 
come eventually to all. We look upon the . . . 
decision as a ticket which is now available to 
every parent and child who need it and want to 
use it.
According to most sources, turbulent years followed 
the Supreme Court’s 1955 decision in the Brown case. In 
fact numerous southern states implemented "massive 
resistance . . . intended to thwart the force of the Court’s 
desegregation decision." For example. Bland notes: "These
included statutes allowing local school boards to rearrange 
students among various districts in order to maintain
^Greenburg, p. 215. ^^Bland, p. 86.
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segregated facilities; repealing laws requiring compulsory 
attendance, thus inviting parents to withdraw their children 
from integrated schools; laws providing for state-supported 
segregated private schools; acts permitting the withdrawal 
of state funds from any school system that complied with 
the desegregation decree; and state laws threatening the 
direct closing of public schools if integration became 
inevitable.
In the face of these circumstances and other 
maneuvers to maintain the status quo, "between 1956 and 
1961 the NAACP [lawyers] . . . countered Southern resistance 
with no less massive program of litigation in order to 
force an end to segregated public schools." Regarding the 
sustained and widespread reluctance in the South and side 
effects of litigation, it has been noted: "As late as
1958 . . . the Southern School News reported that four 
years after the School Segregation Cases in the seventeen 
Southern and border states, elimination of de jure segre­
gation had begun or been completed in only 764 of 2,889 
school districts; none of the school districts in Alabama, 
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, 
and Virginia has, as yet, complied with the law. The 
litigation that ensued often brought with it racial turmoil, 
rioting, and open hostility that necessitated the
Bland, p. 99.
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intervention of local and state forces and on occasion even 
the federal government."®^
Importantly, the period from 1955-1960 represents 
Marshall's final years with the NAACP. Litigation by NAACP 
lawyers during this period continued to address school 
segregation problems in general and resistance to the Brown 
decision in particular. R. W. Bland writes: "In the first
five years following the second Brown decision (1955) 
Marshall and his colleagues brought seven major cases before 
the Supreme Court of the United States; they were Lucy v. 
Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955); Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board 
of Control, 350 U.S. 413 (1956); Frasier v. University of 
North Carolina, 355 U.S. 838 (1957); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 
U.S. 1 (1958); Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959); and 
Bush V. Orleans Parish Schools, 364 U.S. 500 (1960).
Commenting on resistance to the Brown decisions, 
Benjamin Quarels remarks: "Among the resistance techniques
was that of closing public schools and replacing them with 
'private' segregated schools. The most headlined of the 
school-closing incidents came in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
where the public schools remained shut during the entire 
term 1957-58. In Prince Edward County, Virginia, the 
public schools closed in 1959, although private schools for 
white children were operated with the support of state
®^Bland, pp. 99-100. ®^Bland, p. 100.
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f u n d s . O n e  of the cases— Cooper v. Aaron— presented by 
the NAACP provides another illustration: The [Little
Rock] School Board and the Superintendent of Schools filed 
a petition . . . seeking a postponement of the program for 
desegregation. Their position in essence was that because 
of public hostility, which they stated had been engendered 
largely by the official attitudes and actions of the Governor 
and the Legislature, maintenance of a sound educational 
program at Central High School, with the Negro students in 
attendance, would be impossible." Consequently, "the 
Board . . . proposed that the Negro students already admitted 
to the school be withdrawn and sent to segregated schools, 
and that all further steps to carry out the Board's 
desegregation program be postponed for a period later sug­
gested by the Board to be two and one-half years. The
response of the Supreme Court essentially affirmed the 
judgment of Court of Appeals which reversed the District 
Court's decision to grant the relief requested. Regarding 
the Cooper case, it has been noted:
The constitutional rights of respondents are 
not to be sacrificed or yielded to the violence 
and disorder which have followed upon the actions 
of the Governor and Legislature. As this Court 
said some forty-one years ago in a unanimous 
opinion in a case involving another aspect of 
racial segregation: "It is urged that this
^^Quarels, p. 240.
^'^David Fellman, The Supreme Court and Education 
(3d ed.; New York: Teachers College Press, 1976), p. 149.
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proposed segregation will promote the public peace 
by preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this 
is, and important as is the preservation of the 
public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by 
laws or ordinances which deny rights created or 
protected by the Federal Constitution." Thus law 
and order are not here to be preserved by deprivina 
the Negro children of their constitutional r i g h t s . 65
Further, the Court held: "In short, the constitutional
rights of children not to be discriminated against in school 
admission on the grounds of race or color declared by this 
Court in the Brown case can neither be nullified openly and 
directly by state legislators or state executive or judi­
cial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through 
evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted 
'ingeniously or ingenuously.'"^^ Also, it seems pertinent 
that the Court reacted emphatically to the activities of 
the governor and the legislature while unanimously 
reaffirming the Brown decision. Accordingly, it has been
No state legislator or executive or judicial 
officer can war against the Constitution without 
violating his undertaking to support it. CHIEF 
JUSTICE [JOHN] MARSHALL spoke for a unanimous 
Court in saying that: "If the legislatures of the
several states may, at will, annul the judgments 
of the courts of the United States, and destroy 
the rights acquired under those judgments, the 
constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery. . .
A Governor who asserts a power to nullify a federal 
court order is similarly restrained. If he had 
such power, . . . "it is manifest that the fiat 
of state Governor, and not the Constitution of the 
United States, would be the supreme law of the 
land; that the restrictions of the Federal
Fellman, p. 152.
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Constitution upon the exercise of state power would 
be but impotent phrases."
It is, of course, quite true that the 
responsibility for public education is primarily 
the concern of the States, but it is equally true 
that such responsibilities, like all other state 
activity must be exercised consistently with 
federal constitutional requirements as they apply 
to state action. The Constitution created a 
government dedicated to equal justice under law.
The Fourteenth Amendment embodied and emphasized 
that ideal. State support of segregated schools 
through any arrangement, management, funds, or 
property cannot be squared with the Amendment's 
command that no State shall deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. The right of a student not to be segregated 
on racial grounds in schools so maintained is 
indeed so fundamental and pervasive that it is 
embraced in the concept of due process of 
law. . . . The basic decision in Brown . . .  is 
now unanimously reaffirmed. The principles 
announced in that decision and the obedience of the 
States to them, according to the command of the 
Constitution, are indispensable for the protection 
of the freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental 
charter for all of us. Our constitutional idea of 
equal justice under law is thus made a living 
truth.G7
The preceding examples do not pretend to include
every significant accomplishment of the NAACP legal staff.
However, they do seem to substantiate the vigorous and
victorious nature of the NAACP's legal efforts to fulfill
its lofty goals toward first-class citizenship for Negro
Americans. Speaking generally about the NAACP's efforts
to end racial inequality. Bland noted:
Marshall and his fellow lawyers employed a line of 
argument that was to be used in every other edu­
cation case by the NAACP down to the Brown case 
itself; that is, that the doctrine of separate
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but equal was without legal foundation or social 
justification: "Classifications and distinctions
based on race or color have no legal validity in 
our society. They are contrary to our Constitution 
and laws, and this Court has struck down statutes, 
ordinances of official policies seeking to estab­
lish such classification. In decisions concerning 
intrastate transportation and public education, 
however, this court appears to have adopted a 
different and antithetical constitutional doctrine 
under which racial segregation is deemed permissible 
when equality is afforded. An examination of these 
decisions will recall that the 'separate but equal' 
doctrine is at best a bare constitutional hypothesis 
postulated in the absence of facts showing the cir­
cumstances and consequences of racial segregation 
and based upon a fallacious evaluation of the 
purpose and meaning inherent in any policy or theory 
of enforced racial separation."68
Role of the Congress of the United States
Prior to the mid-twentieth century the social and 
political climate in America endorsed white supremacy by 
legal and illegal means. Thus the Negro, who had been 
enslaved by law and emancipated by law, experienced oppres­
sion, injustice and little hope of advancement toward 
goals of complete equality.
Since state and local governments consistently 
appear to have neglected endeavors to perpetuate equal 
rights for black Americans, the responsibility for recog­
nizing and remedying problems related to equal rights seemed 
to rest with the federal government. Nevertheless, during 
the early years of the twentieth century, most sources
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report that little was done by the three branches of the 
federal government to ensure equal rights for Negroes. In 
fact, evidence substantiates the fact that with few excep­
tions, legal sanction of segregation continued for almost 
thirty years into this century. Moreover, many scholars 
seem to agree that for political reasons Congress has 
responded least effectively and has been the least helpful 
in aiding the cause of equal justice for all Americans.
Of some significance is the remark about the attitude of the 
federal government for the first quarter of the twentieth 
century made by one historian: "What is now called second-
class citizenship for Negroes was accepted by presidents, 
the Supreme Court, [and] C o n g r e s s . M o r e o v e r ,  in the 
prior century, Frederick Douglas had queried whether 
"American justice, American liberty, American civilization, 
American law, and American Christianity could be made to 
include and protect alike and forever all American citi­
zens in the rights which have been guaranteed to them by 
the organic and fundamental laws of the l a n d . F o r  
several decades into this century, many Americans felt the 
question equally pertinent.
The attitude and action by Congress during this 
period, along with the accompanying outcome, seem signifi­
cant. The legislative organ of government was inactive.
^^Kauper, p. 206. ^^Logan, pp. ix-x. 
^^Logan, pp. 3-4.
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It was insensitive and indifferent to minority needs. Since 
the rights of minorities are logically referable in large 
measure to constitutional protections, it is not surprising 
to find increasing resort to the Supreme Court for their 
vindication. Scholars contend that Congress "too often 
shunted" these matters to the Court. Also, they agree that 
the net effect was to make the Supreme Court, and not 
Congress, the major organ for enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, contrary to the expectations of its framers and 
the meaning of its text.
Many sources reveal that the.United States Congress 
has authority and power, not only to protect and to enforce 
constitutional guarantees in the area of civil rights, but 
also to create "new patterns and methods for solving 
integration problems." Our American system of government 
empowers Congress with viable and extensive resources to 
address problems related to equality and justice. Paul G. 
Kauper acknowledges the reluctance and subsequently the 
limited response by Congress to overwhelming civil rights 
problems. On the other hand, Kauper asserts the extra­
ordinary potentiality for substantial legislative response 
since Congress has been endowed with the most abundant 
supply of powers which, if utilized fully, could yield 
significant advancement in the area of civil rights.
Martin M. Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Consti- 
tutional Rights (Atlanta: Scott, Foresman and Company,
1967), p. 140.
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Kauper comments:
For over three quarters of a century Congress did 
nothing in the civil rights field. By enactment 
of the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts it made 
important contributions to the practical implemen­
tation of the right to vote. Important other tasks 
remain to be done. The general body of civil 
rights legislation going back to the Reconstruction 
period cries out for badly needed revision and 
modernization. The problems raised by resistance 
to the Supreme Court's school desegregation decree 
and the slow movement toward integration in a 
number of the states make it clear also that 
Congress should use the powers available to it both 
for encouraging states to comply with the decree and 
for strengthening the hand of the judiciary and the 
executive department in dealing with the problem. 
Moreover, Congress has a larger reservoir of sub­
stantive legislative powers it may tap, if it will, 
in order to enlarge the body of civil rights on the 
federal level. If Congress defaults in these tasks 
or fails to exercise its powers, this failure is 
attributable not to the lack of constitutional power 
under our federal system but to a system of 
practical politics in which sectional differences 
continue to play a large part.'^
In the area of voting for more than half the
twentieth century, the widespread practices of excluding
Negroes from voting continued. Many sources remark that
"it is hardly surprising that the Negro has turned to
Washington and that Congress has responded with the Civil
Rights Act of 1957, the first such federal legislation
since 1875.
Commenting on the Civil Rights Act of 1957, in 
terms of how it promoted equality in the area of voting, 
Kauper notes:
pp. 205-206. ^^Harris, p. 125.
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Probably the most important feature of this legis­
lation was the section which authorized the Attorney 
General to bring suit on behalf of Negroes in order 
to enjoin violation of their voting rights. The 
effect of such a proceeding is to subject registra­
tion officials to the risk of a contempt proceeding 
in the event that they persist in discriminatory 
practices. Giving authority to the Attorney General 
to bring such a suit in order to assert the rights 
of Negroes is in itself an effective step, both 
because it takes the burden away from individual 
Negroes or organizations representing them to bring 
suits in the first instance and because it may have 
the effect of relieving Negroes from the economic 
burden and reprisals that would be effectuated i f  
they themselves brought the suits. In the 
important Raines case (1960) the Supreme Court held 
that, because of the public interest in the 
enforcement of these rights. Congress could pro­
perly authorize a suit like this in the name of the 
United States. According to Justice Brennan's 
opinion, "there is the highest public interest in 
the due observance of the constitutional guarantees, 
including those that bear most directly on private 
rights, and we think it perfectly competent for 
Congress to authorize the United States to be the 
guardian of that public interest in a suit for 
injunctive r e l i e f . 7 5
In the general area of civil rights Congress has 
been credited with making some contributions. For example, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1957 enacted by Congress has been 
praised for creating and enlarging the duties and powers
of a unique Civil Rights Commission:
The other important feature of the 1957 act 
was the creation of the Civil Rights Commission,
the first of this kind in the history of the
country. The Commission is charged with the task 
of making studies and investigations if alleged 
denials of civil rights including voting rights, 
authorized to conduct hearings, and directed to 
make reports to Congress and the President. The 
Commission was clothed with the power of subpoena.
^^Kauper, pp. 196-197.
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and during the first three years of its life it 
conducted extensive hearings and in 1959 submitted 
its final report which included, inter alia, the 
recommendations that its life be extended and that 
further legislation be enacted. As might be 
expected, the Commission ran into difficulty in con­
ducting its hearings and its power was challenged 
almost immediately, but to date its authority has 
been sustained by the Court.76
According to some historians, the 1957 Civil Rights
Act enacted by Congress failed "to come to grips with the
problem of adequate supervision of the registration process
to make the voting right effective." In response. Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1960:
After extended discussions Congress acted to create 
a system under which federal district courts are 
authorized to employ so-called registrars who will 
assist the federal judges in policing the voting 
registration system and, in effect, will take 
over in a limited way the function of determining 
eligibility to vote once a pattern of racial 
discrimination has been established. The federal 
court now assumes a responsibility through the 
use of registrars for seeing to it that qualified 
Negroes are actually registered as eligible 
voters despite obstructive tactics by local offi­
cers. It is too early yet to tell whether this 
process will be effective or whether, as some 
critics claim, this process will be mired in legal 
technicalities and time-consuming processes.77
Our constitutional federal structure invests other
powers in Congress. Evidence seems to verify the fact that
our system of government prescribes an important role for
the legislature, in particular, to perform in discharging
^^Kauper, p. 198. ^^Kauper, p. 199.
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its responsibilities effectively. Accordingly, sources 
suggest the general capability of Congress and explain ways 
Congress could alleviate problems related to employment;
In these areas of its own legislative compe­
tence and authority, the federal government has 
adequate power not only to create rights but to 
secure their enjoyment by providing sanctions and 
remedies not only against those who acting under 
authority of laws may be found to violate these 
rights but against private persons as well.
Indeed, [Congress has] the power to deal with all 
persons coming directly within the scope of its 
legislative competence. If Congress provides that 
every employer engaged in production for commerce 
shall not discriminate on the basis of race or 
color in the choice or discharge of employees, 
obviously Congress may choose various means to make 
this policy effective. It may provide criminal 
sanctions against employers found guilty of violat­
ing the act; it may authorize a damage action 
against the employer by persons discriminated 
against; it may authorize an injunctive remedy to 
enjoin employers from continuing these practices; 
or it may create an administrative remedy pursuant 
to which an employer's practice is characterized 
after a hearing by a board as an unfair labor 
practice which may be corrected by an appropriate 
order directed to the employer and violation of 
which may be made punishable. In other words, 
when we are dealing with rights created by Con­
gressional legislation in the exercise of the 
independent substantive powers of Congress, we are 
talking about rights which in the more accurate 
and strict sense may be called civil rights since 
they give rise to reciprocal obligations enforce­
able against private persons, as distinguished 
simply from constitutional liberties that are pro­
tected against government in the interest of
individual freedom.78
Also, it has been reported that Congress has not 
exhausted its resources which provide opportunities to 
eliminate other equal rights problems. In the area of
pp. 179-180.
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education, it has been said many times that the spending
power of Congress represents a very significant source of
authority to deal with civil rights, which has not been
utilized generously and proficiently. Regarding this
authority, Kauper noted:
The current discussions apropos federal aid to edu­
cation highlight the possibility of using the 
federal spending power as a means of promoting state 
observance of constitutional rights. Thus it has 
been proposed as a condition to federal spending 
for public schools that no federal money shall go 
to aid in the construction or operation of schools 
that practice racial segregation. Similarly, 
nondiscriminatory provisions may be included in 
federal legislation appropriating money in aid of 
both public and private housing. . . . Apart from 
its corrective power to enforce the Due Process and 
Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, Congress has substantial reservoirs of power 
to draw upon to further a program of protecting 
minorities against discrimination in transportation, 
employment, education, and h o u s i n g . 79
Discussing the role of Congress in respect to
rights guaranteeing equal protection and due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment by making remedies available
through federal courts, reliable sources reveal that
Congress has authority:
The Congressional role in this respect should 
not be underestimated. We tend to forget that 
Congress has made an important contribution to the 
Supreme Court's paramount role in this area by 
giving the Court a power to review the decisions 
of the highest courts of the state dealing with 
questions involving rights, privileges, and 
immunities arising under the Constitution, treaties, 
and laws of the United States. If Congress were 
to limit the Supreme Court's appellate
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jurisdiction as has been several times proposed in 
recent years in order to deny it opportunity to 
raise questions arising under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a large part 
of the effective apparatus for vindication of 
these protected rights would be impaired or des­
troyed. Likewise, Congress has made a valuable 
contribution to enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by making such remedial devices as the 
injunction, habeas corpus, and the declaratory 
judgment available in the lower federal courts as 
well as by legislation subjecting state officers 
and agents to criminal liability and damage actions 
in cases where their actions have resulted in denial 
of due process or equal protection. . . .  It is 
worth noting that the development we have had in 
recent years directed to the end of terminating 
law-imposed segregation in public schools is 
attributable entirely to the action of the federal 
courts. Congress has taken no positive steps to 
aid in the more effective enforcement of this 
decree. Depending . . . upon the Court's authority 
to interpret the meaning of equal protection and 
. . . upon the power of the federal courts to make 
their decrees effective, the Supreme Court and the 
lower federal courts have been carefully, slowly, 
and at times with great difficulty in the face of 
determined opposition, making their way in the 
attempt to convert the Court's decision into an 
operating rule of law throughout the country.80
Some scholars distinguish between rights that pro­
tected against states under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the created rights,
some of which are created directly by the Consti­
tution, either expressly or by implication, and 
some of which are created by Congress. In a case 
of the protected rights Congress has a limited 
function to perform in authorizing corrective 
devices whereby the judiciary and the executive 
can make these protected rights effective. In the 
case of the federally created rights the courts 
have an important interpretative and enforcement 
function, but Congress has a broad function since
pp. 173-174.
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it can create rights of this character as well as 
prescribe the remedies for making them effective.
Other endeavors by the legislative branch which seem 
pertinent to this study include the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968. Referring to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, President Lyndon Johnson referred to it as "a 
challenge to men of goodwill in every part of the country to 
transforra the commands of law into customs of our land." 
President Johnson praised this action by Congress. While 
acknowledging that no single legislative act could eradicate 
all injustice, discrimination, hatred, and prejudice. 
President Johnson insisted that the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 "had gone further in doing so than any previous legis­
lation in the twentieth century." Signing the bill into 
law the president, perhaps wishing to dramatize the event, 
informed a nationwide television audience:
We believe that all men have certain inalien­
able rights, yet many Americans do not enjoy 
those rights. We believe all men are entitled to 
the blessings of liberty. Yet millions are being 
deprived of those blessings— not because of their 
own failures, but because of the color of their 
skin.
The reasons are deeply embedded in history 
and tradition and the nature of man. We can 
understand— without rancor or hatred— how this 
happened. But it cannot continue.
Our Constitution, the foundation of our 
republic, forbids it. The principles of our
®^Kauper, p. 181.
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freedom forbid it. Morality forbids it and the 
law I will sign tonight forbids it.82
One writer points out what he considers some significant
aspects of the 1964 Act:
In the more important of its many provisions, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorized the Attorney 
General to initiate school-desegregation suits and 
eliminated racial segregation in any program or 
activity receiving federal assistance; however, the 
most controversial portion of the Act was 
Title II— or, as it is better known, the 'public 
accommodations' section. It forbade racial dis­
crimination in all places of public accommodations—  
hotels, motels, restaurants, service stations, places 
of entertainment— engaged in interstate commerce.
Such discrimination had long been a particularly 
sensitive area for American Negroes.
Finally, it seems appropriate to mention that this Act met 
resistance just as the previous Acts had been challenged. 
Moreover, many sources assert that resistance by white 
southerners, especially in the Deep South, to the Negroes' 
exercise of public accommodation rights "took on more 
violent forms, including murder.
In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act. 
Presumably, previous legislation contained provisions for 
dealing with problems related to voting rights. However, 
the necessity for this additional legislation is high­
lighted as follows: "Blacks were still systematically pre­
vented from voting in much of the South. An incredible array
James C. Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the 
Johnson Administration (Jackson: University and College
Press of Mississippi, 1973), pp. 16-17.
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of public and private obstacles still confronted blacks in 
their efforts to register and v o t e . R e g a r d i n g  the 
inherent value of ensuring the privilege to participate in 
this important political process, it has been said:
The vote merits attention because it is one 
of the most widely distributed of all political 
resources, because all decisions in a democratic 
form of government rest ultimately on votes, and 
perhaps, because it is the major mechanism for 
translating popular preferences into governmental 
decisions. Various groups, from the propertyless 
to women, have sought the vote on grounds that it 
is an important resource in the implementation of 
their preferences and the recognition of their 
interests, as well as their worth as persons.
The Negro struggle for political rights fits into 
this same c o n t e x t . 85
Perhaps, an interesting corollary of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 is that Congress, though often appearing 
indifferent to civil liberties, provided legal aid for 
the poor and served to make the poor [many, if not most, 
of whom are Negroes] more aware of and sensitive to 
exercising their legal rights. One writer notes: 
"Congress's decision in 1965 to finance legal services for 
the poor on a vastly expanded (if still inadequate) level 
has had particularly broad repercussions. Existing cadres 
of civil liberties and civil rights lawyers were augmented
®^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson 
Administration, p. 26.
^^William R. Kreech, The Impact of Negro Voting: 
The Role of the Vote in the Quest for Equality (Chicago; 
Rand McNally, 1968), p. 3.
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by a vigorous and idealistic group of young men and women 
representing the poor."86
It has been reported that the constitutionality of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was challenged almost imme­
diately. The South Carolina v. Katzenbach case provides an 
example: "The state of South Carolina filed suit before the 
United States Supreme Court on September 25, 1965, to 
enjoin Attorney General Katzenbach from enforcing the act on 
the grounds that the law had unconstitutionally invaded the 
states' rights to establish voter qualifications." It seems 
that the state of South Carolina failed to accomplish its 
goal since the Supreme Court, in this case, "unanimously 
upheld the constitutionality of the entire Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 on the grounds that it was within the power of 
Congress to take affirmative measures to implement the 
Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Scholars report repeatedly that in early 196" 
numerous civil rights bills "languished in Congress." Sig­
nificantly, in 1966 one civil rights bill considered by 
Congress contained an open housing provision. It seems that 
open housing or fair housing proved an insurmountable 
obstacle. One writer noted the key factors contributing to
What They Are— What They Should Be (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1970), pp. xix-xx.
Administration, p. 35.
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the bill's demise: "The sad, ever outrageous, but inescap­
able fact seems to be that the white is not yet acclimated 
to the notion of having a Negro for a neighbor. So the 
bill . . . became the first civil rights measure to be killed 
by Congress in nine years." Among others. President Johnson 
issued an emotional plea calling for fair housing. The 
president reminded Congress that "in the war, the Negro 
American has given this nation his best— but this nation has 
not given him equal justice." Specifically, President 
Johnson asserted, "The bullets at the battle front do not 
discriminate— but landlords at home do." Other difficulties 
and factors that threatened the civil rights bill have been 
documented.® ®
In late 1967, Congress was once more obligated to 
confront the civil rights bill. It seemed obvious that 
passage of such legislature would be difficult, if not impos­
sible. For example, it has been reported: "By late August
the House-passed civil rights bill was sent to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. Senator Eastland announced that he 
planned to kill it by adding the 'open' housing provision to 
it. The Mississippi senator predicted that his action would 
halt further efforts to pass civil rights laws aimed at the 
South." Further, it appears that for numerous reasons 
Congress was not coerced by President Johnson or former civil 
rights advocates among its membership to pass the bill as it
®®Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson 
Administration, pp. 37-43.
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had been in 1966. For example, it has been disclosed:
Despite the rhetoric the administration has 
not pressured as much for civil rights legisla­
tion in 1967 as it had in 1966. Being fully aware 
of the changed complexion of the House and the 
growing backlash, the president seemed to place a 
higher priority on support for other matters, 
especially the undeclared war in Vietnam. Even 
some of the traditional support of northern 
moderates and liberals warned: "The open bussing
and equal employment bills affected the Northern 
homeowner and labor unionist, whose interests had 
not been touched by the civil rights movement. 
Northern members of Congress from both parties, 
many of whom had supported civil rights legislation 
previously, were keenly aware of the sensitive 
nature of those issues." The coalition of 
northern Republicans and Democrats so crucial to 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 seemed to have 
faded a w a y . 89
Concluding this discussion on the civil rights bill 
that Congress failed to pass over a two-year period, it 
seems desirable to note that in 1968 sufficient votes were 
mobilized to result in enactment of a Civil Rights Act. 
Beginning the drive toward eventual passage of the Act, 
President Johnson, in his annual message to Congress on 
January 17, 1968, asserted: "I shall urge Congress to act
on several other pending civil rights measures— fair jury 
trials, protection of federal rights, enforcement of equal 
employment opportunity, and fair housing." Another feature 
in this scenario, some writers claim, can be explained in 
terms of vigorous efforts of Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP 
and other members of the 1966 Leadership Conference. For
Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson 
Administration, pp. 46-47.
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example, one source notes that these leaders "decided to 
make the civil rights bill passed by the House in 1967 and 
still pending in the Senate, the vehicle for open housing 
legislation in 1968." Also, Senator Everett Dirksen who had 
played an important role in previous years with civil rights 
bills had a change of heart which contributed to the even­
tual success of the bill. Significantly, the senator nego­
tiated a compromise with Ramsey Clark and other civil rights 
advocates to modify the coverage of the housing section of 
the bill. Dirksen then introduced an amendment which 
included eighty percent of the nation's housing.
Congress passed this Act on April 10, 1968.
Aspects of the Act include:
The new law which would go into effect fully 
in 1970 prohibited discrimination in the sale of 
rental of about 80 percent of all housing. Most 
housing built with federal assistance, such as 
public housing and urban renewal projects, was 
covered immediately on enactment of the bill.
Coverage was to be extended on January 1, 1969, to 
all multiple-unit dwellings except for owner- 
occupied dwellings with no more than four units.
Also covered on that date were single-family 
houses, owned by private individuals. Privately 
owned single-family houses sold or rented by real 
estate agents or brokers were covered as of 
January 1, 1970. Private owners selling or 
renting their house without the services of a 
real estate agent or broker were exempt. The pro­
hibition against discrimination also applied to 
financing and brokerage services. The secretary 
of Housing and Urban Development was to administer 
this title.
90;Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson
Administration, pp. 47-50.
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The bill also provided criminal penalties for 
injuring or interfering with a person who was 
exercising specific rights which included: to
serve on a jury, to vote, to work, to participate 
in government or government-aided programs, to 
enjoy public accommodations, and to attend school 
or college. In addition, the measure provided 
similar protection to civil rights workers who urged 
or helped others to exercise the rights mentioned 
above.^ 1
Also, some significant responses to the Act have 
been observed. One writer refers to President Johnson's 
remarks upon signing the bill into law. President Johnson 
said:
Now with this bill, the voice of justice speaks 
again. It proclaims that fair housing for all— all 
human beings who live in this country— is now a 
part of the American way of life. This afternoon, 
as we gather here . . ., I think we can all take 
some heart that democracy's work is being done.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1968 America does move 
forward and the bell of freedom rings a little 
louder.52
On the other hand, an article in Christian Century noted: 
"The fact that Washington could sigh with relief when such 
a minor bit of legislation stumbles through is an indica­
tion that the white power structure is still not prepared 
to do anything about the great injustices that perpetuate 
p o v e r t y . A n o t h e r  source reveals some strengths and 
weaknesses of the Act. First, the Act disregards zoning
Administration, pp. 54-55.
Administration, p. 55.
^^"Racism Arrested?" Christian Century, April 24, 
1968, p. 507.
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laws and building codes. Second, Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) lacked enforcement authority. The only 
other action available was to bypass HUD and proceed 
directly to a federal district court. Continuing the 
article notes: "If the procedural and substantive difficul­
ties do not vitiate Title VIII, it may eventually provide 
an escape valve for Negro frustration. Otherwise, it can 
best serve only as a temporary sedative. To at least a 
certain extent, however, exodus from the ghetto is now a 
practical possibility."^^
Perhaps, summarizing the impact of efforts by the 
United States Congress during the mid-twentieth century, 
one black historian remarks :
Few developments have affected the movement 
for racial equality more than the assumption of 
some responsibility by the government. Within a 
decade after the Truman Committee on Civil Rights 
had completed its task. Congress has created the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights. The 
significance of the Commission lay not so much in 
the exercise of its quite limited powers or the 
success of its quite modest program as in its 
symbolizing a remarkable and historic reversal of 
congressional policy on matters affecting race.
And having taken this first, halting step.
Congress, responding to pressures from the outside 
as well as from within, took additional steps.
It extended the life of the Commission on Civil 
Rights and enlarged its powers. A few years later 
in 1964, it enacted into law the most far-reaching 
civil rights bill ever passed by that body, 
authorizing agents of the government to protect 
citizens against discrimination in voting.
^■*"The Federal Fair Housing Requirements : Title
VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act," Duke Law Journal, 
1969:762-771.
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education, and the use of public accommodations.
In the following year it passed the Voting Rights 
Act, which led to a dramatic increase in the number 
of black voters and ultimately of black elected 
public officials. Now that the barrier was 
breached there would be other legislation in the 
area, but none as far-reaching or significant as the 
acts of 1964 and 1965.95
The preceding discussion suggests that for several 
decades Congress did respond, somewhat reluctantly, to the 
need to eliminate racial inequality in some major areas. 
Nevertheless, it seems obvious that these actions did not 
substantially change the status of millions of Negro 
Americans in their pursuit of equality and justice or first- 
class citizenship. Hence, the struggle continues and 
problems remain unsolved. On the other hand, the informa­
tion presented essentially documents specific resources 
Congress utilized to address equal rights problems in some 
areas; i.e., voting, employment, education, fair housing, 
etc. At the same time, our system of government affords a 
wider range of resources for use by Congress which the 
legislature failed to use fully to accomplish greater gains 
in the crucial area of civil rights. Also, the inter­
relationships of the three branches could have functioned 
in a manner to yield more substantive advancement toward 
equality for all Americans.
^^Franklin, Racial Equality in America, pp. 101-
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Role of the United States Supreme Court
This section addresses the nature and scope of the
leadership assumed by the judicial branch of our federal
government, particularly in the area of civil rights.
Specifically, it seems appropriate to concentrate on the
Supreme Court's actions during the twentieth century, which
assisted the Negro's efforts to secure equal rights and
justice. It should be remembered that prior to 1900 actions
by the Court were diametrically opposed to fostering racial
equality. For instance, one writer notes:
The United States Supreme Court had chipped in with 
the 1896 "separate but equal" decision in Plessy 
V. Ferguson, holding in essence that Chief Justice 
Taney was correct when he noted in the famous Dred 
Scott cases that under the Constitution, "The 
unhappy black race were separated from the white 
by indelible marks." The 1896 Court said that the 
law was "powerless to eradicate racial instincts 
or to abolish distinctions based on physical dif­
ferences," and held that the states— and the Federal 
Government, for that matter— were constitutionally 
justified in classifying citizens on the basis of 
race and forbidding their use of state facilities, 
private accommodations, and public utilities on the 
basis of that classification. It added that where 
Negroes were excluded from state facilities or 
private utilities, they must be furnished separate 
and equal accommodations for their own use, a hedge 
that was construed to mean that a one-room Negro 
school in a church basement was equal to a graded 
eight-room school for whites and that Jim Crow 
seats in half of a baggage car were equal to 
Pullman accommodations.96
As the twentieth century began, the Supreme Court 
was content to obstruct rather than promote the ideals of
^^Robert L. Carter et al., Equality (New York: 
Random House, Inc., 1965), pp. 11-12.
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equality and justice. For example, one writer observes:
By 1900 the elaborate apparatus for the 
enforcement of equal rights in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 
and subsequent legislation of 1870, 1871, and 1875 
was largely a failure, and continued in a somewhat 
less degree to be so in 1959. . . . Indifferent and 
inactive Presidents and disinterested or timid 
Attorneys General did little to enforce the amend­
ments and the remnants of the statutes and the 
Supreme Court, as we have seen, imposed very con­
siderable obstacles by invalidating key provisions 
of federal statutes and construing others and the 
amendments strictly.97
Further, for several decades into the twentieth
century, it was evident that the Court did not feel compelled
to move expeditiously in addressing the inequalities and
injustices American Negroes experienced. For instance, it
has been noted:
The long period of legal inactivity which existed 
for almost thirty years following the close of the 
nineteenth century ended with but few encouraging 
signs. Moreover, those few cases were scattered 
over a period of years and had little effect upon 
the total problem of discrimination. Rather than 
representing any sustained efforts, they were only 
occasional victories and often easily circumvented.
Perhaps, it should be mentioned that these cases involved
discrimination in the voting process and housing. For
instance, in 1915, the Court declared use of the "grandfather
clause" unconstitutional and in Warley v. Buchanan (1917)
the court "held as unconstitutional a municipal ordinance
forbidding Negroes to occupy houses on blocks where a
majority of the populace was white." The latter decision
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according to some legal scholars, "furnished the initial 
breakthrough in the housing area.
Moreover, it has been reported that in the mid-1920s 
the Supreme Court acquired additional resources to attack 
discrimination :
In 1925, the passage of a statute pertaining 
to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction was to give 
rise to the possibility of increased Supreme Court 
review of "due process" in the state courts. The 
true significance of this statute has been largely 
hidden and ignored. This statute permitted the 
Supreme Court to review cases through certiorari 
rather than being limited to cases on appeal. Hence, 
it made it possible for the Court to select the 
cases where it felt review was necessary and also 
to prevent the overcrowding and congestion of the 
docket. At the same time, it allowed the Court to 
proceed at its own pace. While it has been 
questioned as to what extent this reform legisla­
tion has been responsible for greater Supreme 
Court activity, this little noted development might 
properly be viewed as a prelude of what was to 
come.9 9
Significantly, one source refers to the Court's activity 
in the area of school segregation during the same period :
In the first three decades of the new century, 
the Court's course in reference to school segrega­
tion had been weak and inconclusive. It had not 
faced the problem squarely, but its evasions 
bolstered the widely held lay and legal belief that 
such segregation squared with the requirements of 
the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. States were encouraged to pursue separate 
school policies and practices. The ruling 
[rejecting Negro students] in the Berea College 
[Kentucky] case was indefensible. It put the great
Legal Aspects
of the Civil Rights Movement (Detroit: Wayne State Uni­
versity Press, 1965), p. 15.
^^King and Quick, p. 16.
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seal of Supreme Court approval on racist legisla­
tion that was patently prescribed even under the 
most restrictive interpretation of the amendment 
and, in so doing, institutionalized racial segre­
gation and the color-caste system. The Court's 
Negro wards fared ill at its h a n d s . 100
Since by the 1930s, it became apparent that the
Court was adopting a more meaningful role in the advancement
of racial equality, perhaps some of the factors contributing
to this change of attitude should be mentioned. It has been
remarked : "In part, the changed outlook of the Supreme
Court reflects 'cultural drift' toward more egalitarian
values in the United States. Although the rulings of the
Court are not necessarily a direct reflection of prevailing
views among the populace, changes in the philosophy of the
Court occur in the context of more or less in harmony with
broader cultural and social trends. Parenthetically,
it should be remembered that the nation was at a crisis in
the early 1930s. According to most historians, the crisis
had been touched off with the stock market crash in the
fall of 1929 and probably intensified the Negro's problem,
particularly in terms of the unprecedented unemployment.
For instance, millions of people, especially Negroes, were
out of work.
During the third decade of the twentieth century, 
the Court's involvement in securing equal rights was signi­
ficant in the area of employment. Commenting on the Court's
100 ,^Miller, p. 216. ^*^^Broom and Glenn, p. 56.
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response to persistent discrimination in employment, Loren 
Miller notes :
There were well-defined limits to effective 
judicial action against discrimination in employ­
ment, but the Court responded to every invitation 
extended to it from the 1930's onward to exert its 
power to strike down discriminatory labor practices. 
It administered the final death blow to state 
statutes which had the effect of fostering peonage; 
it blazed a new trail in its holdings that railway 
labor unions could not discriminate against Negro 
workmen where they were placed in a position to do 
so by federal statutes; it narrowed the doctrine 
that private organizations were free to discriminate 
under any and all circumstances, with the labor case 
rulings that where the union accepted statutory 
benefits, it was restrained from the exercise of 
racial discrimination in much the same manner as a 
legislature; it recognized the right of Negroes to 
picket against discrimination in employment and 
placed that right on a par with picketing rights of 
unions, despite an unnecessary limitation of that 
power in the Hughes case; it validated state fair- 
employment statutes and refused to limit their 
power to act to purely intrastate employers.
Except in the case of peonage statutes, these actions 
were significant departures from the restrictive 
constitutional view taken in earlier cases.102
Another source praises the Court's exemplary leadership and
predicts the far-reaching effect;
[The Court] overturned or ignored its own strangling 
precedents and even assumed an amazing leadership in 
the area of civil rights. By the sheer weight of 
its own example, it inspired something of a similar 
zeal on the part of the executive branch of the 
government and ultimately helped create a climate 
of public opinion in which Congress was induced to 
act by passing the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, 
and 1964, and 1965. The Court's equalitarian 
decisions beginning in the mid-1930's gave increasing 
freedom and opportunities to civil rights organiza­
tions to press it as well as the executive and 
legislative branches of government for ever widening 
reforms.103
•^Miller, pp. 14-15.
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Historians generally agree that numerous factors
contributed to the Court's change of attitude:
The great depression and the measures taken to 
ameliorate it were levelers of a kind, and the war 
against Nazi Germany and its racist dogmas, with 
preachments of equality by American leaders, was a 
great equalizer. Beyond these forces, however, was 
the rise of the Negro race economically and politi­
cally to the extent that more Negroes were ready to 
challenge discriminations which in other times were 
accepted with indifference or resignation. Finally, 
by 1935 powerful groups, well supported by numbers 
and money, had arisen to work for the cause of 
Negroes in the civil rights vineyard, so that cases 
presented in the 1930's and afterwards were, for the 
most part, based on adequately prepared records in 
the trial court and were always marked by the most 
competent presentation of issues in appellate pro­
ceedings. 104
Perhaps, at this point we should take a look at the
socio-political climate in America during the forties.
Among the numerous observations made about this period in
our nation's history, the following seems important for the
purpose of this study:
Racial discrimination burdened the consciences of 
some white Americans, but not enough. Most never 
thought twice about the fact that in one-third of 
the states their fellow citizens with dark skins 
were excluded from most decent schools and restau­
rants and public parks, were confined to the rear of 
buses and to separate railroad cars and could not 
vote in the meaningful elections, the primaries; 
that. North and South, they were largely limited to 
menial employment; that they were forced to serve 
in segregated units of the armed forces of the 
United States; that, eighty years after the Civil 
War, they could not sit down at a drugstore lunch 
counter or see a movie in downtown Washington, D.C., 
the capital of the country.105
^^^Harris, pp. 109-110.
^Anthony Lewis, P_____________________
Random House, 1953), p. 3.
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Beginning in the early forties and continuing for 
two decades, the Court became favorably disposed toward cases 
brought before it by persons aggrieved over racial discrimi­
nation. For example, John Hope Franklin comments: "In
cases involving education, housing, transportation, civil 
rights, and voting, the federal judiciary handed down a 
series of landmark decisions during the last three decades 
that greatly encouraged Negro Americans and all Americans 
who sought racial equality. Another appropriate comment 
on the Court's leadership includes the following:
As the Supreme Court broke with old precedents 
and either overruled them directly or indirectly to 
find a path back toward the goal of the color-blind 
state envisioned by the framers of the Civil War 
Amendments, it acted as a catalytic agent to loose 
other great equalitarian forces. It refurbished 
the concept of the Constitution as the fountainhead 
of equality when it appealed to that document for 
justification of the decisions it rendered. More 
and more often U.S. Attorneys General, who had been 
worse than laggered in enforcement of old Civil 
Rights statutes, appeared as a friend of the 
court— often at the invitation of the justices—  
to throw the weight of the executive branch of the 
government behind racial reforms. The Court's con­
stant reiteration of the sentiments that its civil 
rights decisions were required responses to the 
constitutional guarantees stimulated and helped 
create a climate of public opinion that demanded 
extension and intensification of the very reforms it
had initiated.107
The Supreme Court received criticism when it assumed 
leadership of social reform. Critics seem to view the 
Court's leadership as a departure from its traditional
106.
"^Miller, pp. 431-432.
'Franklin, Racial Equality in America, p. 103. 
107„
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judiciary role— that of declaring and interpreting the law 
as enacted by the legislature and as enforced by the execu­
tive branch of democratic government. Such criticism seems 
to disregard the two facts: (1) the impact of the doctrine
of judicial supremacy on our institutions is immense and (2) 
our Supreme Court, as the final repository of state power, 
plays a primary role in American government.
Those who criticize the Court's current efforts to 
promote equal rights did not criticize the Court when its 
leadership resulted in the weakening and emasculating the 
Civil War Amendments. In other words, the Court was 
commended highly for its leadership then and condemned now 
for its leadership.
Relentless and formidable leadership in the area 
of civil rights became apparent during the mid-twentieth 
century. Several cases illustrate the Court's unprecedented 
endeavors. For example, in Shelly v. Kraemer (1948) the 
Court held that enforcement of restrictive covenants was 
unconstitutional and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Apparently, noting the most important aspect of this deci­
sion, one source points out: "By increasing the scope of
the state action concept, the Court furnished a general 
judicial technique that later was to prove invaluable [since 
subsequently this technique was used in numerous cases to 
overcome the separate but equal doctrine]." Another case—
^°®Miller, p. 432.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
113
Sweatt V. Painter (1950)— provides a second example. In the 
Sweatt case, the Court reversed a decision of the Texas 
Supreme Court which held that a new "basement" law school 
for Negroes was equal to the University of Texas Law School. 
One incident of great importance, according to legal 
scholars, "occurred in the Court's analysis of 'separate but 
equal'" and the indication that the presence of intangible 
factors may make separate facilities inherently "unequal.
The McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents case (1950) 
represents a third example of the praiseworthy leadership 
in the area of equal educational opportunities. In the 
McLaurin case a Negro graduate student at the University of 
Oklahoma was required by state law to sit in a segregated 
area of the classroom, cafeteria and library. Declaring 
this differential treatment "constitutionally impermis­
sible" the Court asserted that such "restrictions impair 
and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions 
and exchange views with other students, and, in general, 
to learn his profession." Also, the Terry v. Adams case 
(1953) which was discussed in a previous section addressed 
discrimination in the area of voting rights. In Terry, the 
Court held that white primaries in Texas were unconstitu­
tional since they excluded Negroes. Another example is 
Henderson v. United States (1950), a case which involved 
discrimination in the dining car of a passenger train.
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Specifically, "a Negro was denied the right to sit in the 
portion of the dining car reserved by the railroad for whites 
only." The Court's decision held that this was a violation 
of an Interstate Commerce Act. In addition, the Court 
said: "We need not multiply instances in which these rules
sanction unreasonable discrimination. The curtains, parti­
tions and sign emphasize the artificiality of a difference 
in treatment which serves only to call attention to a racial 
classification of passengers holding identical tickets and 
using the same public dining facility.
Of special importance is the renown Brown v. Board 
of Education case (1954 and 1955). According to most 
authorities, the Court's decision in the Brown cases not 
only has historical significance for affording equal educa­
tion for all American children but also for initiating 
numerous reforms. Many sources verify the Court's initia­
tive and confirm its effectiveness in promoting social 
reform. For example, one writer comments:
The desegregation decision. Brown v. Board of Edu­
cation . . . ushered in a series of profound 
reforms. States and federal criminal procedures 
were modified to protect defendants, including 
juveniles. Jurisdiction was assumed over the 
apportionment of state and federal legislative 
bodies. . . . There developed an aggressiveness 
in protecting the rights of the Negro. . . . These 
results were accompanied by significant growth in 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts and by
King and Quick, pp. 21-22.
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development of legal doctrine that together provide 
a solid basis for further change.Ill
One source acknowledges the importance of the Brown decision 
in upholding the constitutional prohibitions against racial 
discrimination in public education. But more importantly, 
it claims that the Court's actions probably gave impetus to 
review of other inequalities in ranerican life. Accordingly, 
Supreme Court decisions of the sixties influenced constitu­
tional law dealing with the political processes of govern­
ment. For example, in several cases— Gray v. Sanders (1963); 
Wesberry v. Sanders (1964); and Reynolds v. Sims (1964)—  
the Court made it patently clear that both election and 
representation in the legislature must afford voters per 
capita equality with regard to economic interest or place of 
residence within the political unit. The Court decision 
in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (1966) invalidated 
state laws making the payment of poll tax a prerequisite to 
voting: "The Supreme Court of the United States . . . 
struck down the Virginia requirements as a violation of the 
equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .  In 
overruling an earlier decision in Breedlove v. Suttles, 
Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority of the Court, 
noted in part: 'Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not
the People's Rights (Woodbury, New York: Barron's Educa­
tional Series, Inc., 1973), p. 463.
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germaine to one's ability to participate intelligently in 
the electoral process. . . . The requirement of fee paying 
causes an invidious discrimination.',«113
In other cases. Court decisions, regarding the 
administration of criminal justice, reflected an increasing 
influence of egalitarianism. In 1966, one writer notes 
optimistically that "no period of our history since the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights can equal the last decade in 
the scope, rapidity, and intensity of the changes in the 
law of criminal procedure." He adds that "many of the 
changes are the result of decisions by the United States 
Supreme Court.
Regarding the sit-in cases of the sixties, it has 
been observed:
The historian will be struck with the fact 
that in every case in which it granted review— as 
it did in most cases— the Supreme Court upset con­
victions upheld by state courts of last resort in 
the great sit-in controversy. Time and again, the 
Court put its own construction on the facts and 
came to conclusions opposed to those of the state 
courts. Federal supremacy was asserted with 
vengeance, and no ingenious interpretation of state 
laws governing breach of the peace, unlawful 
assembly, or tresspass was availing against what 
seemed the obvious determination of the Supreme 
Court to protect sit-in defendants against the wrath 
of the states. These decisions had significance 
beyond protection of individual rights : they left
the students and their sympathizers free to pursue 
their massive assault on discrimination in places 
of public accommodation, to keep the controversy
Dorsen, p. 433.
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sional action.115
Perhaps, the following comment on the Supreme 
Court's leadership characterizes the nature, scope, and 
potential summarily:
The sum of the whole matter is that the Supreme 
Court has been bold, aggressive, and creative in 
resuscitating civil rights and in restoring them to 
the place assigned them in the constitutional 
firmament by the Civil War Amendments. It has had 
to break old shackles and depart from old prece­
dents of its own making. It has rarely hesitated. 
Where it could have taken refuge in those old pre­
cedents, it has resisted the temptation to do so 
and has remained undaunted by the shock waves of 
criticism and abuse. It has been tried and found 
worthy of the past moments of its own greatness.
In its great decisions in the white primary cases, 
the confessions cases, the race-restrictive 
covenant cases, the school cases, the sit-in cases, 
the Supreme Court has moved at an ever accelerating 
pace toward making the Negro more and more a free 
man and less and less a freedman. H G
Role of Presidents of the United States
Regarding the role of president or the executive 
branch of the federal government in general, it seems 
desirable to mention duties that authorities consider para-
An important role of the executive department is 
to see to it that the independence and integrity 
of the federal courts are observed and that judi­
cial orders are carried out. Another important 
function is to see that the basic conditions of 
peace and order are maintained, and those, in turn, 
may involve the protection of important constitu­
tional rights. . . . Moreover, some remedies that 
Congress may provide for vindication of certain
^^^Miller, pp. 402-403. ^^^Miller, pp. 432-433.
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rights depend for their effectiveness upon the 
aggressiveness, the initiative, and the energy of 
the executive as it operates through the Justice 
Department or otherwise in the prosecution of these 
remedies.117
Until the mid-twentieth century, presidents failed
to utilize their resources and authority to remedy persistent
racial problems. In fact, Gunnar Myrdal wrote in 1944;
The Negro problem is not only America's greatest 
failure but also America's incomparably great 
opportunity for the future. If America should 
follow its own deepest convictions, its well-being 
at home would be increased directly. At the same 
time America's prestige and power abroad would rise 
immensely. The century-old dream of American 
patriots, that Americans should give to the entire 
world its own freedom and its own faith, would come 
true. America can demonstrate that justice, 
equality, and cooperation are possible between 
white and colored people. . . . America is free to 
choose whether the Negro shall remain her liability 
or become her opportunity.J-iw
Perhaps, Myrdal's comments stemmed in part from the fact
that for the first three decades of the twentieth century
the plight of Negroes to secure first-class citizenship
had been disregarded by the federal government, in general,
and the executive branch in particular. When there was
response from the executive branch, during the decades
following the 1930s, pursuit was limited or inadequate.
Commenting on the Franklin Roosevelt administration, one
writer observes;
There was scarcely any concern about blacks 
in the twentieth century until the Franklin
^■^^Kauper, p. 181.
^Myrdal, pp. 1021-1022.
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Roosevelt administration. Even then, blacks bene­
fited for the most part only because most of them 
were among the poor who were helped by the New Deal 
programs. The emphasis was on economic and social 
class rather than color of skin, but societal 
institutions, including the "breadlines," remained 
segregated. The federal government made no concerted 
effort to lift the barriers that surrounded blacks 
at every turn. During World War II, as the result 
of a threatened march on Washington by black leaders. 
President Roosevelt issued an executive order 
banning discrimination in employment in defense 
industries and established a Fair Employment Prac­
tices Committee (FEPC) to deal with government con­
tract employment.
During the administration of President Harry 
Truman the pace toward accomplishing equality and justice 
did not seem to accelerate greatly. Some of the achieve­
ments of President Truman include creating a Fair Employment 
Practices Board (FEPB) in the Civil Service Commission, 
since Congress had discontinued the FEPC; initiating 
desegregation of our nation’s armed forces; and recommend­
ing a civil rights program. Truman's proposal of a civil 
rights program was considered significant at that partic­
ular time by some people. On the other hand, it has been 
noted; "President Truman, a master at making promises 
which he had no intention of fulfilling, appointed a 
committee, in December, 1946, to work out a civil rights 
program. The resulting document attacked lynching and Jim 
Crow in its manifold forms. Truman, however, obviously 
had no intention of making a fight for this program, and
^^^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson
Administration, p. 3.
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after it ran into strong Congressional opposition, he let 
it gather dust on the shelf.
The accomplishments of the Eisenhower administra­
tion in the area of civil rights seem to be meager. Some 
historians have pointed out Eisenhower's abhorrence of the 
use of executive power to deal with what he considered 
basically local problems. However, it has been observed 
that President Eisenhower continued his predecessor's 
attempts to desegregate the military. Eisenhower also 
established committees to deal with racial discrimination 
against Negroes in both government and contract employment. 
He, also, promoted desegregation in Washington, B.C. 
Eisenhower's lack of commitment to school desegregation was 
evident in that Eisenhower seemed to disassociate himself 
from the Brown cases. Sources indicate that he never 
publicly committed himself to desegregation of public 
schools. Nevertheless, it has been observed that he 
reluctantly set an important precedent by sending in 
federal troops and federalizing the Arkansas National Guard 
to enforce a federal court order for school desegregation 
in Little Rock. Identifying Eisenhower's own role as 
ambigious, historians record the fact that it was during 
Eisenhower's administration that Congress passed the Civil
^^^Foster, p. 530.
^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson 
Administration, p. 4.
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During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, 
presidents probably responded most aggressively to foster 
rights to which Negroes were entitled. Hence, this section 
will deal in some depth with the efforts of these two 
presidents to utilize the power and the influence of the 
presidency to effectuate significant advancement in the area 
of civil rights.
Some of President Kennedy's responses to racial 
injustice and discriminatory practices in America should be 
discussed. His contributions to the Negro's struggle for 
equal rights and justice have been documented many times. 
Evidence supports his involvement in the areas of housing, 
employment, and education. In addition, it should be 
mentioned that President Kennedy appointed numerous Negroes 
to federal positions and sought to reduce discriminatory 
practices in the armed forces.
Our system of government provides substantial 
opportunity for the president to effectuate significant 
change in civil rights and to promote reform. Outstanding, 
perhaps, is the president's authority emanating from the 
prestige of his office and originating within the province 
of his executive power. For example, the president can 
issue executive and administrative orders and make speeches 
to influence public opinion. Also, the president can 
utilize his personal influence to convince governmental 
officials to enforce pertinent policies and offer proposals 
to Congress. As commander-in-chief, the president has
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the power to make changes in the armed forces and to call 
on the military to enforce court orders. Perhaps, most 
importantly, the president can exercise his own authority 
in the area of federal funding. Other powers of the presi­
dent include his ability to encourage or threaten litigation 
in the courts and to make federal appointments.
During the Kennedy administration, many sources 
acknowledge that Attorney General Robert Kennedy served as 
the chief strategist and leader of civil rights efforts 
within the federal government. Interestingly, the nature 
and scope of Robert Kennedy's responsibilities and 
authority have been summarized. "The president's brother, 
Robert Kennedy, who was attorney general . . ., gave 
overall direction to the administration's civil rights 
policies. Major questions of policy and execution to cope 
with large-scale problems were dealt with by him and his
staff."^23
To reduce discrimination in housing. President 
Kennedy issued an executive order called "Equal Opportunity 
in Housing." Regarding this particular executive order, it 
has been explained: "Under its terms the president directed
James C. Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy 
Administration (Hattiesburg, Mississippi: University and
College Press of Mississippi, 1971), pp. 17-18.
^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis­
tration, p. 21.
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federal agencies to take every proper and legal action to 
prevent discrimination in (1) the sale or leasing of housing 
which was owned or operated by the federal government; (2) 
housing which was constructed or sold through loans which 
were made, insured, or guaranteed by the federal government; 
and (3) housing which was made available through slum 
clearance or urban renewal programs.
In the area of employment, discrimination persisted. 
Discrimination in federal employment caused great concern.
For example, one source notes: "Between June 1961 and June
1962, the federal employment of Negroes increased by only 
11,000, while the total number of federal employees increased 
by more than 62,000. Further, it has been mentioned:
"According to a Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity 
report in 1964, Negroes had increased since 1961 from 12.9 
to 13.2 percent of all federal employees, and in the Plans 
for Progress companies the increase was from 5.1 to 5.7.
By the end of 1963, Negroes were still concentrated in the 
least skilled and poorest paying jobs in both public and 
private categories.
President Kennedy assumed the responsibility for 
addressing discrimination in employment. Among other things.
Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis­
tration, p. 29.
^^^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 627.
^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis­
tration, pp. 48-49.
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in 1961, the president made the following announcement :
I am today issuing an Executive Order combining 
the President's Committee on Government Contracts 
and the President's Committee on Government Employ­
ment Policy into a single President's Committee on 
Equal Employment Opportunity.
Through this vastly strengthened machinery, I 
intend to ensure that Americans of all colors and 
beliefs will have equal access to employment within 
the government, and with those who do business with 
the government.
This order provides for centralization of 
responsibility for those policies under the Vice- 
President. It requires the Secretary of Labor—  
with all resources of the Department of Labor at 
his command— to supervise the implementation of 
equal employment policies. And it grants, in 
specific terms, sanctions sweeping enough to
ensure compliance.^27
Also, during the Kennedy administration efforts were made 
to obtain cooperation and assistance from companies not 
holding government contracts in providing for equal job 
opportunities. In June of 1963, President Kennedy issued 
another executive order which was designed to reduce job 
discrimination. For example, it has been reported: 
"President Kennedy issued Executive Order 11114 in which 
he extended the authority of the Committee on Equal 
Employment Opportunity to cover any federally assisted con­
struction project, whether by loan, grant, contract, 
guaranty, or insurance; and he empowered the committee to 
withhold federal funds from any project in which discrimi­
nation against workers was practiced." Despite these 
efforts which were considered praiseworthy at the time.
^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis­
tration , p. 48.
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authorities pointed out, in 1965, that the President's 
attempt to deal with job discrimination under his 1961 
Executive Order had little impact."1^8
Perhaps, it should be pointed out that the year 1963 
marked the one hundredth year of Negro emancipation and one 
year of Negro revolution. Many sources contend that 
Americans experienced the most serious domestic crisis since 
the Civil War and that there were only limited signs of 
progress in the area of civil rights. For example, Lerone 
Bennett notes:
In scores of cities. North and South, there 
were riots and near-riots and small wars were fought 
in Cambridge (Maryland), Danville (Virginia), 
Savannah, and Birmingham. There were . . . more 
than ten thousand racial demonstrations (sit-ins, 
lie-ins, sleep-ins, pray-ins, stall-ins) in this 
year, and more than five thousand American Negroes 
were arrested for political activities. The whole 
army of resistance and rebellion reached a pitch 
in the Red Summer of 1964, one of the most 
turbulent summers in American race relations.
. . . Negro ghettos were spreading like hot lava 
across the concrete crags of every metropolitan 
area; Negro unemployment was at a 1930 depression 
level; and Negro schools, the Supreme Court to the 
contrary notwithstanding, were separate and trans­
parently unequal. In the North, there was gentle 
evasion of the spirit and letter of the Constitu­
tion; and in the South, there was open defiance.
As the year of decision opened, federal troops were 
maintaining an uneasy vigil at the University of 
Mississippi. And police officers and black rebels 
at the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC) were fighting grim guerrilla actions in the 
wilds of the Black Belt counties of southwest 
Georgia and central Mississippi.1^9
^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis­
tration, p. 48.
^^^Bennett, p. 328.
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Another writer makes the following remark: "The fulfillment
of the Negro revolution plainly demanded much more than the 
achievement of the Negroes* legal rights. In April 1963 the 
unemployment rate for non-whites was 12.1 percent, for 
whites 4.8 percent. Poverty afflicted half the non-white 
population, less than one-fifth of the white population. 
Three out of five non-white families lived in deteriorating 
or dilapidated buildings or without plumbing. The racial 
and social problems were inextricably intermingled." Arthur 
Schlesinger comments on the prevalence of revolutions in 
American history and implies their propensity to effect 
social reform:
Every great period of social change in 
American history has been set off by the demand of 
some excluded but aggressive group for larger 
participation in the national democracy: in the
age of Jackson by the frontier farmer, the city 
worker, the small entrepreneur; in the progressive 
era, by the bankrupt farmers of the middle border 
and the by-passed old upper classes of the cities ; 
in the New Deal by labor in mass-production 
industries, the unemployed and the intellectuals.
The uprising of the Negroes now contained the 
potentiality of ushering in a new era which would 
not only win Negroes their rights but renew the 
democratic commitment of the national community. It 
also contained the potentiality, if the anger 
the Negroes exceeded the will of the government to 
redress their grievances and the capacity of their 
own leadership to retain their confidence, of 
rending and destroying the fabric of American 
society. . . .  A generation ago Roosevelt had 
absorbed the energy and hope of the labor revolution 
into the New Deal. So in 1963 Kennedy moved to 
incorporate the Negro revolution into the democratic 
coalition and thereby help it serve the future of 
American freedom.130
A Thousand Days: John F .
Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1965), pp. 975-977.
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It seems that President Kennedy urged Congress to respond 
effectively to civil rights problems. One source notes :
"The President declared that . . .  he was going to ask 
Congress to act on the proposition that race had no place in 
American life or law. He pointed out that already the judi­
ciary and the executive branches of government had made that 
commitment and that it was time for Congress to act." 
Accordingly, the president's message to Congress in 1963 
stressed that Negroes' drive for justice had not remained 
stationary nor would it do so until full equality had been 
achieved. Urging passage of Civil Rights Bills, the presi­
dent said: "The growing and understandable dissatisfaction
of Negro citizens with the present pace of desegregation and 
their increased determination to secure for themselves the 
equality of opportunity and treatment to which they are 
rightfully entitled, have underscored what should have 
already been clear: the necessity of the Congress enacting
this year— not only the measures already proposed— but also 
additional legislation providing legal remedies for the 
denial of certain individual rights.
During the Kennedy administration, there were 
efforts to eliminate discrimination in public schools. For 
instance, in the fall of 1962 the Justice Department filed 
an unprecedented law suit in the federal district court in 
Richmond, Virginia, to end racial discrimination in the
tration, pp. 56-58.
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Prince George County Public S c h o o l s . The widespread 
significance of this action has been indicated: "This
marked the first time that the federal government had ini­
tiated a school desegregation suit. It was an important 
case for private groups, because they foresaw that the 
financial burden of instituting and prosecuting civil rights 
cases might be shifted to the federal government in those 
parts of the South which benefited from impacted area 
aid." Also in the fall of 1962, there existed evidence to 
verify the president's leadership. Of tremendous impor­
tance, perhaps, is evidence not only of President Kennedy's 
responsive and exemplary leadership but also the effective­
ness of cooperation between branches of our government to 
secure equal rights for Negroes. For example, actions 
were taken to ensure James Meredith's admission into the 
University of Mississippi in compliance with a federal 
court order. Accordingly, it has been noted:
In order to carry out the court order, it was 
necessary for the Justice Department to dispatch 
541 United States marshals, and the president 
alerted several thousand federal troops and 
federalized the Mississippi National Guard. Federal 
troops were retained in Oxford for the rest of the 
year to maintain order and to protect Meredith, 
as he completed requirements for a degree.
The president's commitment to equal rights in edu­
cation was again demonstrated in 1963 when Governor George
^^^King and Quick, p. 263.
^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis­
tration, pp. 40-41.
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Wallace refused to allow two Negroes, Vivian Malone and 
James Hood, to register at the University of Alabama. He 
signed an executive order to federalize the Alabama National 
Guard to ensure their registration. Further, Kennedy 
appeared on television and explained to the nation the 
necessity for the use of federal troops. Delivering an 
address praised by many people as the Second Emancipation 
Proclamation and by others as the Kennedy Manifesto, the 
president asserted: "We are confronted with a moral issue.
It is as old as the scriptures and as clear as the 
American Constitution. The heart of the question is whether 
all Americans are to be offered equal rights and equal 
opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow 
citizens as we want to be treated.
Kennedy was willing to indicate to all Americans 
that his administration would choose individuals for impor­
tant governmental appointments on the basis of their merit 
and without regard to other considerations. Of some 
importance is the fact that Kennedy appointed Negroes to 
numerous positions. One writer remarks:
Kennedy showed little hesitation in appointing 
Negroes to important federal positions. As judges 
he appointed Thurgood Marshall to the Circuit Court 
in New York, Wade McCree to the District for 
Eastern Michigan, James Parsons to the District 
Court of Northern Illinois, and Marjorie Lawson, 
Joseph Waddy, and Spottswood Robinson to the bench
'^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis­
tration, pp. 41-42.
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in the District of Columbia. Robert Weaver became 
the head of the Housing and Home Finance Agency 
. . . .  The President also appointed George L. P. 
Weaver to be Assistant Secretary of Labor, Carl 
Rowan as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and 
later Ambassador to Finland, and Clifton R. Wharton 
and Mercer Cook to be Ambassadors to Norway and 
Niger, respectively. He appointed two Negroes,
Merle McCurdy and Cecil F. Poole, as United States 
Attorneys, several others to presidential committees 
working in the civil rights field and to other 
boards and commissions, including John R. Duncan to 
the Board of Commissioners of the District of
Columbia.135
The preceding information does not pretend to 
include all endeavors of the Kennedy Administration to 
ensure equal rights for Negro Americans. However, it pre­
sents some evidence of President Kennedy's active involvement 
in the area of civil rights. Particularly in education the 
President demonstrated the leadership and coordination of 
federal resources which yielded benefits. One writer 
evaluates achievements of the Kennedy Administration:
In appraising the Kennedy record on desegregation 
in education, one salient feature stands out: 
the President and his administration spokesmen 
have created a new mood which at the moment is 
primarily qualitative, but which will eventually 
have its quantitative effect on the Negro com­
munity. Following an era in which the federal exe­
cutive had maintained a posture of an impartial 
agent of law enforcement and a neutral arbiter 
between Negro claims on the one hand and white 
supremacy on the other, the Kennedy Administration 
has resolutely moved the presidency into a position 
of support for the embattled judiciary on the side 
of Negro rights.136
l^^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 626-627.
^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis­
tration, p. 42.
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John Hope Franklin notes:
The young President had no ambitious plans for 
new legislation to elevate the Negro in American 
life. Instead, he looked toward expanded executive 
action, especially in those areas where federal 
authority was most complete and undisputed. He 
hoped, moreover, to use the prestige of his office 
to exercise the "moral leadership" to which he had 
referred during the campaign. He encouraged the 
Department of Justice, headed by his brother Robert, 
to carry forward its efforts to secure the right to 
vote through negotiation and litigation.137
In another source there exists evidence that the office of 
the president was transformed during the Kennedy adminis­
tration. This transformation was apparently most signifi­
cant in the area of civil rights. For example, it has been 
observed:
President Kennedy changed the image of the 
presidency from a position of seeming neutrality on 
civil rights as under the Eisenhower to one of 
positive actions on behalf of the frustrated 
blacks. In his executive actions. President 
Kennedy relied heavily on precedents established 
during previous administrations. . . .  In fact, 
one might say that Kennedy returned the presidency 
to the attempt at leadership of the civil rights 
movement as under Truman. John F. Kennedy was, of 
course, more successful, though much remained to 
be done at the time of his death.1^°
Perhaps it should be added that despite some advancement
of Negro rights, much remained to be accomplished. Further,
it has been noted: "The president's leadership role had
been vital in obtaining a meaningful bill which had a
chance of passage in the House. This goal of enacting a
1^'^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 626.
Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis­
tration , p. 71.
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civil rights bill was unfulfilled because of his death on 
November 22, 1963. But a new president, Lyndon Johnson, 
made it plain in an address to Congress a few days later 
that he meant to see the bill passed into law. His own 
leadership played a major role in fulfilling that part of 
John F. Kennedy's program by July 1964, when the most far- 
reaching civil rights bill in American history became law.
A significant step had been taken toward making the Negro 
a first-class citizen of the United States.
In the 1960s direct action occupied center stage 
in the Negro's quest for equality. At the same time 
Negroes were reminded by leaders that the ballot and the 
courts were still valuable instruments for achieving pro­
gress. In 1964, Roy Wilkins, executive secretary of the 
NAACP considered by many the most consistently powerful 
civil rights organization, insisted that the flexible use 
of a variety of tactics would be essential if the civil 
rights movement were to accomplish its goals. Wilkins 
asserted: "We cannot have meaningful change in human rela­
tions, especially if these involve the revision of laws 
and uprooting of tradition, without confrontation, tension 
and occasional s t r i f e . C o n t i n u i n g ,  Wilkins said :
^^^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis­
tration, p. 63.
^^^Frances L. Broderick and August Meier, eds., 
Negro Protest Thought in the Twentieth Century (New York : 
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), p. 397.
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The plain lesson is that we must use every 
method, every technique, every tool available. We 
need to devise new tools. Our attack must be 
across the board and must be leveled at all forms 
and degrees of second class citizenship. Where one 
weapon is sufficient, let it be employed. Where a 
combination is required, let it be used. Where 
variations in timing and methods will be effective, 
by all means let us employ them. But let none of 
us, in the North or in the South, "activists" or 
not, fall into the trap, at this crucial stage, of 
attempting to solve all problems everywhere by a 
single method.
If Negro citizens today need to re-examine 
their positions, white people are under no less 
obligation to review theirs. Despite the bitter­
enders, the question of the day is not whether 
racial inequality and its principal tool, segrega­
tion, shall survive. The question is only on the 
means and the pace of eliminating it. Diehard 
opposition will but delay matters; it cannot win.
. . . American Negro citizens are a unit insisting 
that the Constitution of the United States 
guarantees protection of their citizenship rights 
against the abridgements and denials of any 
racist doctrine or practice, in Atlanta or in
Spokane.141
In 1964, Negroes expected to move at an accelerated pace 
toward the practical realization of first-class citizenship.
President Lyndon Johnson seemed reluctant to use 
the power of his office to press Congress toward passage 
of the Voting Rights Act. However, on March 15, 1965, he 
addressed the matter of voting as a basic right, and 
reminded Congress that "every device of which human 
ingenuity is capable has been used to deny this right.
^Broderick and Meier, p. 400.
^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson 
Administration, p. 31.
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He concluded his speech by outlining proposals which he 
planned to submit to remedy the existing problems.
On August 6, 1965, signing the Voting Rights Act 
into law, Johnson asserted that the act would "strike away 
the last major shackle" of the black’s "ancient bonds." 
Generally speaking, this act suspended literacy tests and 
gave the attorney general the power to appoint federal 
examiners to supervise voter registration where tests or 
similar qualifying devices existed.
Johnson was praised for bringing more blacks into 
prominent federal positions than any previous president. 
Noting that the urban Negro's suffering was greatest in the 
area of unemployment, one source suggests that "President 
Johnson attempted to set a pattern for fair employment by 
continuing to appoint Negroes to high government posts. 
Johnson's appointments included the following: Thurgood
Marshall, Solicitor General and Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court; Robert Weaver, Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development; Hobart Taylor, Board of Directors of the 
Export-Import Bank; Clifford Alexander, Chairman of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Theodore Berry, 
Assistant Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO); and Ruby Martin, Director of the Office of Civil
^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson 
Administration, p. 34.
^^^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 641.
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Rights; and Carl Rowan, Director of the United States Infor­
mation Agency (USIA) . As ambassadors, he appointed James 
Nabrit, Jr., to the United Nations, Patricia Harris to 
Luxenbourg, Clinton E. Knox to Dahomey, Franklin Williams 
to Ghana, and Merle Cook to Gambia.
In the area of employment, Johnson used the power 
of the presidency to promote reform. For example, in 
1965, he issued an executive order which transferred the 
responsibility for widening equal employment opportunities 
within the federal government from the President's Committee 
on Equal Employment Opportunity to the Civil Service 
Commission. Revealing some activities of the commission, 
James C. Harvey observed:
The commission almost immediately undertook efforts 
to recruit and train personnel and to police 
various efforts at equal employment opportunity 
within the federal government. A number of 
governmental agencies took independent action in 
that direction too. In 1966 the commission 
established a new program called MUST (Maximum 
Utilization of Skills and Training) to assist other 
federal agencies to recruit and train workers who 
did not or could not ente the civil service 
through regular testing procedures. The commission 
in 1966 for the first time made intensive efforts 
to recruit personnel at black colleges. Finally,_ 
it made attempts to revise entrance examinations in 
order to eliminate "cultural bias.
One study of black employment in the federal government.
^^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson 
Administration, pp. 64-65.
Administration, p. 69.
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completed in 1969, reflects progress during the Johnson 
Administration. In part, the study indicates that more 
Negroes were employed but black employees were still largely 
employed in the lowest paid and the most menial positions.
In 1965, President Johnson issued an executive 
order citing the need for coordination of all parts of the 
federal government involved in the elimination of discri­
mination and the promotion of equal opportunity. Writing 
The Presidency and Black Civil Rights, Allan Wolk summarizes 
President Johnson's endeavors :
Lyndon Johnson's Council on Equal Opportunity 
was the first fullfledged official unit of 
coordination which had specific powers and respon­
sibilities stated in an executive order. It, 
however, was created reluctantly by a president 
who always had reservations as to its need. Its 
short existence was an indication that the adminis­
tration preferred decentralized civil rights 
implementation, with White House control vested in 
the trusted Justice Department. This was further 
reflected in the delegation of Title VI coordina­
tion responsibilities to Attorney General Nicholas 
Katzenbach, who did not view his new duties as 
calling for czar-like action. Katzenbach, rather, 
saw the Justice Department as a moderating force 
which kept civil rights enforcement advancing at a 
steady and even speed. Thus, the Attorney General, 
as coordinator, did not engage in the pushing type 
of operation that was desired by civil rights 
groups, but rather assumed a more passive coordina­
tion role, one in which he used his power to keep 
the various departments working in tandem, and in 
which he tried to prevent political embarrassment 
for the President.148
^^^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson 
Administration, p. 76.
^^^Allan Wolk, The Presidency and Black Civil Rights 
(Madison, New Jersey: Farleigh Dickinson University Press,
1971), pp. 204-205.
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On the other hand, it has been mentioned that President 
Johnson missed an opportunity to exercise essentially strong 
presidential leadership when he dismantled the vehicle for 
a centralized coordination of civil rights efforts. Further, 
it has been contended: "If he had retained that instrumen­
tality and given it his full support there would have been 
much greater progress than there was in implementing civil 
rights.
Finally, it seems safe to conclude that the Negro's 
struggle for equality made some progress during the Johnson 
presidency but not enough. Although President Johnson 
utilized some of his power and authority to ensure the pas­
sage of three civil rights bills, many political scientists 
seem to agree that Johnson gave little attention to their 
enforcement. Frequently, it has been observed that without 
persistent pressure and support from the executive branch, 
the bureaucracy was often unable or unwilling to fulfill 
the objective of legislation. Commenting specifically on 
the achievements of the Johnson administration, one writer
In evaluating the overall accomplishments of 
the Johnson administration in terms of civil 
rights coordination, appointment of blacks to 
significant positions in the federal government, 
black employment with the federal bureaucracy, and 
blacks in the armed services, one must make some
^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson
Administration, p. 225.
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positive and some negative statements. As far as 
coordination of civil rights activities is con­
cerned, the Johnson administration seemed to have 
set up the strongest mechanism in 1965, but it was 
abandoned within a few months. After that, efforts 
to coordinate were at best uneven and too much 
dependent upon voluntarism. Quite a number of 
blacks were appointed to important posts . . . but 
all too often they were of the "revolving door" 
type and had little or no real power. More blacks 
were hired to work in the bureaucracy than ever 
before, but they still held very few of the higher 
positions; there was still too much tokenism above 
the lower levels. Strides were made in desegregat­
ing the armed forces, but here too, blacks tended 
to be top heavy in the lower ranks and to be too 
heavily involved in the combat units. . . . Black 
servicemen still found much prejudice off base.150
The preceding brief history of the Negro's struggle
for equality in America appears to reflect the pattern of
social and political forces operating during most of the
twentieth century. This information provides comprehensive
views of events and issues which Thurgood Marshall felt
compelled to address from 1965-1967. In this connection,
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden assert: "Distinguished
oratory and social crisis are closely related. . . . The
stress of events associated with man's quest for freedom
in civil and political life, the upsurges of patriotic
fervor occasioned by man's desire to preserve his rights or
to extend the influence of his power— these and other
manifestations of the human will have always dominated the
^^^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson 
Administration, pp. 89-90.
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address.
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CHAPTER IV
THURGOOD MARSHALL’S SPEECHES TO 
GENERAL AUDIENCES
This Study analyzes five of Thurgood Marshall's 
speeches delivered between 1965 and 1967 while Marshall 
served as Solicitor General of the United States. These 
speeches were selected because they deal with the theme of 
equality and justice for all Americans. Also they appear 
to be typical of the comprehensive discussions developed by 
Marshall on the -subject equality and justice. During this 
period Marshall not only directed the course of litigation 
for the United States, particularly cases pertaining to 
civil rights; but, being called upon to make speeches at 
universities and public conferences, occupied more of the 
public limelight than at any other stage of his career.^ The 
five speeches may be divided into two categories: (1) those
delivered to general or lay audiences and (2) those pre­
sented to law students and lawyers. The first category 
includes two speeches delivered 1) at the White House Con­
ference on Civil Rights on June 1, 1966 and 2) at the 
Greater Indianapolis Housing Conference on June 15, 1966.
The second category includes three speeches:
(Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1973), p. 143.
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"The Constitution and Social Change" to the Federal 
Bar Association on September 16, 1965;
"Human Rights— Civil Rights: From Theory to Prac­
tice" to the University of Miami School of Law on 
April 27, 1966;
"Law and the Quest for Equality" to the University 
of Washington School of Law on March 8, 1967.
This chapter analyzes Marshall's two speeches to 
general audiences in terms of the following: (1) the occa­
sion and the audience; (2) preparation, integrity of his 
basic ideas, and major premises; (3) the organization, 
identifying purpose, proposition and structure ; (4) logical 
appeals; (5) evidence and support; (6) the emotional 
appeals; and (7) ethical appeal or ethos.
The Speech of June 1, 1966
Occasion and Audience
Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General of the United 
States, delivered an address on the struggle for equality to 
about 2,500 men and women representing many facets of 
American life. The occasion was a "White House Conference 
to Fulfill These Rights" in Washington, D.C. Marshall 
spoke during a banquet session held on the evening of the 
first day of the conference. The Washington (D.C.) Post on 
June 1, 1966, reported : "The conference was called a year
ago by President Johnson to focus on developing new means 
and methods to help the American Negro fulfill the rights
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which, after the long time of injustice, he is finally about 
to secure."^
Some significant events preceded this conference. 
President Johnson called a planning session which was held 
November 17-18, 1965. About two hundred scholars and 
"practitioners in the areas of civil rights, labor, business, 
education, religion, and social welfare met for intensive 
working sessions." This group developed a comprehensive set 
of recommendations "reflecting a variety of viewpoints and 
experience." In February, 1966, President Johnson appointed 
a thirty-member council under the chairmanship of Ben W. 
Heineman, Chairman of Chicago and North Western Railway 
Company, that included Martin L. King, Jr., Vernon Jordan, 
Roy Wilkins, and other members of groups active in the 
civil rights movement, along with representatives from 
numerous major corporations. This council set the policies 
and supervised the detailed planning of the conference.
White House staff and numerous consultants reviewed and 
refined the Council's recommendations and made preparation 
for the Conference.^
The White House Conference, held June 1-2, 1966, 
assembled, according to Heineman, "to pool knowledge.
"Civil Rights
Talks Begin Here Today," Washington Post, June 1, 1966.
^Council's Report and Recommendations to the White 
House Conference (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1966), p. 2.
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energy, and resources in this common cause" and represented 
"a significant milestone in this nation’s drive to remove 
all remaining barriers which prevent Negro Americans from 
full and free participation in our society." He added that 
the one hundred recommendations prepared by the planning 
council were to serve as "our blueprint for realistic and 
attainable action."** The Conference directed its attention 
to four critical areas— economic security and welfare, 
housing, education, and administration of justice. The major 
goal of the Conference was to determine "immediate, practi­
cal steps to enlist in this cause the great mass of 
uncommitted and uninvolved A m e r i c a n s . V i c e  President 
Hubert Humphrey addressed the conferees the morning of the 
first day, and Marshall spoke that evening at a banquet 
held in the Sheraton Hotel of Washington, D.C.
President Johnson, having called for this White 
House Conference, established the theme— "To Fulfill These 
Rights," and asserted that the object "would be to help the 
Negro American move beyond opportunity to achievement," and 
invited the 2,500 men and women in the interracial audience 
to attend this two-day conference. Prior to Marshall's
Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To 
Fulfill These Rights" (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1966), p. i.
^Report of the White House Conference "To Fulfill 
These Rights" (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1966), p. 5.
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speech. President Johnson addressed the assembly and said: 
"Now you are here tonight from every region of this great 
land, from every walk of life, to play your part in this 
momentous undertaking and in this great adventure."  ^ Presi­
dent Johnson, who had appointed Marshall Solicitor General of 
the United States and had invited Marshall to address the 
conference, introduced him to the audience. Accordingly, 
Johnson remarked that for five years he had worked to attain 
equal employment in federal jobs and referred to the rare 
nature of his introduction:
And I am tonight going to give a good example of it 
[equal employment provided Negroes]. I have a very 
unusual pleasure and pride to introduce to you a 
great soldier. I might say that the President of 
the United States does not often have the opportunity 
to introduce another speaker.
But I am glad that tonight I do have that oppor­
tunity. I am going to introduce to you one who 12 
years ago established in the field of civil rights a 
beachhead from which we shall never retreat.
Since that day, he has already occupied two 
great offices— as distinguished Justice of the Court 
of Appeals, and now as the great Solicitor General 
of the United States of America. When he accepted 
this call and left his lifetime job to take a tem­
porary one in this administration, not knowing how 
long it would be but realizing that it offered an 
opportunity to serve his country, he had argued 
already 33 major cases before the Supreme Court.
But he was really in the kindergarten class 
then, because before he finishes his term he will 
probably have argued more cases before the Supreme 
Court than any other American. And let no man ever 
say that he is not a qualified lawyer and judge.
^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To 
Fulfill These Rights," p. 1.
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I am proud that he serves my administration.
I am very proud that his is the voice of the 
people of all of the United States before the 
highest and greatest court of this land.
Nothing, I think, could be really more appro­
priate than that this man should speak to the first 
great national conference that has ever been called 
to really consider the rights and the opportunities 
of Negro Americans.
Now I consider it my high honor and my very 
great privilege to present to you the man who has 
been in the forefront and will continue to be in 
the forefront of all battles for the things that are 
good for our country— Thurgood Marshall, the 
Solicitor General.7
Obviously, in his introduction President Johnson established 
the virtues of Marshall as a man and his authority on the 
topic to be discussed.
President Johnson's introduction accomplished the 
following: (1) for the listeners who were unfamiliar with
the speaker, it provided essential infoimiation about 
Marshall's background and professional experiences; (2) 
many conferees were familiar with Marshall's personal expe­
riences, as a black American, which he shared with inter­
viewers for national publications, reported during frequent 
meetings with NAACP members, and discussed in less formal 
situations. Obviously, they were cognizant of his profes­
sional experiences which demonstrated his outstanding 
leadership in the NAACP's legal strategy, struggle, and 
victories in the field of civil rights; culminating in the 
landmark decision Brown v. Board of Education which
^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To 
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 9-10.
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eliminated the "separate but equal" theory of racial 
equality. For these hearers, Johnson's introduction probably 
confirmed their preconceived image of Marshall; (3) Johnson 
presented information about the speaker that indicated the 
president's close relationship with and esteem for the 
speaker. He related instances which stressed the appro­
priateness and value of Marshall's information and ideas for 
this particular audience. The President revealed Marshall's 
eminent qualifications as an authority in the area of civil 
rights and his competence to provide essential leadership and 
direction for the conference and the conferees. Therefore, 
it may be concluded that for the entire audience Johnson's 
introduction sharpened interest and established a favorable 
relationship between speaker and listeners.
Preparation, Integrity of Ideas 
and Major Premises
This section examines significant aspects of 
Marshall's preparation, his capacity for formulation of 
ideas, and his ability to determine major premises.
Preparation. Information about Marshall's activ­
ities as legal defense counsel for the NAACP and comments 
by persons who observed him in other speech situations 
during the 1950s and the 1960s provide important information 
about his preparation. For example, one biographer comments 
on Marshall's briefs for court cases: "Apparently Marshall
had come to believe that the success of litigation depends
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greatly upon the amount of preparatory work done before the 
case is brought to court. Marshall spent countless weeks 
and months in research, evaluating precedents, consulting 
with witnesses, and writing and rewriting briefs.
Colleagues remark that Marshall's cases and speeches were 
prepared with habitual thoroughness. Substantial evidence 
supports the fact that Marshall believed in being well- 
prepared when he argued a case or delivered a speech.
As legal counsel for the NAACP, Marshall frequently 
addressed local chapters and other groups throughout the 
country. Most of his speeches dealt with the struggle for 
equality and justice. Also, Marshall was acclaimed as a 
successful lawyer who devoted most of his career to the 
legal struggle for civil rights.^ These factors obviously 
enabled him to be thoroughly familiar with his subject and 
with speechmaking.
Integrity of ideas. The critic must assess the 
speaker's capacity for formulation of ideas. Accordingly, 
it seems essential to review briefly pertinent factors in 
the life of this black American which influenced the ideas 
about the struggle for equal rights he composed and
Bland, p. 8.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on the Judi­
ciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall to Be Solicitor 
General of the United States, Hearing, 89th Congress, 1st 
Sess., July 29, 1965 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1965), p. 8.
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delivered. Also, Marshall's ideas are evaluated in terms of 
traditional rhetorical requirements.
Forces emanating from his home, schools, and legal 
career appear to have contributed to the development of 
certain skills and concepts. Evidence was presented earlier 
in this study. Significantly, Marshall's devotion to 
reading and respect for research which started at Lincoln 
University have been maintained throughout his adult life. 
Entering the private practice of law in 1933 he demonstrated 
skill as a trial lav/yer and zest for equality and justice.
As NAACP lawyer for more than two decades, Marshall parti­
cipated in the struggle for human rights and dignity. For 
"his wise counsel and his unflagging devotion and courage 
as NAACP lawyer, Marshall's legal skills and dedication to 
the cause of civil rights were praised. Marshall served as 
legal counsel for the NAACP arguing numerous cases involving 
civil rights, including fifty-one cases before the Supreme 
Court [and lost only eight]. In this connection, one 
source reports:
While Brown v. Board of Education was perhaps 
the most famous case presented to the Court during 
Marshall's 23 years with the NAACP and the one 
with the most far-reaching consequences, under his 
legal guidance the NAACP won several other 
important victories including the banning of the 
"white primary" in the South, the exclusion of 
restrictive covenants in housing and outlawing of 
Jim Crow restrictions in interstate travel. Many
"Marshall's Nomination Hailed by Wilkins," The 
Crisis, 62:559, November, 1961.
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of today's gains in civil rights might well have been 
impossible had it not been for the dedication and 
brilliant legal groundwork which he laid. . . . H
When Marshall was appointed to federal judgeship, NAACP 
Executive Secretary Jloy Wilkins asserted; "The veteran 
civil-rights attorney . . . carries to his new position extra­
ordinary experience in the federal courts, a wealth of 
knowledge of federal procedures, a breadth of understanding 
rare even among the country's most outstanding and successful 
l a w y e r s . B i o g r a p h e r s  comment that Marshall demonstrates 
legal ability, intellectual acumen, high code of ethic, 
clear reasoning, and hard work dedicated to the highest 
American ideals of the Constitution.^^
Marshall's personal and professional experiences 
afforded him frequent encounters with violations of civil 
rights and racial prejudice, discrimination, and injustice. 
Presumably, these factors contributed to his ability to 
formulate egalitarian ideas, identifying crucial problems 
related to inequality and injustice and proposing solutions.
In this speech, Marshall seems to meet Dewey's 
requirements for appraising a speaker's ideas and reflective
Thurgood Marshall . . . Uncle Sam's Lawyer," The 
Crisis, 66:435, August-September, 1965.
"Marshall's Nominatio 
Crisis, 62:559, November, 1961.
^^Editorial, "Supreme Court Justice Thurgood 
Marshall," Negro History Bulletin, October, 1967, p. 5.
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t h i n k i n g . M a r s h a l l ' s  capacities can be measured as 
follows: (1) He recognized the problem of translating the
promise of equality into reality for millions of Negro 
Americans as the most important problem at the moment and one 
that would seriously disturb the status quo. Commenting on 
the depth of the problem of racial prejudice and discrimi­
nation in America, Marshall implies or states that the prac­
tices and policies which have denied Negroes equality and 
justice for centuries represent an unwillingness to change.
(2) He analyzed the nature and bearing of the problem upon 
the social setting. Marshall reviews the historical back­
ground of the struggle for racial equality in this country 
and discusses recent dramatic accomplishments "to place the 
present in proper p r o s p e c t i v e . M a r s h a l l  notes that 
recent progress in the area of civil rights has encountered 
various types of resistance but that tactics of delay and 
evasion could only postpone, not defeat, the victory won.
He seems to imply the need to address the tremendous social 
challenge of conflict in the country. (3) Marshall suggests 
ideas relevant to a solution of the difficulty. Here, he 
acknowledges that recent progress in the area of civil 
rights represents no more than a firm base from which to
Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W. 
Braden, Speech Criticism (2d ed.; New York: Ronald Press
Company, 1970), p. 395.
^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference 
"To Fulfill These Rights," p. 39.
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launch the final attack on the causes of racial inequality 
and injustice. Marshall notes the role of the federal 
government in translating the constitutional promise of 
equality for every American. On the other hand, he advocates 
passage of more laws and stronger laws which must be 
vigorously enforced. Also, he recommends restudying and 
renewing the drive toward ending the gap between theory and 
practice in the area of civil rights. (4) He demonstrated 
acuteness in examining, through reasoning, the implications 
of his suggestions. Marshall seems to deal with matters 
which lie at the center of the issues. He uses historical 
facts to reveal the problem. He relates specific instances 
which can be considered typical to prove certain assertions. 
It seems that Marshall preferred to rest his important 
propositions on historical narrative and examples. This 
speech was arranged in a chronological order. Marshall's 
purpose for examining the past was expressed directly: 
"History . . . tells us how deeply rooted habits of prejudice
are, dominating the minds of men and all our institutions 
for three centuries; and it cautions us to continue to move 
forward lest we fall b a c k . F r e q u e n t l y ,  narratives of 
the past and present dramatize values and tendencies which 
the listeners are already anxious to discover. Audience 
response to this device generally earns praise for the
^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To 
Fulfill These Rights," p. 40.
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speaker's invention and insight. Marshall's arguments 
focused chiefly upon the social, moral, and political forces 
which allowed him to present a body of data and incidents 
correlated and synthesized to make his conclusions about 
their importance appear unquestionable to the listeners.
(5) Dewey's final requirement is the verification of the 
speaker's judgment following acceptance of the most feasible 
solution. It is probably unnecessary for Marshall to meet 
this requirement since some rhetoricians assert:
In general, those who wait upon ceremonial 
speakers are drawn from their habitual haunts by a 
sense of duty, a personal involvement in the occa­
sion, a lively curiosity, or— perhaps most often— by 
a desire to hear a preachment upon the significance 
of the occasion. And the ceremonial speaker . . . 
is usually at liberty to view the celebrated event 
in its most symmetrical cosmic attitude. Listener 
and speaker are intent upon contemplating together 
the relation of the occasion to the received values 
honored by all parties. The celebrants may differ 
with those outside their bethel, but differences 
among themselves are usually excluded by tacit 
agreement.17
Assuming that the listeners did not add incompatible views 
to Marshall's message nor disregarded the information he 
chose to include, it is likely that they accepted his view 
of the case. Subsequent activities and plans by the con­
ferees may, in part, constitute acceptance of the solution 
proposed by Marshall. For example, the conferees' report 
which was submitted to President Johnson admitted that a
^^Carroll C. Arnold, "George William Curtis," A 
History and Criticism of American Public Address, ed. Marie 
Kathryn Hochmuth (New York: Russell and Russell, 1955),
p. 153.
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broad and vigorous attack on the roots of the problem must 
be mounted if the nation is to meet the goal— equality as a 
fact and as a result not just equality as a right and a 
theory. It should be noted that observers report the 
following: "There was no complacency as they addressed them­
selves to their task. These meetings were charged with an 
atmosphere of urgency. Their conviction that despite the 
tremendous gains which had been made in creating a legal 
framework for equality, the ugly racial crisis facing the 
nation was quickening in m o m e n t u m . T h e  conferees' 
report also disclosed:
In order to achieve a common focus on specific 
action efforts, it was necessary to select a 
manageable number of areas of concentration . . .  in 
which the results can be far-reaching.
The resulting conclusion was that the Conference 
should direct its primary attention to four critical 
areas— economic security and welfare, education, 
housing, and administration of justice. It was also 
decided that there should be developed in each of 
these areas a limited number of specific proposals 
for local action to which the conferees could then 
commit their efforts in their own communities to 
actions which will achieve early important effects.
The Council's Report is designed to serve 
these purposes. It seeks to summarize, succinctly 
but thoroughly, the chief problems in each subject 
area that deny Negroes their full share of parti­
cipation in the life of the nation. It defines the 
broad goals that must be attained if we are to 
realize "not just equality as a right and a theory, 
but equality as a fact and a result." It details 
ma]or actions that need to be taken by various ele­
ments of our society— by government at all levels; 
by private groups, such as business, labor, reli­
gious and voluntary organizations; and, in some
"To Fulfill
These Rights" (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1966), p. 2.
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instances, by private citizens, themselves, acting 
individually.
Finally, the Council proposes several specific 
local activities in each area on which Conference 
participants and other public-spirited citizens 
may concentrate their efforts.
As the Report clearly indicates, there is no 
intention to slight the importance of governmental 
action, whether Federal, state, or local. The need 
for additional legislation, administrative changes, 
and executive leadership at all three levels of 
government has been extensively treated; the pro­
posals in this category and the Conference reactions 
to them will be transmitted to the President and 
will be made available to state and local public 
officials.
But the Conference would fail in its main pur­
pose if it did no more than that. Governmental 
action, however forceful and creative, cannot succeed 
unless it is accompanied by a mobilization of effort 
by private citizens and the organizations and insti­
tutions through which they express their will.
Indeed, the role of government itself is in large 
part determined by the presence or absence of such 
citizen efforts.
That is why the major emphasis of this Confer­
ence must be on immediate, practical steps to enlist 
in this cause the great mass of uncommitted, 
uninvolved Americans.
That is why we must not end these discussions 
without a common resolve to return to our communi­
ties and undertake those specific actions for which 
our varied interests and positions best fit u s .
Major premises. Authorities in the field of rhetoric 
advise that the prospective aspect of logical analysis is 
furthered by determining the premises from which the speaker 
argued. Substantial evidence discussed earlier supports the 
fact that personal and professional experiences afforded 
Marshall frequent encounters with violations of civil rights.
Report of the White House Conference "To Fulfill
These Rights," p. 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
155
As a lawyer he acquired knowledge of court law, experience 
as the nation's foremost advocate of civil rights and a 
profound, almost religious, respect for the efficacy of the 
law. Biographers acclaim Marshall's ability to outwit, out- 
score, and eventually overcome forces of entrenched and 
organized oppression. His faith in the Constitution as a 
"living d o c u m e n t " w a s  confirmed in his arguments before 
the Supreme Court which received an unprecedented number of 
favorable decisions in the struggle for equality and justice. 
It can be assumed that these circumstances and experiences 
were the sources from which Marshall drew premises pre­
sented to his listeners.
Analysis of Marshall's speech of June 1, 1966, 
appears to indicate the underlying assumption that every 
American must be guaranteed equality and justice. The 
speaker seems to support his position by presenting con­
tentions with the following major premises:
(1) For centuries, Negro Americans have been denied 
equality and justice guaranteed white Ameri­
cans.
(2) During the first three decades of the twentieth 
century, efforts ensure equality and justice 
were limited and/or ineffective.
^ü.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall of New York to Be an Asso­
ciate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
Hearing, 90th Congress, 1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, 
and 24, 1967 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1967), p. 49.
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(3) During recent decades of the twentieth century 
the struggle for equality and justice has made 
significant progress.
(4) In the future, passage, implementation and 
enforcement of laws are essential to secure 
equality and justice for every American.
Organization
Disposition embraces the following matters : (1) the
emergence of a central theme or proposition, (2) the order 
in which the parts of the discourse are developed and the 
proportioning of materials, and (3) the general method of 
arrangement adopted for the speech.
Thematic emergence. It seems suitable to preface 
the presentation of the theme of Marshall's speech to the 
White House Conference with a discussion of the purpose of 
his address. First, the fact that President Johnson invited 
the speaker he had appointed the first black Solicitor 
General of the United States who served as the people's 
advocate authorized to conduct and argue cases for the 
government before the Supreme Court, combined with his 
success as a people's advocate while serving as NAACP lawyer 
and continuing as Solicitor, Marshall represented a symbol 
of civil rights. Undoubtedly, President Johnson invited 
Marshall to speak for two reasons: to inspire and to inform.
In this speech Marshall implied that his purpose was to 
inform; but in reality, it appears that the speaker used 
exposition to persuade. The information presented to support 
his thesis was clearly persuasive.
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Marshall's theme seems to emerge in his opening 
statements of the speech: the present mission and future
actions of those attending the White House Conference "To 
Fulfill These Rights" can benefit from reviewing the history 
of the struggle for racial equality in America. How 
closely Marshall follows this theme will be revealed in the 
section dealing with the structure of this speech.
Rhetorical proportioning and order in disposition.
In this speech, Marshall followed the traditional tripartite 
division of introduction, body and conclusion. In terms of 
word distribution, the introduction consisted of approxi­
mately 26G words. This relatively short introduction seems 
somewhat typical for Marshall. The body of this speech 
contained about 2,740 words and the conclusion consists of 
almost 140 words.
In the introduction presumably Marshall attempted 
to enlist the interest and attention of the listeners. 
Certainly, Marshall indicated the purpose and revealed the 
direction his speech was going to take. For example, 
Marshall began his speech as follows : "My immediate task
in this conference 'To Fulfill These Rights' is to place 
the present in the proper prospective. In order to do this 
I have been requested to review the historical background 
of the struggle for racial equality in this country." He 
established his thesis at the end of the third paragraph 
when he remarked: "History tells us how deeply rooted
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habits of prejudice are, dominating the minds of men and 
all our institutions for three centuries; and it cautions 
us to continue to move forward lest we fall back." Since 
the preceding passages referred to the occasion, explained 
the purpose of the speech, stated the plan of treatment, and 
expressed the central idea, it can be assumed that they were 
effective in enlisting the interest and the attention of 
the audience.
Often understanding the speaker's invention is aided
by knowledge of the organizational pattern evident in a
speech. Therefore, the following outline of the body of
Marshall's speech to the White House Conference contributes
to the analysis of the speaker's invention.
Central Idea ; Those of us who know the struggle 
is far from over history tells how deeply rooted 
habits of prejudice are, dominating the minds of 
men and all our institutions for three centuries; 
and it cautions us to continue to move forward lest 
we fall back.
I. During the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nine­
teenth centuries, history reveals significant 
factors about the struggle for and denial of 
equality and justice for some Americans.
A. During the seventeenth century Americans 
faced experiences that helped them define 
certain rights.
B. During the eighteenth and nineteenth cen­
turies, some Americans struggled to elimi­
nate frequent abuses of slaves and denials 
of free Negroes' rights perpetrated by 
individuals, states, and branches of the 
federal government.
^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To 
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 39-40.
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During the first three decades of the twentieth 
century, history discloses additional dis­
franchising laws, expansion of enforced segre­
gation, and very limited efforts by any govern­
ment, federal, state, or local, to improve 
prevailing conditions; but the Negro began to 
protest and organize to alleviate these circum­
stances.
A. Nothing was done by any government, federal, 
state, or local, although there was an 
occasional pious declaration by the President 
or another high federal official to improve 
prevailing conditions.
B. Disenfranchising laws were multiplied, 
enforced segregation— once confined to a few 
activities and a few states— now reached 
farther and deeper, including the federal 
government which officially adopted a policy 
segregating government offices and the 
military services.
C. The few Supreme Court decisions [the first 
NAACP victories] in support of Negro rights 
were long bearing fruit, easily circumvented 
and did not change the Negro's status sig­
nificantly.
D. Efforts of the NAACP and the Urban League 
to curtail legal and extralegal instances 
of inequality and injustice represent the 
only significant measures to remedy the 
prevailing conditions.
During the next two decades [1929-1948], the 
status quo did not change significantly but 
from 1948 to 1966 history reveals meaningful 
signs of progress in the struggle for equality.
A. From 1929 to 1948, history records the
Great Depression combined with the New Deal; 
the federal government's thrust for fair 
housing; the establishment of a somewhat 
ineffective Civil Rights Section in the 
Department of Justice and a Fair Employment 
Practices Commission combined with the per­
sistence and intensification of segregation 
by law and by policy within federal agencies 
which did not change the status quo signi­
ficantly and did not benefit the Negro's 
struggle for equality dramatically.
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B. During the period from 1948 to 1966, efforts 
of the three branches of the federal govern­
ment, which revoked its discriminatory 
policies, reversed its stand on the insur­
ability of homes in mixed neighborhoods, 
declared unconstitutional judicial enforcement 
of racially restrictive covenants and 
"separate but equal" schools, outlawed 
segregation in railroad dining cars and in 
State graduate school, declared illegal 
discrimination by places of public accommoda­
tion, passed the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 
1960, and 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, and undertook as never before to 
enforce and implement the court decisions 
and new laws, represent actions to translate 
and to fulfill the constitutional promise of 
equality and significant contributions to the 
Negro's struggle for equality.
IV. The history of the struggle for Negro rights
reveals some lessons for the future.
A. Law is important in determining the condition 
of the Negro, whether enslavement, emancipa­
tion, disfranchisement, or equality.
B. Law— whether embodied in acts of Congress or 
judicial decisions— is, in some measure, a 
response to national opinion, and, of 
course, non-legal, even illegal events, can 
significantly affect the development of law; 
hence this history demonstrates the impor­
tance of getting rid of hostile laws and 
seeking security in new friendly laws.
C. Provided there is the determination to 
enforce it, law can not only provide concrete 
benefits but can change the hearts of some 
men since history makes it clear that the 
hearts of men do not change of themselves.
D. Evasion, intimidation, violence may sometimes 
defeat the best laws but they, too, can be 
legislated against.
E. The Negro will more readily acquiesce in his 
lot unless he has a legally recognized claim 
to a better life.
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Conclusion; I do not suggest a complacent reliance 
on the self-executing force of existing laws. On 
the contrary, I advocate more laws and stronger laws. 
And the passage of such laws requires untiring 
efforts.
. . .  we must use the present tools— not as an end, 
but rather as additional incentive to restudy and 
renew our drive toward ending the gap between theory 
and practice.
Moreover, laws have only limited effect if they 
are not vigorously enforced. What I do say is that 
I have faith in the efficacy of law. Perhaps that
is because I am a lawyer and not a missionary. But
I think history— which proves so many things—  
proves me right.
In the body of this speech, Marshall presented four 
main contentions. Three explained historical events related 
to the Negro’s struggle for equality and justice. The
fourth contention affords directions for the future of the
struggle for racial equality. The copies of the speech 
printed in reliable sources include the fourth contention as 
part of the conclusion. However, upon close examination it 
appears to represent part of the body of the speech.
The conclusion of this speech may be considered 
brief. On the other hand, it contains an appeal for accep­
tance and action. Marshall's concluding statements were 
probably effective in winning listeners to his point of view.
Method of arrangement. Marshall followed a 
chronological order of development. Undoubtedly, the pattern 
made the message easy to follow and enabled the audience to 
understand what was being communicated without any difficulty. 
Further, Marshall used internal summaries, transitions and 
signposts which usually achieve cohesive organization.
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Logical Appeals
According to Aristotle, logical materials are the 
most important ingredient in a speech. Thonssen, Baird and 
Braden maintain that the object of analysis of logical con­
tent is the following; "To determine how fully a given 
speech enforces an idea; how closely that enforcement con­
forms to the general rules of argumentative development; and 
how nearly the totality of the reasoning approaches a measure 
of truth adequate for purposes of action.
The rhetorical critic's duty is to examine and to 
determine the effectiveness of the speaker's arguments and 
the support offered to substantiate the speaker's position. 
This section focuses on Marshall's logical appeals.
Marshall's main ideas in the first speech can be 
summarized as follows:
(1) Deeply rooted habits of prejudice dominated 
the minds of men and all our institutions for 
three centuries ;
(2) During the last two decades, legal actions, 
court decisions, executive orders, legislative 
acts, and concerted efforts of organized groups 
helped reduce racial prejudice, discrimination, 
and injustice;
(3) In the future, we must have more laws, stronger 
laws, and vigorous enforcement of laws which 
require that we take affirmative action toward 
ending the gap between theory and practice.
A study of logical proof should examine the speaker's 
reasoning and evidence. The validity of his reasoning can
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be determined by constructing syllogisms from his main 
points and testing them according to the rules of logic.
Three hypothetical syllogisms can be constructed 
from Marshall’s main points to illustrate concisely what 
he was trying to prove.
The first hypothetical syllogism can be stated as
follows ;
(Major Premise) If racial prejudice and discrimi­
nation prevailed for three cen­
turies, all Americans did not 
enjoy equality and justice.
(Minor Premise) Racial prejudice and discrimina­
tion did prevail for three 
centuries.
(Conclusion) Therefore, all Americans did not
enjoy equality and justice.
The syllogism is valid because the antecedent in 
the major premise is affirmed by the minor premise and 
because the conclusion affirms the consequent.
The major premise can be considered an historic 
fact. It was probably accepted readily by the audience. 
However, the speaker probably thought that the minor 
premise needed proof. He presented an abundance of evi­
dence. Marshall frequently employed specific instances and 
authoritative testimony to support his contentions. The 
nature of the illustrative examples and the source of the 
expert testimony differed from speech to speech. In his 
White House Conference speech, Marshall included details of 
historical events during three centuries that illustrated 
the prevalence of inequality. He mentioned slavery in the
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South, lynchings, coerced confessions, frequent acts of 
violence by white mobs in the North, the "enactment of 
highly imaginative segregation statutes . . .  to degrade an 
entire race of people," the legitimization of segregation 
by the Supreme Court when it invalidated the Civil Rights 
Acts of 1870, 1871, and 1875. The speaker acknowledged his 
indebtedness to the well-known historian, John Hope 
Franklin, for the historical data prior to 1900.
The second main idea can be formulated as a valid 
hypothetical syllogism.
(Major Premise) If recent laws and doctrine reduce 
discrimination and inequality, they 
should be promoted and enforced 
vigorously.
(Minor Premise) Recent laws and doctrine do reduce 
discrimination and inequality.
(Conclusion) Therefore, they should be promoted
and enforced vigorously.
Marshall probably felt the need to prove the minor premise 
of this syllogism. In some speeches, Marshall argued largely 
from specific instances of historic events— the federal 
government stopped discrimination in hiring; the Supreme 
Court outlawed segregation; passage of the Civil Rights Acts 
of 1957, 19 60, and 1964; passage of the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965; and the enforcement of court decisions by the 
president in Little Rock and Oxford, Mississippi. He men­
tioned his personal experiences and victories in arguing many 
civil rights cases and the important Brown v. Board of 
Education case. He added: "Perhaps most important, the
Executive Branch has undertaken as never before to enforce
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and implement the court decisions and the new laws. Little 
Rock and Oxford, Mississippi are the most dramatic examples. 
But, there are countless other daily occasions when the 
President, the Attorney General, and the Civil Rights Divi­
sion of the Department of Justice act to 'execute* the law 
of the land.
In each speech, Marshall offered evidence that could 
be documented and testimony from competent authorities. It 
is highly probable that the audience could accept his state-
The third main idea can be formulated as a valid syl­
logism also:
(Major Premise) If equality for all Americans is 
to become a reality, we must take 
affirmative action.
(Minor Premise) Equality for all Americans must 
become a reality.
(Conclusion) Therefore, we must take affirmative
Marshall sought to prove the minor premise of this syllo­
gism briefly by citing personal experiences and expert 
testimony.
In each hypothetical syllogism, the minor premise 
affirms the antecedent and the conclusion affirms the conse­
quent. Therefore, the syllogistic reasoning is valid. The 
speaker employed evidence that met traditional requirements. 
The evidence can be considered sufficient. It is probable
^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To 
Fulfill These Rights," p. 52.
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that the audience accepted his conclusions and was convinced 
by his logic and persuasion.
Close examination of this speech reveals other facts 
about the evidence or forms of support utilized by the 
speaker. For example, frequently Marshall seems to employ 
argument from circumstantial details. Brembeck and Howell 
define circumstantial detail argument as that in which 
numerous items not intimately related to each other by cause 
to effect relationships combine to form a pattern. Further, 
this argumentative form, derived from courtroom proceedings, 
is one of the most useful forms of reasoned d i s c o u r s e . T h e  
following excerpt from the speech illustrates Marshall's 
use of circumstantial details:
In 1867 some Negroes got the vote, but not all. 
Some got a few rights, but not all. And whenever 
they secured some of their rights, it took extra­
ordinary courage— even gallantry— to exercise them. 
For they had little or no protection, either at the 
local level or from the federal government. Schools 
were segregated, even where Negroes had some poli­
tical power. (They never had much.) People 
laughed when Negroes sat down in a restaurant to have 
a cup of coffee or when they tried to get accommoda­
tions in a hotel. The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 
before Congress for five years before it was finally 
passed, was not effectively enforced anywhere. When 
the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in 
1883, few Americans took notice of it; for the Act 
was already a dead letter in Atlanta, San Francisco, 
Chicago, Washington, and New York. Responsible 
citizens boasted of this fact.
The Fourteenth Amendment, never an effective 
shield for human rights, became the mechanism by
^Winston Lament Brembeck and William Smiley Howell, 
Persuasion: A Means of Social Control (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 202.
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which corporate businesses took on human traits and 
enjoyed protection that few black human beings ever 
enjoyed. One southern state after another amended 
its constitution to disfranchise as many Negroes as 
possible without disfranchising, as one leader put 
it, a single white man. And no strong voice was 
raised against this blasphemy of American democratic 
practices.
After citing these details the speaker concluded that during 
this period "there was no time to consider the basic human 
rights, no interest in securing to all Americans equality 
and justice. The effectiveness of this method can be
measured in terms of the "cumulative effect of the list.
Another illustration of the speaker's use of circum­
stantials detail emerges to support his contention that the 
goal of racial equality and justice will be fulfilled in 
terms of the American constitutional system:
What is striking to me is the importance of 
law in determining the condition of the Negro. He 
was effectively enslaved, not by brute force, but 
by a law which declared him chattel of his master, 
who was given a legal right to recapture him, even 
in free territory. He was emancipated by law, and 
then disfranchised and segregated by law. And 
finally, he is winning equality by lav7.27
Marshall used facts and opinions to support his con­
tention that from 1948 to 1966 progress was made toward 
securing equality and justice. In part, he said:
^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To 
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 44-45.
^^Brembeck and Howell, p. 202.
^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To 
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 52-53.
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The real march forward for the American Negro 
begins in 1948, first by very small steps, later by 
much bigger ones.
In that year, the Executive Branch of the 
federal government officially revoked its discrimi­
natory policies and began a slow effort to undo what 
it had done. The desegregation of the armed forces 
was undertaken. Discrimination in government hiring 
was ordered stopped. And FHA reversed its stand on 
the insurability of homes in mixed neighborhoods.
So, also, in 1948— urged to do so by the first 
amicus curiae brief ever filed by the United States 
in private civil rights litigation— the Supreme 
Court held unconstitutional judicial enforcement of 
racially restrictive covenants.28
Rhetorical logic requires the use of evidence. 
Examples of the speaker's use of circumstantial details and 
facts and opinions to support his contentions have been 
presented. Assuming that the speaker's supporting materials 
approach completeness, the conclusion drawn is more accept­
able. From these details the speaker draws conclusions 
which the audience can probably accept. Providing facts and 
opinions which approach completeness as supporting material 
probably enabled the audience to reach the same conclusion 
as the speaker reached.
Emotional Appeals
A study of emotional proof should examine how the 
speaker utilized appeals to the primary and secondary needs 
of the audience, how the speaker employed emotive and con- 
native language, whether the emotional appeals were adjuncts
^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To 
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 50-51.
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to reason, and whether the emotional proof moved the audi­
ence to agree or to act.
Marshall employed major emotional appeals in the 
speeches studied: (1) appeals to individual freedom; (2)
appeals to sense of justice and fair play; and (3) appeals 
to social responsibility.
Addressing the White House Conference "To Fulfill 
These Rights," it seems that Marshall appealed to the 
listener's respect for individual freedom when he said:
The existence of slavery in the colonies at a 
time that they were fighting for their independence 
proved to be a serious embarrassment. It was 
scarcely possible to limit the great principles of 
freedom, stated so eloquently by Jefferson, to only 
white people of the emerging United States. It was 
an iniquitous scheme, Mrs. John Adams said, to 
fight for what they were daily robbing and plunder­
ing from those who had as good a right to freedom as 
the patriots had. In Massachusetts, Negroes 
insisted that they had "in common with all other men 
a natural and inalienable right to that freedom 
which the great parent of the universe hath 
bestowed equally on all mankind and which they had 
never forfeited by any compact or agreement."30
Marshall frequently appealed to the hearers' sense
of justice and fair play. For example, he contends:
Once the colonies gained their independence and 
became the United States of America, hardly a year 
passed that did not witness some new abuses of 
Negro slaves and some denial of rights even to those 
who had gained their freedom. . . .
One might have thought that the Civil War in 
which scores of thousands of white Americans gave
Major Addresses at the VThite House Conference "To 
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 40-41.
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their lives and in which 186,000 Negroes fought 
would have settled once and for all the question of 
equal rights. But this was not the case. Even the 
most elementary rights were denied the freed men at 
the end of the Civil War. It mattered not how many 
sacrifices Negroes had made to save the Union, how 
many were men of education and property, how loyal 
they were to the finest traditions of American 
democracy, they had few rights that anyone was bound 
to respect. . . .31
The following passage seems to illustrate the 
speaker's appeal to social responsibility:
Just as the Supreme Court decisions on the 
"White Primary," "Restrictive Covenants," and social 
segregation provided the impetus for stepped-up 
protests of Negroes, we must use the present tools 
not as an end, but, rather as additional incentive 
to restudy and renew our drive toward ending the 
gap between theory and practice.32
Marshall's appeal to sense of justice and fair play 
can be perceived in the following excerpt from this speech: 
"One Southern state after another amended its constitution 
to disfranchise as many Negroes as possible without dis­
franchising . . .  a single white man. And no strong voice 
was raised against this blasphemy of American democratic 
practices." Continuing Marshall said:
When the 145 Negroes assembled . . .  in 1880 
to organize the Afro-American League . . . they knew 
that they had few if any friends. . . . One thing 
they knew, however, and it was that they had become 
the custodians of America's ideals, the conservators 
of America's professions of equal rights. They 
could well have been proud of their own role as they 
pledged themselves "to protect against taxation; to
^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To 
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 41-44.
32
Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To 
Fulfill These Rights," p. 54.
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secure a more equitable distribution of school 
funds; to insist upon a fair and impartial trial by 
judge and jury; to resist by all legal and reason­
able means mob and lynch law; and to insist upon 
the arrest and punishment of all such offenders 
against our legal r i g h t s . ^ 3
Obviously, Marshall’s speeches contained some pathe­
tic proof. In this speech as well as others, the emotional 
appeals presumably serve as adjuncts to reason. Most 
importantly, the effectiveness of the speaker's emotional 
proof was probably because of relationship established 
between noble and lofty sentiments and the interests of the 
audience.
Ethical Appeals
Aristotle defines the role of ethos in persuasive 
speaking as follows;
The character (ethos) of the speaker is a 
cause of persuasion when the speech is so uttered 
as to make him worthy of belief; for as a rule we 
trust men of probity more, and more quickly about 
things in general, while on points outside the 
realm of exact knowledge, where opinion is divided, 
we trust them absolutely. This trust, however, 
should be created by the speech itself, and not 
left to depend upon an antecedent impression that 
the speaker is this or that kind of man. It is not 
true, as some writers on the art maintain, that the 
probity of the speaker contributes nothing to his 
persuasiveness; on the contrary, we might almost 
affirm that his character (ethos) is the most
potent of all the means to persuasion 34
^^Major Addresses of the White House Conference "To 
Fulfill These Rights," p. 45.
^^Brembeck and Howell, p. 245.
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Further, Aristotle suggests three constituents of ethical 
proof: character, sagacity, and goodwill.
To determine Thurgood Marshall's ethical appeals, 
two questions should be posed. First, what reputation did 
the speaker bring with him to the speaking situation?
Second, what did the speaker do during the speech to enhance 
the audience's impression of his character, sagacity, and 
goodwill?
Several events appear to have increased materially 
the force of Marshall's ethical appeal. First, as chief 
counsel for the NAACP Marshall has been described as the 
"champion of Negro rights" for twenty-six years who argued 
thirty-two cases before the Supreme Court which resulted in 
twenty-nine victories, "including the 1954 school integra­
tion decision, perhaps the most famous Supreme Court deci­
sion of modern times." Secondly, after the 1954 decision 
"Marshall became internationally recognized in the legal 
profession." Thirdly, in 1960 Marshall "was invited to 
Britain as special advisor to the fourteen African members 
of the Kenya Constitutional Conference and helped to draft a 
constitution of Kenya writing into the documents safeguards 
for Kenya's white minority." Fourthly, in 1962 President 
Kennedy appointed Marshall to a federal judgeship which 
seemed to represent "that point of security and prestige 
toward which he had been working all his life." However, in
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1965, Marshall was appointed the first black Solicitor 
General of the United States and "went back to a familiar 
occupation— arguing before the Supreme Court.
Undoubtedly, the fact that the then President Lyndon 
B. Johnson introduced Thurgood Marshall when he addressed 
the White House Conference on June 1, 1966, made a favorable 
impression. It should be remembered that President Johnson 
had called for this White House Conference and established 
the theme— "To Fulfill These Rights." The president 
asserted the object of the conference "would be to help the 
Negro American move beyond opportunity to achievement." 
President Johnson had invited the 2,500 men and women in the 
audience to attend this conference. During his remarks to 
the assembly on June 1, 1966, he said: Now you are here
tonight from every region of this great land, from every 
walk of life, to play your part in this momentous under­
taking and in this great a d v e n t u r e . A l s o ,  it is 
generally considered a rarity for the president to introduce 
a speaker. In this connection, Johnson remarks that for 
five years he had "worked diligently to attain equal 
employment in federal jobs" and refers to his appointment of 
Marshall as Solicitor General as an example. Noting the 
rare nature of his introduction and Marshall's reputation, 
Johnson said:
3 % . S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Bess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 32, A985-A986.
Fulfill These Rights," p. 1.
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I have a very unusual pleasure and pride to intro­
duce to you a great soldier. . . .  I am going to 
introduce to you one who 12 years ago established 
in the field of civil rights a beachhead from which 
we shall never retreat. . . .  I am proud that he 
serves my administration . . . [and] that he is the 
voice of the people of all the United States before 
the highest and greatest court of this land. . . .
I consider it my high honor and very great privilege 
to present . . . the man who has been in the fore­
front and will continue to be in the forefront of 
battles for things that are good for our country.38
Presumably; most people attending the White House 
Conference were familiar with Marshall's concern and advocacy 
for minorities and those in the lower economic strata, his 
advocacy of freedom of expression, and his advocacy for the 
disfranchised as an NAACP lawyer and throughout his legal 
career. Marshall's highly publicized legal endeavors com­
bined with frequent expression of his conviction that Negro 
Americans must be afforded equality and justice indicate 
that Marshall was not only the champion of the inarticulate 
masses but also that he believed intensely in the causes for 
which he spoke. In February 1966, Marshall remarked to one 
interviewer: "What is important is that the Negro keep
impressing three things on the American conscience. One, that 
the Negro has had a bad shake all these years. Two, that he 
is entitled to a better shake. And three, that he has not
^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To 
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 8-9.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 3, A986.
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combined with Marshall's message which embraces similar con­
victions probably convinces the audience the speaker is 
virtuous.
The Speech of June 15  ^ 1966
Occasion and Audience
United States Representative Andrew Jacobs, Jr 
(D-Ind.) identifies the occasion, its sponsorship, and prin­
cipal speaker when he requested permission to insert 
Marshall's address in the Congressional Record (June 21, 1966) :
Mr. Speaker, a housing conference was held 
June 14 and 15, 1966, in Indianapolis under the 
sponsorship of the President's Committee on Equal 
Opportunity in Housing and the Major's Commission 
on Human Rights.
Principal speaker at the conference was the 
Honorable Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General of 
the United States.^®
In Chapter Three, it was mentioned that during this 
period several civil rights bills were being debated in 
Congress with little hope of being voted upon favorably. 
Specifically, fair housing was considered "the major stumbl­
ing block." In this connection, it has been noted:
A number of civil rights leaders realized that 
strong opposition was likely to develop in Congress 
against "open" housing, and urged the president 
[Johnson] to extend the coverage under the executive 
order issued by President Kennedy in 1962. . . .
Such organizations as the Americans for Democratic 
Action and the National Committee Against Discrimi­
nation in Housing communicated to the president
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966) CXII, No. 101, A3319.
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their concern that federal funds and credit were 
perpetuating an even increasing the amount of 
racially segregated housing.
Although Johnson rejected the suggestion of the civil rights 
leaders "allegedly on the grounds that it might raise 
serious constitutional questions," it was reported that on 
April 28, 1966, the president urged action from Congress. 
Regarding housing, the president requested passage of legis­
lation as follows: "To declare national policy against
racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, and 
to create remedies against that discrimination in every part 
of America.
According to the Indianapolis Recorder, Congressman 
Jacobs opened the two-day conference, held at the Severin 
Hotel, with a speech revealing his intention to introduce 
before Congress a new housing bill which would prohibit the 
acquisition of land or construction of public works until 
"adequate and comparable replacement homes and churches are 
available to the d i s p l a c e d . A l s o  in attendance were Paul 
R. Oakes, Republican nominee for Congress for the Eleventh 
District of Indiana, Mayor John J. Barton and Dr. Cleo W. 
B l a c k b u r n . R e p o r t e d l y ,  Mayor Barton was the first to
Johnson Administration (Jackson, Mississippi: University
and College Press of Mississippi, 1973), pp. 36-37.
42» Housing Expert Urges Whites to Help Others,"
Indianapolis Recorder, June 18, 1966.
Developer Will Be Spei 
Indianapolis Star, June 16, 1966
eaker at Housing Conference,"
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initiate substantial measures to ensure adequate housing for 
44
all. Dr. Blackburn, executive director of the Board for
income housing project in Indianapolis in 1966— was con­
sidered a pioneer in housing p r o g r a m s h a v i n g  developed 
programs not only in Indianapolis but throughout the eastern
reports that "Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General of the 
United States, spoke at a noon luncheon attended by more 
than 450 p e r s o n s . I n d i a n a p o l i s  newspapers also identi­
fied the "interracial a u d i e n c e " a s  representatives of 
government, including social service agencies, business, 
and religious organizations assembled to discuss "critical 
local housing problems and plans for more decent low-income 
housing.
Earlier in this study, Marshall's commitment and 
success as an advocate of equality and justice for all 
Americans throughout his legal career were documented
^^Based on conversation between Nellie Gustason 
and the author, October 17, 1978.
45^
46
Indianapolis Recorder, June 18, 1966.
'Based on conversation between T. C. Vaughn,
Director of the Greater Indianapolis Housing Commission, and 
the author, September 29, 1978.
Indianapolis Star, June 14, 1966.
^^Indianapolis Star, June 14, 1966.
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substantially. Regarding the matter of discrimination in 
housing, several facts seem pertinent. At this point, it 
seems pertinent to mention Marshall’s involvement in the 
area of fair housing.
As Director-Counsel of the NAACP, Marshall partici­
pated in a vigorous legal attack against restrictive 
covenants from 1945 until he left this position. Also, 
Marshall suggested that the NAACP create a staff position 
devoted to the area of housing.
Prior to Marshall's address before the "Greater 
Indianapolis Housing Conference of Adequate Housing for All," 
his endeavors to eliminate discrimination in housing had 
been widely publicized and generally applauded. For 
example, in one interview Marshall said:
What we must have, and will have eventually, is 
total integration, of schools, housing, the power 
structure, everything. . . . Not until you have 
young people growing up together on an equal basis 
from the start are you going to have real accept­
ance. It is too late to do that for most of the 
present generation of children but we can try to 
do it for the next.
Take for example, the cooperative apartment 
house we live in in New York. There were whites, 
Negroes, Catholics, Jews, Orientals, every group—  
all living side by side and there was never an 
incident. Now those children have a pretty good 
chance of growing up without p r e j u d i c e . 52
Clement E. Vose, Caucasians Only: The Supreme
Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), p. 64.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 32, A986.
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As Solicitor General of the United States, Marshall 
continued to argue cases dealing with civil rights in 
general and racial or housing discrimination in particular. 
For example, Reitman v. Mulkey case challenged the validity 
of provision in the California constitution, prohibiting the 
state or any of its subdivisions or agencies from enacting 
"open or fair housing statutes." When the case reached the 
Supreme Court of the United States, Solicitor General 
Marshall presented the government's position. Marshall 
argued that the amendment had made the state a guilty partner 
in a discriminatory act since it freed the citizens of 
California from the restraints of not only the Unruh Act 
which prohibited racial discrimination in all places of 
business accommodation, but also of other statutes which had 
been enacted to end racial discrimination in housing. The 
Supreme Court of the United States agreed after hearing 
the governmen--s p o s i t i o n . T h e  man the audience came to 
hear had been highly praised as "a man whose work has 
symbolized and spearheaded the struggle of millions of 
Americans for equality before the l a w . W i t h  the preced­
ing in mind, one can understand why Marshall was selected 
as the person to address the Indianapolis Housing Conference.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Hearing, 90th Congress,
1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
180
Basic Ideas and Major Premises
This section focuses on pertinent factors that con­
tributed to Marshall's storehouse of knowledge regarding 
housing problems and enabled him to determine certain major 
premises.
Integrity of ideas. The numerous forces which 
influenced Marshall’s ideas about racial inequality and 
injustice, in general, have been discussed earlier. At this 
point, it seems appropriate to mention some of Marshall’s 
previous experiences related to housing problems which he 
brought to the speech situation in Indianapolis.
In this connection, during the 1940s and 1950s 
Marshall was actively involved in struggle against restric­
tive covenants which have been described as "the most clear
For
example, in 1945, the NAACP called a national conference on 
the matter of housing and launched a vigorous attack against 
restrictive covenants in the courts. During the conference, 
as Director-Counsel, Marshall discussed legal strat .-^ ies:
"The objective, explained Marshall, was to develop causes 
by which the constitutionality of the enforcement of racial 
contracts could be successfully challenged before the 
Supreme Court of the United States. . . . Every aspect of 
the techniques of attacking restrictive covenants was
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 279.
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discussed." Following the conference, it has been reported 
that Marshall announced that the NAACP and its lawyers would 
place special emphasis on the fight against restrictive 
covenants. Also, Marshall declared the NAACP's commitment 
to a propoganda crusade against "the evils of segregation 
and racial restrictive covenants" and suggested the creation 
of a staff position devoted to the area of housing.
In 1947, eighteen Negro leaders including Marshall 
held a second conference on housing and decided to use 
sociological and economic support in the fight against 
restrictive covenants when the next case was argued before 
the Supreme Court. Commenting on the inevitable decision of 
NAACP lawyers to rely on sociological and economic material 
as a principal point in litigation involving such cases, 
it has been noted: "Marshall . . . [was] impressed with the
growing number of articles and other publications showing 
the disastrous sociological and economic effects of not 
only racially segregated housing but racial segregation per 
se. Since Marshall was already making use of social 
theories in two cases involving higher education . . ., he 
was predisposed to the doctrine.
Of some importance is Marshall's participation in 
cases involving discrimination and segregation in housing. 
For example, in McGhee v. Sipes it has been reported:
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The question presented to the Supreme Court of 
the United States by Marshall and [Loren] Miller, 
both in brief and in oral argument, was predicated 
on the facts involved in the case; "Does the 
enforcement by state courts of an agreement restrict­
ing the disposition of land by prohibiting its use 
and occupancy by members of unpopular minority 
groups, where neither the willing seller nor the 
willing purchaser was a party to the agreement 
imposing the restriction, violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment and treaty obligations under the United 
Nations Charter?"58
Specific information about the nature of the brief for the
McGhee case reveals the following:
The authors [Marshall and Miller] of the 
brief . . . devoted thirty-eight pages to a discus­
sion of the damaging effects on unpopular minorities 
because of these agreements. Using data extracted 
from the Bureau of Census figures and Special Census, 
Race, Sex by Census Trace, they analyzed the problems 
of overcrowding and of deteriorated dwellings. They 
cited such findings as revealed in Britton, "New 
Light on the Relations of Housing to Health," in the 
American Journal of Public Health (1942); Hyde and 
Chisholm, "Relations of Mental Disorders to Race 
and Nationality," in New England Journal of Medicine 
(1944); Cooper, "The Frustration of Being a Member 
of a Minority Group," in Mental Hygiene 29 (1945); 
and Farris and Dunham, Mental Disorders in Urban 
Areas: An Ecological Study of Schizophrenia and
Other Psychoses (1939). In this way Marshall and 
Miller attempted to link the unsanitary conditions 
of the ghetto with ill health. Moreover, they con­
tended, the perpetuation of slum areas amounted to 
greater costs for the whole community in prejudice, 
hostility, and racial tension. The Negro lawyers 
pointed to an argument presented in Gunnar Myrdal's 
An American Dilemma, a recent study of American 
race relations conducted by a Swedish sociologist, 
"that in many northern states . . . there is partial 
segregation aided by the gerrymandering of school 
districts." Referring to an article by Robert 
Weaver, the advocates . . . concluded that the 
inevitable result of such redistricting: "As
Negroes are relegated . . .  to physically
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undesirable areas . . . they are associated with 
blight . . . are all believed to be undesirable, and 
their perpetual and universal banishment to the 
ghetto is defended on the basis of racial charac­
teristics. "59
Marshall included similar ideas in his June 15, 1966
speech. For instance, he supports his contention that the
perpetuation of ghetto costs greatly. In part, he said;
"It imposes a social and moral cost beyond measure; it
assesses a financial cost of physical maintenance and social
and public service which must be calculated not in the
millions but in the billions.
Marshall's conclusion in McGhee v. Sipes contained
ideas which he reiterated before the Indianapolis Housing
Conference in 1966:
This case is not a matter of enforcing an isolated 
private agreement. It is a test as to whether we 
will have a united nation or a nation divided into 
areas and ghettos solely on racial or religious 
lines. To strike down the walls of these state
court imposed ghettos will simply allow a flexible
way of life to develop in which each individual 
will be able to live, work, and raise his family 
as a free American.61
Addressing the thirty-ninth Annual NAACP Conference 
in Kansas City, Missouri, June 23, 1948, Marshall's topic
was "Restrictive Covenants and the Segregation Picture."
^^Bland, p. 56.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
^^Bland, p. 57.
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He quoted, in part, the Supreme Court's unanimous decision 
in McGhee case;
Freedom from discrimination by the States in 
the enjoyment of property rights was among the 
basic objectives sought to be effectuated by the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. That such 
discrimination has occurred in these cases is clear. 
Because of the race or color of these petitioners 
they have been denied rights of ownership or 
occupancy enjoyed as a matter of course by other 
citizens of different race or color.
Marshall continued as follows:
This statement sums up a big victory in a long 
fight against segregated housing. It did not and 
will not of itself destroy segregated housing. It 
is our job to protect the effect of this decision 
and to push forward toward the total destruction of 
not only segregation in housing but all forms of 
segregation in American life. Thirty years ago we 
won another victory in the Supreme Court which 
declared unconstitutional a city ordinance in 
Louisville which required racial segregation in 
housing. Ever since that time we have been battling 
various devices by which white supremacists have 
sought to evade that decision. Restrictive covenants 
were the final, most workable and most prevalent 
device which formed the cornerstone of the ghetto 
for the Negro and the Jew, the Mexican and the 
Oriental. Indeed, for every minority to whom some 
Americans would deny democracy.62
Discussing the nature and scope of racial segregation,
Marshall comments on the housing problem: "A shortage of
adequate housing, and I mean unsegreqated housing, for all
American citizens raises a crucial problem. . . . Racial
segregation is inextricably tied up with every single problem
that you can name. No economic, political or social reforms
Thurgood Marshall, "Restrictive Covenants and the 
Segregation Picture" (Address before the thirty-ninth 
annual conference of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, Kansas City, Missouri, June, 
1948), p. 1.
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directed at any one of these problems can be effective so
long as segregation exists." Regarding the solution for the
problem of segregation, Marshall asserts:
There is no single easy solution to this problem.
It will not be solved solely by any court decision 
. . .  by any act of Congress . . .  by the act of 
any State Legislature . . .  by any resolutions by 
this or any single organization, public or private.
This problem will only be solved by all of 
these actions plus a climate of opinion throughout 
this country in favor of full citizenship for every 
American regardless of race, creed or color. It 
will not be solved until the day comes when prefixes 
to the word "American" are removed by court decision, 
by statute and from the thinking of all American
citizens.
In 1953, NAACP lawyers participated in another
restrictive covenant case— Barrows v. Jackson. Marshall
assisted in the preparation of the brief. Although Miller
argued this case before the Supreme Court of the United
States, it should be added that the argumentation repeated
much of that contributed by Marshall and Miller in the
McGhee case. The NAACP lawyers received another favorable
decision from the Supreme Court. Further, it has been noted:
The Restrictive Covenant Cases proved to the legal 
arm of the NAACP that utilization of multigroup 
support through amici curiae briefs and other forms 
of group pressure on concerned federal agencies was 
an invaluable asset. Essential to the success of 
this strategy was the fact that for the first time 
in a private suit the federal government had sub­
mitted a brief friendly to the Negro cause.
In the 1960s, Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall
argued many civil rights cases before the Supreme Court. In
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particular, he argued cases involving racial discrimination 
in housing. For example, in the Reitman v. Mulkey case 
Marshall, as amicus curiae, presented the government's posi­
tion, which, in part, held that the amendment to the 
California constitution which prohibited the state or any 
of its agencies to enact open or fair housing statutes made 
the state a guilty partner in a discriminatory act since it 
freed citizens of California from statutes which had been 
enacted to end racial discrimination in housing. Subse­
quently, the Supreme Court agreed with Marshall that 
California Supreme Court's decision that the amendment vio­
lated the equal-protection clause must be upheld.
Reliable sources agree that the intensive prepara­
tion and exceptional strategy contributed to the legal 
victories of Marshall and his associates in the restrictive 
covenant cases. For example, in a book about Marshall's 
legal career. Bland writes : "The success of the [NAACP
legal staff] in the Restrictive Covenant Cases supported 
its long-practiced strategy of lengthy, legal preparations, 
exposing arguments before moot courts of interested law 
schools . . . and soliciting the finest professional 
talent." Also, commenting on the activities of Marshall 
and his staff in the development of these cases, Clement 
E. Vose remarks:
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Analysis of the Negro victory in the Restrictive 
Covenant Cases forces the conclusion that this 
result was an outgrowth of complex group activity 
which preceded it. Groups with antagonistic 
interests appeared before the Supreme Court, just 
as they do in Congress and other institutions that 
mold public policy. Because of organization the 
lawyers for the Negroes were better prepared to do 
battle through the courts. Without this . . . they 
would not have freed themselves from the limiting 
effects of racial covenants, notwithstanding the 
presence of favorable social theories, political 
circumstances, and the Supreme Court justices.67
Major premises. After discussing the factors which 
contributed to the shaping of Marshall's basic philosophy 
and concepts, it seems desirable to examine the major 
premises presented in Indianapolis. The factors discussed 
in the previous section probably enabled Marshall to select 
appropriate premises for his speech of June 15, 1966. Upon 
close examination of this speech, the following premises 
appear to emerge :
(1) The impact of urban housing problems extends 
beyond the immediate residents.
(2) Ensuring adequate housing for all Americans 
requires community and national commitment and 
program.
(3) To remove conditions which require certain 
people to live in the ghetto involuntarily, we 
must attain certain prerequisites in terms of 
program and policy and their implementation.
In this speech Marshall's premises focus on housing
as a specific area of racial discrimination. On the other
hand, they seem consistent with arguments dealing with
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racial segregation and discrimination in other areas. 
Further, these contentions were most likely acceptable to 
most of his listeners in principle if not in practice. It 
seems that these contentions support Marshall’s position 
and could lead to the desired responses from his many, if 
not all, of his hearers.
Marshall's years of experience as a trial lawyer 
and public speaker, his thorough knowledge of racial 
segregation and discrimination, and his acclaimed reputa­
tion for unparalleled skill in determining legal strategy 
to solve problems related to racial segregation and dis­
crimination apparently qualify him as a well-known and 
highly respected authority on the subject discussed with 
his audience. These factors, among others, enabled 
Marshall to know the significance of various ideas and 
their probable effects on the audience. Further, he seems 
to know the audience's present state of mind, its knowledge 
of the subject, and its awareness of opposing ideas. 
Possessing a broad understanding of the aforementioned 
matters, presumably Marshall can select the best possible 
strategic ideas.
Organization
Disposition will be examined in terms of the 
speaker's purpose, the emergence of a central theme or 
proposition, and the general method of arrangement adopted 
for the speech.
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The speaker's purpose. Marshall's purpose before 
the Grea-cer Indianapolis Housing Conference appears to be 
twofold: (1) to increase the hearers' knowledge or to
inform the members of the audience assembled to confront 
housing problems "head-on" and (2) to convince the listeners 
to adopt a specific attitude toward his proposition and to 
take action on it. The speaker seems to indicate his pur­
pose and to provide a preview of his discussion in the 
following passage: "While this conference cannot produce an
absolute unanimity of view, it can define with some preci­
sion the true and real nature of the area's housing situa­
tion, and, hopefully, point the way toward a community-wide 
attack on the problems that do e x i s t . M a r s h a l l ' s  purpose 
can be considered audience-oriented.
The emergence of a proposition. In this address, 
Marshall seems to imply the following proposition: Persis­
tent segregation and discrimination in the area of housing 
violate the rights of many Americans and perpetuate a divided 
society.
Structure of the speech. The introduction, body, and 
conclusion of this speech are discernible as the major divi­
sions of this speech. The length of the introduction 
presented in Indianapolis is similar to that presented about
U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
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two weeks earlier in Washington, D.C. The introduction con­
sists of approximately 265 words. Perhaps, more importantly, 
the content of this introduction probably enlisted favorable 
attention, promoted friendliness and respect, indicated the 
speaker's knowledge of the various attitudes of his hearers, 
and established common ground while indicating purpose and 
previewing the direction his discussion will take. For 
example, Marshall said:
I am grateful to all of you here today, not 
simply for the courtesy of your invitation to parti­
cipate in this conference but, far more important, 
for your willingness to confront the housing 
problems of the Greater Indianapolis community head- 
on.
I suspect that there are here, as in other 
areas through the country, varying and divergent 
assessments about housing— its adequacy, its ready 
accessibility by all, its character and its quality.
There are those, I am sure, who see no real 
need for concern about the situation, who believe 
that things, in total, are not too bad at all.
Then, at the opposite end of the spectrum, 
there are those who are convinced we face a crisis 
in housing, that it constitutes one of the most 
serious shortcomings of our economy and our society.
And finally, there is that sizeable middle 
group who haven't given the matter much attention 
or thought, those who are relatively satisfied and 
at ease with their own lot and find it difficult to 
involve themselves in problems that may affect 
others but which don't, they feel certain, have any 
broader or more pressing impact.
While this conference cannot produce an 
absolute unanimity of view, it can define with some 
precision the true and real nature of the area's 
housing situation, and, hopefully, point the way 
toward a community-wide attack on the problems that 
do exist.69
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This introduction fulfills rhetorical requirements 
in terms of gaining attention, securing goodwill, and 
preparing the audience to understand the discussion which 
follows. Also, it probably paves the way for acceptance of 
the speaker's implied position that widespread urban 
housing problems must he solved. Marshall seems to imply 
that segregation and discrimination in the area of housing 
which deny adequate housing and suitable environment for 
millions of Americans must be eliminated.
Marshall employs the problem-solution method for 
developing the body of this speech. This approach is 
generally considered an appropriate design for an 
indirect argument. Accordingly, part one presents an 
analysis of the problem and part two deals with determining 
solution.
In terms of word distribution, the discussion con­
tains approximately 1,275 words. The following brief 
outline illustrates the speaker's invention:
I. Urban housing problems . . . are not isolated 
to just a few communities; they are, in hard 
and unpleasant fact, a challenging and 
dangerous characteristic of urban America,
North as well as South, West as well as East.
A. The scope and dimension of these problems 
make them a matter of interest and concern 
whose impact goes beyond those who per­
sonally suffer the inadequacies, day in and 
day out.
B. Housing— and specifically the lack of 
adequate housing— is a community problem, 
an American problem.
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II. [We must meet this problem in several ways.]
A. Commitment of community and nation must be 
developed to ensure guarantees with the 
Housing Act of 1949.
B. We must dissolve the ghetto by removal of 
conditions which require certain people to 
live in it involuntarily.
C. We must establish certain pre-requisites in 
terms of program and policy and their 
implementation.
D. Everyone must share the responsibility.
Most listeners were probably acquainted with
Marshall's background. In such situations, the speaker may
need only to confirm his reputation by the materials used
and the confidence demonstrated in the presentation of his
ideas. The forms of support Marshall used will be covered
later in this study.
Marshall builds a good case and concludes this
speech by reiterating his central idea and with a plea for
action. Accordingly, the speaker seems to focus the
thought of his audience on his central idea and openly
appeals for belief and action. In concluding, Marshall says:
We are left, therefore, with the massive and urgent 
task of correcting the problem, of overcoming the 
obstacles, of righting wrong we have permitted to 
develop and grow.
As hard as the work admittedly will be, it 
must be done, and in the doing we have made a last 
contribution toward fulfilling the American purpose 
and redeeming the American promise.
There is no higher function of citizenship 
than that.
Let us determine to perform it with wisdom and 
persistence, for the good of us all.70
U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3320.
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In this connection, perhaps it should be mentioned that some 
authorities in the field of speech have noted: "If you have
a good case for your proposition you have won the right to 
ask your audience to share your beliefs and act upon them.
You do your case an injustice if you fail to enlist the 
interests and em
Logical Appeals
Marshall's speech to persons attending the "Greater 
Indianapolis Conference on Housing for All" focused on one 
specific and crucial aspect of discrimination and inequality; 
i.e., housing, whereas his other speeches dealt with numerous 
areas of inequality and injustice experienced by Negroes.
Marshall's main ideas summarized in the preceding 
section may be cast into the form of the following hypothe­
tical syllogisms:
(Major Premise) If the scope of urban housing
problems extends beyond the imme­
diate residents, it becomes a 
problem of the community and of the 
nation.
(Minor Premise) The scope of urban housing problems 
extends beyond the immediate resi­
dents .
(Conclusion) It becomes a community problem.
(Major Premise) If segregated and inadequate housing 
is to be eliminated, community and 
national commitment and program are 
required.
Good Speech (2d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 89.
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(Minor Premise) Segregated and inadequate housing 
must be eliminated.
(Conclusion) Therefore, community and national
commitment and program are 
required.
The syllogistic reasoning is valid since in each 
instance the minor premise affirms the antecedent and 
the conclusion affirms the consequent. Marshall's logical 
proof apparently demonstrates sound reasoning and con­
vincing conclusions drawn from acceptable premises.
Characteristics of the speaker's forms of support 
should be discussed. The logical proof in Marshall's 
speech before the Indianapolis Housing Conference depended 
largely upon the speaker's personal and professional 
knowledge and experiences as the major source of evidence. 
For example, the speaker supported his minor premise about 
the nature and scope of urban housing problems by using 
assertions :
Urban housing problems, unfortunately enough, are 
not isolated to just a few communities; they are, 
in hard and unpleasant fact, a challenging and 
dangerous characteristic of urban America, North 
as well as South, West as well as East.
And it should be plainly evident that the 
scope and dimension of these problems make them 
a matter of interest and concern whose impact goes 
far beyond those who personally suffer the inade­
quacies, day in and day out.
It is not a problem just of the poor, although 
its effect on this economic group is a direct and 
telling one.
It is not a problem just of the Negro 
American although, once again, he is affected more 
severely than most of his fellow citizens.
It is not a problem of a particular religious 
or nationality group, although some of these have
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more intimate knowledge of housing inadequacies 
than do others more fortunate.
Housing— and specifically the lack of adequate 
housing— is a community problem., an American 
problem.72
Keeping in mind that Marshall was considered an 
expert authority on the subject, his assertions probably 
were sufficient for audience acceptance of his conclusions. 
Presumably, these assertions clarified and explained his 
contention.
Apparently, Marshall was not content to rest his 
conclusion solely upon assertions. He continued with 
supporting materials which consisted of statements of fact, 
definition and opinion:
The Congress of the United States, in the 
Housing Act of 1949, declared the national housing 
policy to be "a decent home and a suitable living 
environment for every American family."
As to terms, I am certain most people could 
reach a common understanding as to what "decent 
home" should be. Yet ten million Americans live 
in dwellings that are substandard and therefore are 
denied the decency of housing which the 1949 
Housing Act solemnly pledged.
But shortcomings of promise and performance—  
between goal and reality— become markedly more 
severe when we get to the point of "a suitable 
living environment" which is also pledged for 
every American family.73
Marshall's supporting materials explain and clarify 
his main idea. Further, many listeners probably shared 
his belief and did not need additional evidence to arrive 
at the conclusion drawn.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
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In this speech Marshall employs argument by alter­
nation to some extent. The speaker devoted a great propor­
tion of his speech to the demonstration of the practicality 
of the solution he proposed for the elimination of discrimi­
nation and segregation in the area of housing. First, he 
asserted that this "requires the eventual dissolution of 
the ghetto, not necessarily its total physical destruction, 
but conditions which require certain people to live in it 
involuntarily." Continuing he said to accomplish that,
"we must attain certain pre-requisites in terms of program 
and policy and their implementation." Then Marshall pro­
ceeds to outline and explain these factors. Following the 
explanation of his plan, the speaker said:
We cannot delude ourselves by oversimplifying the 
complexity of the work to be done or in under­
estimating the difficulties we will encounter.
The alternative to facing up to that complexity 
and those difficulties, however, is even more 
burdensome, because it would be a program of 
inaction which is fraught with terrible danger to 
our economy, our society, and our national con­
science.
It would be wrong— tragically, destructively 
wrong.
It seems clear to me there is no alternative 
in the true spirit of the word.^^
On the one hand, this illustration indicates that 
Marshall did not present the alternatives comprehensively.
On the other hand, it seems likely that this audience of 
people assembled to find solutions to urban housing problems
74,U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319-A3320.
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would not need further evidence regarding- the alternatives. 
Further the listeners were probably most interested in the 
details of Marshall's recommendations since his life and 
career had been devoted to solving problems related to dis­
crimination and segregation not only in the area of housing 
but in other areas as well. Presumably^ these factors earned 
respect for, if not complete acceptance of, Marshall's con­
clusion.
Emotional Appeals
In Marshall's speech at the Indianapolis Housing 
Conference, one finds evidence of Marshall's appeals to 
patriotism. For instance, Marshall says: "Housing— and 
specifically the lack of adequate housing— is a community 
problem, an American p r o b l e m . A l s o ,  appealing to both 
patriotism and social responsibility, Marshall comments :
We are left, therefore, with the massive and 
urgent task of correcting the problem, of overcoming 
the obstacles, of righting the wrong we have per­
mitted to develop and grow.
As hard as the work admittedly will be, it must 
be done, and in the doing we will have made a last­
ing contribution toward fulfilling the American 
purpose and redeeming the American promise.
There is no higher function of citizenship than
that.
Let us determine to perform it with wisdom and 
persistence, for the good of us all.76
Speaking to the Indianapolis Housing Conference, Marshall
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3320.
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also appeals to the sense of social responsibility. After 
he enumerates the essential requirements to attain adequate 
housing for all, Marshall said;
If we are to succeed in this effort, we face 
staggering tasks and massive obligations. And I am 
in no way underestimating the role or absolving the 
Federal Government's responsibility when I say that 
the solution to this problem of housing rests not 
with Washington alone. It is shared by State and 
local governments, by business and labor, by fair 
housing groups and other community action agencies, 
by religious and civil rights organizations, by 
those now isolated in the ghettos and, most 
assuredly, by those who now enjoy the foolish luxury 
of ignoring them.
But if we do that job, it will be effort and 
expenditure put to constructive use and devoted to 
a healthful purpose, as compared to the vast costs, 
in both time and money, which are now ploughed into 
the divided society and the separate worlds of 
today. That is the kind of cost we can no longer 
afford, either in dollars or in depressed human
values.77
Marshall employed emotional proof to reinforce 
reason. Evidence supports the fact that many of his lis­
teners shared his beliefs and attitudes. He provided the 
audience with adequate motives for action. Many rhetoricians 
maintain that audiences are moved to action by emotional 
appeals and that proposals identified with emotional appeals 
have been effective in securing their acceptance. It seems 
likely that Marshall's emotional appeals helped gain accept­
ance of his arguments. Hence, his use of emotional appeal 
probably contributed to the overall effectiveness of 
Marshall's speeches.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
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Ethical Appeals
Marshall was probably invited to speak on this and 
similar occasions because of the reputation he had 
established as a leading advocate of civil rights and human 
rights, as the constitutional lawyer whose superior strategy 
and skill resulted in a large number of legal victories, 
particularly in the area of civil rights, and as the NAACP 
Director-Counsel who frequently addressed NAACP members and 
other groups helping them to determine the nature and scope 
of specific problems involving racial segregation and dis­
crimination and providing practical solutions to reduce or 
to eliminate the problem. This favorable reputation was a 
major advantage to the speaker in his efforts to convince or 
actuate his audience.
Prior to Marshall's address before the "Greater 
Indianapolis Housing Conference of Adequate Housing for All," 
his endeavors to eliminate discrimination in housing had 
been publicized and generally applauded. For example, in 
one interview Marshall said:
What we must have, and will have eventually, is 
total integration, of schools, housing, the power 
structure, everything. . . . Not until you have 
young people growing up together on an equal basis 
from the start are you going to have real acceptance. 
It is too late to do that for most of the present 
generation of children but we can try to do it for 
the next.
Take for example, the cooperative apartment 
house we live in in New York. There were whites, 
Negroes, Catholics, Jews, Orientals, every group— all 
living side by side and there was never an incident.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Now those children have a pretty good chance of
growing up without p r e j u d i c e . 78
Also, as an NAACP lawyer and as Solicitor General Marshall 
had sought relentlessly to ensure equality and justice for 
all Americans. Further, Marshall had been publicly acclaimed 
the voice of the American Conscience. It seems that these 
factors, among others, sufficiently establish the probity 
of Marshall's character and probably predisposed the 
audience to give the speaker respectful attention when he 
spoke.
Evidence of Marshall's use of ethical proof as a 
means of persuasion can be perceived in his ability to 
establish character, sagacity and good will while he spoke.
Previous discussion indicates that it was probably 
not necessary for the speaker to convince the audience of 
his virtue. Obviously, most listeners admired these 
qualities before the occasion of the speech. However, the 
probity of Marshall's character was strengthened during the 
address since the speaker relied upon authority largely 
derived from his personal experience which has been mentioned
Generally, Marshall established sagacity in dis­
course since he revealed a broad familiarity with the 
interests of his audience. For example, the speaker said:
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 32, A986.
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The Congress of the United States, in the 
Housing Act of 1949, declared the national housing 
policy to be "a decent home and a suitable living 
environment for every American family."
If that purpose were to be achieved, I am con­
vinced most of us would agree that we would have met 
the goal of adequate housing.
But we must be sure of our terms and creative 
and perservering in developing the means and the 
responsibility for establishing needed programs and 
implementing them into r e a l i t y .
During this speech, Marshall also established good 
will by discovering common ground between himself and his 
audience. For instance, he noted:
If we are to succeed in this effort, we face 
staggering tasks and massive obligations. . . .
But if we are to do that job, it will be effort 
and expenditure put to constructive use and devoted 
to a healthful purpose, as compared to the vast 
costs, in both time and money, which are ploughed 
into the divided society. . . . That is the kind 
of cost we can no longer afford, either in dollars 
or in depressed human values.
We have made some progress. . . .
But we cannot delude ourselves. . . .
We are left, therefore, with the massive and 
urgent task of correcting the problem, of over­
coming the obstacle, or righting the wrong we have 
permitted to develop and grow.
Let us determine to perform it with wisdom 
and persistence, for the good of us all.80
Another example illustrates Marshall's practice of mentioning
goals and beliefs common to himself and his audience: "We
face a crisis in housing . . . [which] constitutes one of
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
89th Cong.,
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319-A3320.
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the most serious shortcomings of our economy and our 
society.
While Marshall spoke the probity of his character, 
sagacity, and good will were strengthened. These examples 
of the speaker's ethical appeal seem to conform to 
rhetorical standards.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
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CHAPTER V
THURGOOD MARSHALL'S SPEECHES TO LAWYERS 
AND LAW STUDENTS
This chapter analyzes three speeches delivered by 
Thurgood Marshall to law students and lawyers during his 
tenure as Solicitor General of the United States. These 
speeches will be appraised in terms of the following: (1)
the occasion and the audience; (2) the speaker's preparation, 
integrity of his basic ideas, and his major premises; (3) 
the organization, identifying purpose, proposition of central 
idea and structure; (4) characteristics of the speaker's 
logical appeals ; (5) forms of evidence and support; (6) the
speaker's emotional appeals; and (7) the speaker's ethical 
appeal or ethos.
The Speech of September 16, 1965
Occasion and Audience
Thurgood Marshall's address, "The Constitution and 
Social Change" was delivered during the 1965 Federal Bar 
Association (FBA) Convention held at the Conrad Hilton Hotel 
in Chicago Illinois September 15-18, 1965. The FBA Conven­
tion theme was "The Great Society.
^Margaret Pallansch, "Chicago Convention Preview," 
Federal Bar News, July, 1965, p. 224.
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It should be mentioned that this speech represents 
Marshall's first major address as Solicitor General.
Marshall spoke "to a truly overflow crowd of 450" persons 
assembled for "the September 16 lead-off luncheon" 
entrusted to the YLC [Younger Lawyers Committee], "an honor 
bestowed for the third successive year." Regarding this 
occasion, the Federal Bar News reports that the "program 
reaches new high" and continues:
The Sixth Anniversary of the Younger Lawyers 
Committee celebrated at the FBA Annual Convention 
in Chicago was a successful and appropriate con­
clusion to the year of leadership by retiring YLC 
Co-Chairmen. . . . Combining to make this year's 
YLC Convention activities reach a new mark were 
elements such as a luncheon program which had 
record attendance for the first address of the 
Solicitor General of the United States since coming 
to his new office, . . . and a warm reception for 
a leading program designed to bring the message of 
the Bill of Rights into classrooms.2
Other factors about the occasion seem important. According
to Michael Waris, Jr., Program Chairman of the 1965 FBA
Convention, "subjects and speakers . . . will deal with all
varieties of new problems confronting the lawyer in today's
w o r l d . I n  an article published in Federal Bar News prior
to the convention Varjan Staniec, Vice Chairman of
Publicity and Promotion Committee, wrote that the "Great
Society" Convention was shaping-up to be an SRO Success,
J. Thomas Rouland and Joseph Fontana, "Convention 
Program Reaches New High," Federal Bar News, October, 1965, 
p. 338.
^Pallansch, p. 224.
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while announcing that many "headline" political, profes­
sional, and government figures will have active convention 
roles and naming, among others. The Honorable Abe Portas, 
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court and 
The Honorable Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General of the 
United States, as persons they would be "honored and 
privileged to have with them.
Presumably, any discussion about the general nature 
of the audience should include some pertinent facts about 
the organization with which they were affiliated. Accord­
ingly, the FBA, established in 1920 in Washington, D.C., is 
an association of members of the Federal Judiciary and of 
lawyers who are or have been in the employ of the United 
States Government in legal capacities.^ In 1965, the FBA 
had a membership about one-tenth the size of the American 
Bar Association which had 119,000 members.  ^ Approximately 
87 chapters, four of which were in European cities, were 
affiliated with the FBA.^ According to the Federal Bar 
News, a publication forwarded to each member, the purposes
Shaping-Up to Be an-SRO Success," Federal Bar News, August, 
1965, p. 255.
September, 1965, p. 281.
^"President's Page," Federal Bar News, December, 
1965, p. 388.
^Sylvester A. Puzio, "Campaign to Establish New 
Chapters of the Federal Bar Association," Federal Bar News, 
May, 1966, p. 156.
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of the FBA in part are as follows;
To advance the science of jurisprudence; to promote 
the administration of justice; to uphold a high 
standard for the Federal Judiciary, attorneys 
representing the Government of the United States, 
and attorneys appearing before courts, departments, 
and agencies of the United States. . . .
The legal business of the Government would be 
expedited with resultant benefits to the public were 
federal lawyers and private practitioners brought 
into closer relationship. Effective means for 
bringing this about is through wide membership in 
the Federal Bar Association by private practitioners 
who are eligible by reason of their former service 
as a federal judge or as a civil or military 
employee or official of the Federal or District of 
Columbia Governments and by those attorneys 
presently employed by these governments.8
Other characteristics of this audience can be per­
ceived from remarks made by other speakers. For example, 
■Phillip F. Ziedman, General Counsel of the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) and at the age of 31 the youngest 
general counsel in the federal government, accepted an award 
during the luncheon program and included the following com­
parison of lawyers employed by the federal government and 
those who are not:
We have each chosen . . .  to serve the Government 
of the United States. Our abilities and our 
energies, our origins and our prospects; the tools 
at our command and the quality of our labors— none 
necessarily differ significantly from those of our 
classmates who have chosen a different path.
If we do differ from our contemporaries in law 
firms and in corporations, that difference is in 
large part a reflection of the different objectives, 
the different concerns, and the different 
responsibilities of our respective clients.^
"The Federal Bar Association," Federal Bar News, 
September, 1965, p. 281.
^Rouland and Fontana, p. 339.
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Significantly, Zeidman continues by identifying the current 
and future role of federal lawyers, especially "younger" 
lawyers :
To many of this generation it seems clear that the 
action and passion of life in the last half of the 
twentieth century is increasingly to be found in 
public service. For here, it is that one can find 
both action and passion. It is in this arena that 
one can play a role, large or small, in formulating 
the Nation's response to the great challenges of 
our time : . . . how to assure equality of oppor­
tunity to every American . . . and how to do so 
within a framework supported by laws.
These are challenges which do not yield readily 
to traditional techniques . . . but the role of the 
lawyer— defining the issue, resolving the conflict, 
bringing order out of chaos— remains . . . central 
to our society. . . .
These are the challenges which will not be 
solved in our time . . . but a conference whose 
theme is "Federal Law and the Great Society" mani­
fests not only a recognition that we are making a 
start, but also the legal profession's readiness to 
make its own unique contribution to that effort.
These are challenges which are not responsive 
to the empty blandishments of the brash young man 
. . . but they may well be ripe for a fresh look 
and an eager, willing hand . . . for a chance to 
do better what they see their elders not doing 
well . . .  or not doing at all.
Perhaps "younger" lawyers may be defined as 
those who are still young enough to believe that 
solutions to these awesome challenges can be sought 
and found by people unified in their purpose and 
resolute in their determination. And we are young 
enough to deem ourselves fortunate to be participants 
in that historic search.10
Similarly, Abe Fortas comments that federal lawyers have
participated in a crucial expansion of the concepts of
individual, group, and national responsibility for the
^^Rouland and Fontana, pp. 339-340.
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welfare of others— specifically reflected in the field of 
social legislation and notes the beginning of a new defini­
tion of the role of federal lawyers including the privilege, 
through legislation and litigation, to participate in the 
remarkable expansion of human rights. Speaking before the 
FBA Convention after Marshall, Fortas said:
It has been in the Federal forum that the basic 
rights of the poor, the Negroes, and even those 
accused of crime have been forcefully reaffirmed—  
here it is that the basic legislative and judicial 
affirmations have taken place, that the Constitu­
tion applies to Negroes as well as to whites, to 
the poor as well as the rich, and it has been 
primarily in the Federal courts that the difficult 
definition and redefinition of the rights of those 
accused of crimes are being shaped.H
Significantly, Fortas characterizes members of the Federal
Bar as follows: "To be a Federal lawyer is . . . not merely
to specialize in matters before the Federal government and
the Federal courts. It is . . .  a way of life, as well as
a professional s p e c i a l i t y . T h e  preceding information,
to some extent, indicates that the listeners probably had
positive attitudes toward the ideas Marshall presented.
Regarding the attitudes of this audience, consisting
of federal lawyers, toward the speaker; substantial evidence
has been presented earlier in this study that other lawyers
praised and respected Marshall as "a distinguished and an
^^"An Address by Honorable Abe Fortas," Federal Bar 
News, October, 1965, pp. 315-316.
^^"An Address by Honorable Abe Fortas," p. 313.
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excellent lawyer and jurist" and a trial lawyer, federal 
judge and Solicitor General with "extraordinary legal 
a b i l i t y . O n e  senator remarked: "As a practitioner
before the Supreme Court, in his capacity as Circuit Judge, 
and . . .  as Solicitor General, he has displayed a knowledge, 
ability, and competence as well as [judicial] tenqperament.
In the mid-1960s, lawyers made similar comments 
about Marshall's status. For example. Senator Hiram L. Fong 
(D-Hawaii) commented that the fact that Marshall is "a Negro 
who has been in the forefront of many of the most signifi­
cant efforts to secure our ideas of equality and brotherhood 
to all Americans" made all Americans proud. Also, Fong 
said: "The name of Marshall is one of the most illustrious
in the annals of American constitutional law, . . . con­
tributing to the Nation's trememdous strides to make a 
reality the ringing words of equality in our Declaration of 
Independence."^^ Congressman William F. Ryan (D-New York) 
referred to Marshall as one of the nation's finest advocates
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Judiciary, 
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Hearing, 90th Congress, 
1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 16.
^'^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Judiciary, 
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Hearing, 90th Congress, 
1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 17.
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Judiciary, 
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Hearing, 90th Congress, 
1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 16-17.
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and certainly one of its most distinguished citizens and 
repeated President Lyndon Johnson's appraisal of Marshall's 
qualifications: "A lawyer and judge of very high ability,
a patriot of deep convictions, and a gentleman of undisputed 
integrity." Identifying Marshall as a "great American,"
Ryan remarked: "I personally and most Americans applaud the
contribution he has made to our jurisprudence in his 2 0 
years as chief counsel of the NAACP. Regardless of indivi­
dual feelings, his skills are universally recognized.
This audience in all probability held similar 
opinions toward the speaker and respected him as a foremost 
authority. As an acknowledged leader in the legal profes­
sion, the audience probably expected the speaker to give 
information, advice and guidance which the listeners would 
most likely respect and/or accept.
Integrity of Ideas
The numerous sources of Marshall's ideas have been 
discussed at length earlier in this study. Essentially, the 
speaker's ideas were derived from his extensive reading and 
research, his thinking, his personal experiences and his 
career as an NAACP lawyer, federal judge and Solicitor 
General of the United States. Apparently, these experiences 
contributed to his interpretation of "doctrinal history; his
mittee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall to 
Be Solicitor General of the United States, Hearing, 89th 
Congress, 1st Sess., July 29, 1965 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1965), pp. 8-9.
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suggestion that "in recent decades the Supreme Court has 
molded the Constitution into a much needed instrument of 
social change, capable of initiating, accommodating and 
even requiring fundamental changes in the fabric of American 
society;" and his conviction that lawyers must assume greater 
responsibility to ensure that the criminal process conforms 
with "our highest traditions of fairness and justice" and 
to advocate laws which correspond with our constitutional 
ideals.
Early evidence of Marshall’s ability to formulate 
ideas regarding equality and justice appears in an article 
published in 1939. Commenting that the United States 
Supreme Court had rendered favorable decisions in twelve 
out of the thirteen cases handled by the NAACP, Marshall 
added;
These decisions have served as guideposts in 
a sustained fight for full citizenship rights for 
Negroes. They have broadened the scope of pro­
tection guaranteed by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution in the 
fields of right to register and vote, equal justice 
before the law, Negroes on juries, segregation, and 
equal educational opportunities. These precedents 
have been cited more than sixty-five times in the 
highest courts in the land and have been of benefit 
to all citizens, both Negro and white.
The opinions in these cases define the consti­
tutional rights of the Negro as a citizen. In 
addition, they broaden the interpretation of con­
stitutional rights for all citizens and extend civil 
liberties for whites as well as Negroes.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5979 and A5981.
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The activity of lawyers acting for the NAACP 
has added to the body of law on civil rights for all 
Americans. The association, by pressing these 
cases, has brought nearer to realization the ideal 
embodied in the quotation engraved over the Supreme 
Court building in Washington, D.C.: "Equal Justice
Under Law."
While it may be true that laws and constitu­
tions do not act to right wrong and overturn 
established folkways overnight, it is also true that 
the reaffirmation of these principles of democracy 
build a body of public opinion in which rights and 
privileges of citizenship may be enjoyed, and in 
which the more brazen as well as the more sophisti­
cated attempts at deprivation may be halted.!8
Marshall noted the implications of Supreme Court
decisions. Also, he confirmed, as many others have elsewhere,
his active participation in civil rights litigation which
promoted equality and justice for all.
In the 1957 issue of the Journal of Negro Education,
Marshall wrote a chapter— "The Rise and Collapse of the
White Democratic Primary"— tracing the white primary from
its obscure origin during Reconstruction days, according
to "Lewinson in his Race, Class, and Party," to its
"collapse" during the mid-twentieth century when Supreme
Court decisions held such primaries unconstitutional.
Explaining the nature and scope of the white primary, Marshall
wrote :
Of all the so-called "legal" devices for 
checking Negro participation in Southern politics 
perhaps the most effective, and on the surface the 
most legal, was the white Democratic Party primary—  
the most effective because it disfranchised the
Thurgood Marshall, "Equal Justice Under Law," The 
Crisis, July, 1939, pp. 199 and 201.
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Negro by excluding him from participating in the 
preelections which for all practical purposes were 
the elections in the one-party South, and the most 
"legal" because the Democratic Party, according to 
contemporary legal theory, was considered as being 
a voluntary association of citizens which could 
discriminate on the basis of race and color or 
along any other line in the conduct of its private 
affairs without offending the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments.
Marshall adds that the rise and collapse of the white Demo­
cratic primary is an important and distinct chapter in the 
story of the Negro's struggle for political equality. 
Evidence of Marshall's research can be found in frequent 
references to authoritative sources and the inclusion of 
practically every pertinent case brought to court.
Other factors seem pertinent to this discussion.
For example, at this point in Marshall's life, he was 
extolled as a man who had been dedicated to the practice and 
administration of justice, playing a leading role and mani­
festing always his high standard of legal ability, an 
intellectual acumen, a high code of ethics, clear reasoning 
and hard work through the years. Also, many sources 
acknowledged that as an attorney and as a judge Marshall 
demonstrated his commitment to the highest American ideals
Thurgood Marshall, "The Rise and Collapse of the 
'White Democratic Primary,'" Journal of Negro Education, 
Summer, 1957, p. 249.
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Executive Report No. 13,
90th Congress, 1st Sess., August 21, 1967 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 1.
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his conunitment to the highest American ideals of constitu­
tionalism and his belief that his listeners must share the 
responsibility for meaningful compliance with existing laws 
which protect the rights of all Americans and the advocacy 
of more laws if necessary to ensure equality and justice 
for all.
Many lawyers have expressed similar views regarding 
the impact of the Supreme Court decisions discussed by 
Marshall and the need for enforcement of current laws and 
designing new laws. For example, Archibald Cox, Marshall’s 
immediate predecessor as Solicitor General, wrote:
For a decade and a half the Supreme Court has 
been broadening and deepening the constitutional 
significance of our national commitment to 
Equality. The decisions implementing the equal 
protection clause set new constitutional goals for 
the states and the Congress, which lie substantially 
beyond accepted practices and whose achievement 
requires affirmative governmental action.
A newer theme is the strong declaration of 
congressional power under section 5 of the 
fourteenth amendment. If Congress follows the lead 
that the Court has provided, the last [1965] Term's 
opinions interpreting section 5 will prove as 
important in bespeaking national legislative 
authority to promote human rights as the Labor Board 
decisions of 1937 were in providing national 
authority to regulate the economy. They may also 
relieve some of the stresses to which constitu­
tional adjudication is subjected when the Court is 
forced to take the lead in a legal revolution.21
When Abe Fortas, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, addressed the FBA Convention on
^^Archibald Cox, "The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 
Harvard Law Review, 80:91, 1966.
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September 18, 1965, he speaks similarly about 1) the impact 
of legislation and judicial decisions and 2) the essential 
obligations of the federal lawyer. Regarding the first 
point, Fortas said that while federal action and administra­
tion have been and will continue to be essential because of 
the magnitude of problems of this age, there are limits to 
the vitality and effectiveness. Concerning the latter, 
Fortas remarked :
Perhaps the most satisfying aspect of being a lawyer 
is the opportunity— perhaps the necessity— to 
function— to function at maximum capacity— to 
participate intensively not only in the trials and 
tribulations of our fell^o^,men, but also in the 
crises of our time— to help perpetuate the magnifi­
cent principles and institutions of our democracy, 
and . . .  to help carefully and cautiously to apply 
them to drastically changing conditions. To all 
lawyers, comes the summons to function in crisis—  
the call to largeness of mind and s p i r i t . 22
Harvard Law School Professor and President of the Meyer
Research Institute of Law, David F. Cavers, explained the
lawyers' concerns and responsibilities:
Their concern goes to the quality of the social 
order. In many areas [decent housing, fair employ­
ment, civil rights, etc.], the typical problem 
confronting the lawyer is how to protect the 
individual against the bureaucracy. . . .  In other 
areas the typical problem is how to provide a 
bureaucracy capable of protecting the individual 
or how to assert the public interest effectively in 
clashes with private interests that often are more 
ably represented or more aggressively pressed.
These tasks may entail the enforcement of existing 
law or the creation of new law. Troubles may spring 
from the obsolescence of legal instrumentalities
Bar News, October, 1965, p. 316.
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or procedures which have persisted for want of 
studies searching enough to reveal their deficien­
cies. There may be the need for social inventions. 
There certainly will be the need for the identifi­
cation of goals and the articulation of issues 
where goals c o n f l i c t . 23
It appears that Marshall possessed the personal and 
professional resources to recognize and to address the 
pressing problems of the time. Proof of his conviction 
that the promises of equality and justice for all Americans 
are not self-fulfilling can be found in historical facts.
Briefly, a review of several events preceding 
Marshall's speech seems pertinent. By the early 1960s the 
civil rights movement intensified. Southern officials used 
First Amendment provisions as devices to harass outspoken 
civil rights advocates. Two civil rights groups paid for 
a full-page advertisement generally critical of the vicious 
treatment by Alabama officials of civil rights demon­
strators. When the advertisement was printed in The New 
York Times, a libel suit was brought against the newspaper 
for one-half million dollars, charing it with printing 
erroneous and defamatory statements of "fact," an action 
punishable under an Alabama libel statute. The Alabama 
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment; but in New York Times 
V. Sullivan (1964), the Supreme Court reversed, and "for the 
first time in American history ruled that libelous utterance.
David F. Cavers, "Legal Education in Forward- 
looking Perspective," Law in a Changing America (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: The American Assembly, Columbia Univer­
sity, 1968), p. 144.
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with certain important qualifications, was protected under 
the First Amendment." Importantly, Justice William J. 
Brennan asserted that criticism of government, which neces­
sarily implies indirect criticism of individuals associated 
with it, "is to be encouraged, not merely in the interests 
of free speech, but in the interest of checking governmental 
power over people, and maintaining a democratic society.
During the Kennedy administration and part of the 
Johnson administration, the Supreme Court rendered consti­
tutional interpretations involving problems in other areas. 
For example, it extended the Fifth Amendment's prohibition 
against compulsory self-incrimination to the states. The 
Court felt that the citizen had the same right in state 
court as in federal. In addition, the Court took action 
which startled some constitutional lawyers as follows:
[It] called for the creation of a whole body of 
extra-constitutional rights, arguing that this 
action was thoroughly within the spirit of the 
Ninth Amendment and the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth. With such tools, . . . the Court was 
in a position to strike down all state legislation 
that violates "fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice" or that was contrary to the "traditions 
and (collective) conscience of our people.
By the end of the 1964-65 term, the justices completed a
variety of judicial business inherited from the Eisenhower
administration. Also, the Court had put a judicial seal of
Paul L. Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis Times 
1918-1969 (New York: Harper and How Publishers, 1972),
pp. 398-399.
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approval on numerous New Frontier programs and objectives, 
including rulings dealing with reapportionment, criminal 
procedure, etc. Apparently, much remained to be done during 
the Johnson administration to ensure equality and justice 
for all Americans. It should be remembered that Johnson 
and Congress made giant strides to secure equal rights for 
all Americans until Johnson's handling of the Dominican 
Republic and South Vietnam situations evoked criticism froiri 
Congress, black leaders and many other Americans.
It seems that solutions for serious domestic prob­
lems were neglected considerably. The anti-Vietnam 
demonstrations and the 1965 riots in Watts, Chicago, and 
Cleveland, among other activities, suggest the critical 
nature of these problems. Many Americans were being 
deprived of their basic rights, including lives.
Pertinent to this discussion seems to be Fortas' 
comment on the climate of the 1960s and resources of the 
federal government :
In our times, whether we like it or not, the 
Federal government and the Federal courts have been 
at the dynamic center of the nation's affairs 
. . . .  It is here— in the Federal forum— that the 
law and the legal institutions that we have 
inherited, and those that we newly devise— it is 
here that these instruments have principally been 
brought to bear upon the raw materials of our 
times— in search for adequate answers. It is here 
in the Federal forum— in the Congress, the adminis­
trative and executive agencies, and the Federal
^^Murphy, p. 403.
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courts— that we have primarily been compelled to 
cope with the turbulent developments of this 
exciting age— to mold and fashion, to direct and 
contain, the strong, raw, explosive thrusts of the 
revolutionary events of our time.27
A large number of these judicial decisions were 
reached by the Supreme Court frequently at Marshall's 
urging. It is probable that Marshall possessed the intel­
lectual resources which enabled him to formulate ideas in 
accordance with rhetorical standards. Further, the validity 
of his ideas rested, largely, upon historical accuracy.
Also, it seems that the speaker demonstrated the power to 
envision the consequences of the American crisis.
Significantly, the speaker's message appears to con­
tain several assumptions worthy of consideration: (1)
promises of equality and justice under law for all Ameri­
cans have not been fulfilled; (2) the significance of 
recent judicial decisions which represent appropriate and 
essential measures to guarantee and to protect the rights 
of all Americans should be examined by the audience; and 
(3) attainment of equality and justice under law for all 
Americans is a realistic, although not self-fulfilling goal.
Close examination of Marshall's speech, "Constitu­
tion and Social Change," seems to reveal the following major 
premises :
^^"An Address by Honorable Abe Portas," Federal Bar 
News, October, 1965, p. 313.
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(1) Supreme Court decisions, in recent decades, 
have reaffirmed and enlarged constitutional 
guarantees protecting the right to criticize the 
status quo.
(2) Through its power of invalidation, the Supreme 
Court has wrought fundamental changes in the 
structure of our society, attacking state laws 
designed to prevent Negroes from participating 
in the political process and from attaining any 
sort of social or economic equality.
(3) The Supreme Court's posture of leadership in 
reforming the criminal process and the law into 
an effective instrument of social policy should 
be shared by, not criticized by, members of the 
legal profession.
The major premises are only listed here. However, they will
be analyzed in the section of this study which deals with
logical appeals.
Organization
This section examines the organization of Marshall's 
speech of September 16, 1965. The concept of organization, 
defined by Russell Wagner as "the functional selection and 
use of materials for a particular p u r p o s e , s e r v e s  as a 
useful guide. Accordingly, the organization is discussed in 
terms of purpose, proposition or central idea and structure.
Purpose. Typically, Marshall seems to suggest that 
his purpose is to inform. For example, the speaker says 
that his address "is offered merely as one interpretation of
Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W. 
Braden, Speech Criticism (2d ed.; New York: Ronald Press
Company, 1970), p. 471.
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recent Supreme Court decisions, with no pretense that it 
is the only interpretation."^® However, close study of 
this message indicates that the speaker presented informa­
tion with the ultimate purpose of convincing his audience 
about the merits of these decisions and the necessity for 
meaningful implementation of these and other laws.
Authorities in the field of speech generally agree 
that the speaker who seeks to convince or persuade is an 
a d v o c a t e . V i e w i n g  Marshall's life, his career, and this 
particular speech, it is probable that Marshall's primary 
purpose was advocacy. Indeed, the speaker was not content 
merely to provide his listeners with information. Pre­
sumably, he wants his listeners to adopt a specific attitude 
toward the proposition and even to take action on it. As 
this discussion proceeds, it becomes more apparent that 
Marshall presents arguments and appeals in support of a 
position to which he has previously demonstrated his total 
commitment because he believes in it.
Central idea. Stating his central idea, Marshall 
appears to reiterate his specific purpose. For example, he 
said: "My hope is to cast a new light on this doctrinal
history, to suggest that in recent decades the Supreme
^®U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5979.
Good Speech (2d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 37.
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Court has molded the Constitution into a much needed instru­
ment of social change, capable of initiating, accommodating 
and even requiring fundamental changes in the fabric of 
American s o c i e t y . T h i s  statement seems to specify 
Marshall's immediate goal in speaking to this particular 
audience. This statement not only allows the speaker to 
point up his central idea but also to clarify what he hoped 
to accomplish. Frequently, it is considered wise to express 
purpose and central idea in this manner. The audience is 
better equipped to know what the speaker is trying to do 
from the beginning. The subject matter of the speech is 
narrowed and unified. Presumably, this audience of federal 
lawyers was aware of Marshall's participation in litigation 
which yielded many of these judicial decisions. The 
listeners probably found the speaker's statement candid, 
acceptable, and appropriate.
In the statement of his central idea Marshall pre­
views what is to come in the body of the speech and pre­
pares the audience for understanding and appreciation of the 
subject. It certainly seems to establish the need to listen 
for this particular audience.
Structure. This aspect of Marshall's address will 
be discussed in terms of its principal divisions: intro­
duction, body, and conclusion.
31,U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5979.
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The entire introduction consists of only 116 words 
or two paragraphs. Marshall quickly discloses his subject 
as he begins the second paragraph. Marshall probably 
established good relations with his listeners and gained 
their attention, saying:
The recent history of the Supreme Court is, in 
one respect, like a contemporary abstract painting. 
It is not that we cannot understand the painting, 
if we try, but that it has so many different inter­
pretations each of which has a measure of truth 
and relevancy. None of them can be dismissed for 
being impossible; none has a claim to absolute 
correctness; and each reflects the interpreter's 
special insights.
The subject of these remarks, "The Constitu­
tion and Social Change," is such an interpretation, 
suffering from these faults and seeking the appro­
priate immunities.32
Previously, we noted that recent Supreme Court 
decisions regarding civil rights and human rights had been 
praised and criticized, especially by members of the legal 
profession. Also, evidence supports the fact that 
lawyers, in general, and federal lawyers, in particular, 
recognized and respected Marshall's advocacy of equal rights 
under law for all Americans. It is very likely that 
Marshall's introduction was considered relevant and imagina­
tive. A statement of the speaker's central idea followed 
the aforementioned passages.
Authorities in speech tend to agree that if the 
opening portion of an address is interesting, if the speaker 
is interesting, if the speaker is likable and has prestige.
32^
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and if he begins with some aspect of the subject with 
which the audience can agree, then he may be able to get his 
listeners to change their attitudes, where necessary, toward 
his p r o p o s a l . M a r s h a l l ’s introduction appears to meet 
rhetorical standards.
The body of this speech consisting of almost 3,800 
words is lengthy vis-à-vis other speeches treated in this 
study. Studying this speech as printed in the Congressional 
Record of October 1965 and in the Federal Bar News, dated 
October 1965, the following headings suggest a topical 
pattern of organization:
(1) Protecting the Right to Criticize the Status Quo;
(2) The Power of Invalidation;
(3) Reform of the Criminal Process.
Possibly, the following sentence outline of the speech, 
which contains main ideas and major sub-points, best 
illustrates how the body of the speech fulfilled the rhe­
torical requirements in terms of developing the central 
idea of the message, which was specified previously :
I. Recent Supreme Court decisions re-affirmed con­
stitutional guarantees of the right to criticize 
the status quo
A. In framing the Bill of Rights a certain pri­
macy was given to assuring that the 
citizenry would have the fullest opportunity 
to criticize the established social and 
political order and to propose radical 
reform.
Milton Dickens, Speech Dynamic Communication (3d 
ed.; New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1974),
p. 301.
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B. Although the philosophic roots of the con­
stitutional guarantees can be traced to the 
very founding of this nation, only within 
recent years has this promise of the First 
Amendment approached fulfillment; today, 
the First Amendment stands as one of the 
touchstones of our civilization, not just 
as a mere legal rule to be applied dis­
passionately by the courts, but as a 
viable principle for organizing all our 
social relations.
C. However, in 1922, the Supreme Court declared, 
almost as a proposition of hornbook law, 
that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor 
any other provision of the Constitution of 
the United States imposes upon the States 
any restrictions about freedom of
speech. . . ."
D. In 1925, the Gitlow v. New York case marked 
the inception of a new era in the First 
Amendment doctrine, safeguarding the right 
to criticize from suppressive actions of 
the states.
E. In recent years, confrontations with state 
suppression created the occasion for the 
Court to interpret or reinterpret First 
Amendment guarantees.
1. In the New York Times Case (1964), the 
Supreme Court interpreted the First 
Amendment to yield a measure of protec­
tion never before afforded, of placing 
crisp limits on state libel laws: 
criticism of public officials could not 
be the subject of governmental sanction.
2. The Court expanded the First Amendment 
to protect freedom of expression, recog­
nizing that there are many forms of 
human behavior which serve in terms of 
First Amendment purposes, the same 
function as speech— to express dissatis­
faction; to protest; and to criticize.
II. In the last decade, the Supreme Court, through 
its power of invalidation, assaulted discrimi­
natory state regulations and laws and wrought 
fundamental changes in the structure of our 
society.
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A. Brown V. Board of Education was the initial 
spearhead launched by the Supreme Court; 
segregation in public education was consti­
tutionally condemned and thus stripped of 
all moral predicates.
B. In the first half of the twentieth century 
the power of invalidation was too often used 
to frustrate recently enacted legislation 
designed to effect a whole sale change in 
the social order; yet Brown v. Board of 
Education, and its progeny, initiated and 
required social change.
C. Two conditions justify transforming the 
power of invalidation into an active instru­
ment of social change : (1) an established
social pattern that threatens a central 
constitutional ideal and (2) default by 
other societal institutions.
D. The hope is not that the Supreme Court will 
singly take up the burden of eliminating 
massive injustices through requiring further 
reform, but that the other social and 
political institutions will make it a joint 
enterprise if not their special 
responsibility.
Supreme Court's involvement in reforming the 
criminal process and transforming law into an 
effective instrument of social policy represents 
province and responsibility of courts which 
should be shared and not criticized.
A. In the 1930s, two Supreme Court decisions 
heralded a new Supreme Court supervision 
radically reforming the state criminal 
processes and introduced a new dimension of 
its involvement in the process of effecting 
social change.
B. Supreme Court's involvement in judicial 
reform of the judicial process has continued 
to the present with ever greater intensity, 
guaranteeing the right to counsel and pro­
tecting the personal rights of the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments through the imposition 
of exclusionary rules on the premise that 
the Fourteenth Amendment entrusted the
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federal courts with an independent through 
supplementary power to decide which actions 
by state law enforcers violated our basic 
concepts of justice.
C. The Supreme Court's extraordinary posture 
of leadership can in part be attributed to 
a serious default by other institutions, 
and the time has come when the burden must 
be shared by institutions closer to the 
citizenry, especially members of the bar.
D. In recent decades, the Supreme Court has 
transformed the law into an effective 
instrument of social policy, and the example 
par excellence is its involvement in social 
change; it seems more important to recog­
nize this transformation than to debate its 
propriety.
Marshall's conclusion for this speech seems suit­
able since it reaffirms his belief in the capability of 
laws and the Constitution to ensure equality and justice 
under law for all. However, this conclusion differs from 
that in other speeches treated in this study because 
Marshall specifies the fact that his speech is ending and 
he uses a quotation. For example, Marshall concludes his 
address as follows:
I will close . . .  by quoting a revolutionary 
patriot, Thomas Jefferson:
"I am not an advocate of frequent changes in 
laws and constitutions, but laws and constitutions 
must go hand in hand with the progress of the 
human mind, as that becomes more developed and more 
enlightened. . . . Institutions must advance . . . 
to keep pace with the time. We might as well 
require a man to wear still the coat which fitted 
him as a boy as civilized society to remain under 
the regime of their barbarous ancestors."
Without attempting to trace the influence of
Jefferson on Marshall's life and beliefs, it seems
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significant that Marshall incorporated some of Jefferson's 
ideas in the conclusion of this speech. It seems reasonable 
to assume that Jefferson's ideas have influenced Americans 
and American life for centuries. For example, Edwin A. 
Alderman, an American educator of earlier times who fre­
quently spoke about the necessity for making education, 
particularly in the South but also throughout the nation, 
more democratic, also eulogized great Americans. In 1924, 
speaking of Jefferson's services and influences, Alderman 
characterized him as (1) the first great philosopher and 
intelligent radical in American life; (2) the first great 
American Democrat; and (3) the greatest liberal that has 
appeared in American h i s t o r y . I n  a later speech, Marshall 
noted that Jefferson sought to have slavery condemned in the 
Declaration of Independence although he was unsuccessful.
Of especial import is Marshall's use of 
Jefferson's words which enabled the speaker to restate the 
belief he desired the audience to accept. Further, it 
probably provided the audience with additional motives for 
building the desired attitude.
Although evidence seems to indicate that most of 
the hearers shared Marshall's belief in equality and justice 
under the law for all Americans, surely there were listeners 
who did not. Perhaps, Marshall linked his belief with that
^William N. Brigance, ed., History and Criticism of 
American Public Address (New York: Russell and Russell, 
1960), pp. 545-546.
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of Jefferson to gain the desired response to his message 
from the entire audience, particularly the latter group.
Restatement of the belief is considered an effective 
way to conclude this type of speech. It is likely that 
Marshall's conclusion meeti rhetorical standards.
In summary, this discussion of the organization of 
Marshall's speech reveals that this address contained an 
introduction, a body, and a conclusion. Materials of the 
introduction probably established goodwill and gained the 
attention of the listeners, indicating purpose and thesis.
The main ideas in the body of the speech, to a great extent, 
follow the speaker's plan and support the central idea 
expressed initially by the speaker. Finally, the conclusion 
includes materials, restatement and a quotation, which can 
be considered appropriate and effective.
Logical Appeals
Having discussed Marshall's major premises and lines 
of argument, the critic must examine the form.s of support 
which the speaker used to gain understanding, acceptance, and 
action. According to some authorities in the field of public 
address and rhetoric, "the supporting materials for a speech 
may serve any one of three purposes: (1) to clarify, (2) to
prove, and (3) to amplify.
Giles W. Gray and Waldo W. Braden, Public Speaking: 
Principles and Practices (New York: Harper and Row
Publishers, 1951), p. 281.
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With these purposes in mind, this section will focus 
on the nature of Marshall's supporting materials, the 
speaker's methods of employing them, and the general effec­
tiveness of these forms of support in terms of helping the 
speaker to achieve his purpose.
Marshall's evidence in his speech before the FBA 
can be described under the categories of fact and opinion.
For evidence of fact the speaker referred to the Bill of 
Rights, constitutions, laws, historical data, personal 
observations and legal cases or precedent.
Supporting his contention that recent Supreme Court 
decisions protected the right to criticize the status quo, 
Marshall argued inductively, citing circumstances and legal 
cases. He added personal opinions to support his contention 
that in recent decades the Supreme Court reaffirmed consti­
tutional guarantees by enlarging and reinterpreting the 
right to criticize the status quo. One example illustrates 
the speaker's practices.
Although the philosophic roots of constitutional 
guarantees can be traced to the very founding of 
this nation, only within recent years has this 
promise of the first amendment approached fulfill­
ment. Now the first amendment stands as one of the 
touchstones of our civilization, not just as a mere 
legal rule to be applied dispassionately by the 
courts, but as a viable principle for organizing all 
our social relations. This near universal acceptance 
makes us lose sight of the fact that in 1922, almost 
150 years after the founding of the Nation and 
adoption of the first amendment, and 50 years after 
the Civil War and the adoption of the 14th amendment, 
the Supreme Court declared, almost as a proposition 
of hornbook law, that "neither the 14th amendment
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nor any other provision of the Constitution of the 
United States imposes upon the States any restric­
tions about freedom of speech."
Three years later this declaration was rendered 
obsolete. (Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) 
in one sense marked the inception of a new era in 
first amendment doctrine. Thanks to the absorptive 
powers of the Due Process Clause of the 14th amend­
ment, the first amendment's protective cloak was 
spread wide enough to safeguard the right to 
criticize from suppressive actions of the State 
. . . .  The non-Federal levels of government have 
been the primary agencies formulating policy on the 
issues that concern the ordinary citizen in a most 
direct and immediate way— education; police pro­
tection; sanitation; recreation; zoning; etc.
Without limiting the power to suppress criticisms 
of these policies, the first amendment freedoms 
would be meaningless to the ordinary citizen, who for 
example, is not likely to take up the cause of 
altering the form of American Government, but who
can be moved to question the soundness of the local
school board's recent decision. Of course, most 
States have had laws guaranteeing freedom of speech 
. . . and have developed viable traditions of free 
criticism. Yet the extension of the Federal con­
stitutional guarantee involves an independent and 
impartial protection, the significance of which can 
be illustrated by imagining what it would have meant 
to those on the historic Selma March if they had 
nothing more to rely on than the laws and the law
enforcers of Alabama to protect their right to
criticize the policies of that State.
Marshall further clarifies his interpretation of the Court's
efforts regarding right to criticize status quo. Here, the
speaker refers to the New York Times case (New York Times
Co. V. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) in which the Court
interpreted the first amendment to yield a protection never
before afforded, placing crisp limits on State libel laws.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5979-A5980.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5980.
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Marshall also refers to another aspect of First Amendment 
protection which he called "lateral expansion." In other 
words, the specifics mentioned in the First Amendment, such 
as freedom of speech and press, have come to be referred to 
as the freedom of expression.^®
Arguing deductively, Marshall contends that through 
its power of invalidation, the Supreme Court has wrought 
fundamental changes in the structure of cur society. Then, 
the speaker supper ■ this contention with example, profes­
sional experience and opinion, testimony of authority, 
restatement, and contrast:
My point can best be made through example, and 
I chose the example that is closest to me— Brown v. 
Board of Education. So much has happened in the 
decade since the decision, and people's expectations 
have risen, quite justifiably, at such an 
accelerated pace, that we often lose perspective.
Yet just 25 years ago most Negroes' lives were con­
stricted by a whole series of state-imposed and 
state-fostered laws and regulations designed to 
foreclose them from attaining any sort of social or 
economic equality. In the last decade, however, 
there has been a massive assault on this citadel, 
and although today we find the legislature, the 
executive, and the general populace joining and to 
some extent directing the assault, two things cannot 
be forgotten— Brown v. Board of Education was the 
initial spearhead, and it was launched by the 
Supreme Court.
What crumbled was not merely a network of legal 
rules; it was a whole social system bent on keeping 
the Negroes in a position of inferiority, a social 
system inspired by the Jim Crow laws. Segregation 
was constitutionally condemned and it was thus 
stripped of all moral predicates. . . .  In this 
struggle for racial equality the Supreme Court 
served, at least in 1954, as a voice not of
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contemporary opinion but as a voice of communal 
conscience, or in Chief Justice Hughes' earlier 
characterization, as "teachers to the citizenry."39
To support his second contention in this speech, 
Marshall also employed contrast. He proceeds to contrast 
use of the power of invalidation in the first half of the 
twentieth century with its use in recent decades: "The
essential difference can . . .  be expressed in terms of the 
concept of social change. In the first half of the 20th 
century the power of invalidation was too often used to 
frustrate recently enacted legislation designed to effect a 
wholesale change in the social order; yet Brown v. Board of 
Education, and its progeny, initiated and required social 
c h a n g e . M a r s h a l l  added the following opinion: "This
contrast reveals two conditions that justify transforming 
the power of invalidation, spawned in a more modest context, 
into an active instrument of social change— an established 
social pattern that threatens a central constitutional 
ideal and default by other societal institutions.
Evidence is provided to support the speaker's third 
contention. Marshall cited examples of cases and decisions 
and drew a conclusion regarding the Supreme Court's leader­
ship in reform of the criminal process.
In Powell V. Alabama (287 U.S. 45) decided by 
the Supreme Court in 1932, State convictions were
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong. 
(1965), CXI, NO. 198, A5981.
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reversed because the defendants were denied the 
effective assistance of counsel in their trial; and 
in BrowL V. Mississippi (297 U.S. 278 (1936), 
decided four years later. State convictions were 
invalidated because they rested solely "upon confes­
sions shown to have been extorted by officers of the 
State by brutality and violence. " These two deci­
sions heralded a new Supreme Court supervision 
radically reforming the State criminal processes, 
and they introduced a new dimension of its involve­
ment in the process of major social c h a n g e . 42
Marshall supported his conclusion with a somewhat lengthy 
explanation that the Supreme Court's involvement in this 
type of reform was consistent with the traditional role of 
the courts. Listing other areas which need radical reform, 
Marshall asked lawyers to share the responsibility for 
judicial reform and to insure that trials conform to our 
highest traditions of fairness and justice.
Apparently, Marshall felt that the needs of his 
listeners would not be met if he failed to acknowledge the 
controversy surrounding Supreme Court decisions. Accord­
ingly, he remarked that some of the criticism stemmed from 
those whose material selfishness and self-satisfaction led 
them to resist any change in the status quo with fury.
Other criticism, he opined, stemmed from a more intellectual 
level. In this category he identified two groups. First, 
he adverted to those who felt that they would have rendered, 
a different decision from that handed down by the Supreme 
Court. He added, "That kind of disagreement is the life­
blood of the law; the vigor of such disagreement is an
42,
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occasion to rejoice rather than despair." Secondly, he 
referred to those whose intellectual and professional 
criticism reflected a profound misunderstanding and 
reflected a refusal to accept a new concept of law, to shake 
free of the 19th century moorings and to view law, not as a 
set of abstract and socially unrelated comiriands of the 
sovereign, but as effective instruments of social policy.'*^
Brembeck and Howell describe the common arguments on 
a continuum ranging from induction to deduction because, in 
practice, few arguments are purely inductive or deductive 
in m e t h o d . I n  this speech, Marshall argued inductively 
and deductively. In this speech, as in others, Marshall 
employs argument from circumstantial detail. Indeed, the 
speaker demonstrates a preference for this cause-to-effeet 
reasoning which points to a group of circumstances and 
alleges results.
Most of Marshall's evidence can be considered 
historical fact, legal cases which he had argued or 
researched thoroughly, and opinions which he was well- 
qualified to express. The factual materials stand and can­
not be denied. The listeners were probably familiar with 
the legal cases and Marshall's participation. While the 
opinions may be subject to challenge there were factors
^^Ibid.
^^Winston Lamont Brembeck and William Smiley Howell, 
Persuasion (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1952), pp. 194-240.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
236
emanating from speaker's knowledge, training and experiences 
which would win respect if not acceptance.
It can be concluded that the evidence presented by 
Marshall met rhetorical requirements. Certainly they 
clarified and amplified the main points. Undoubtedly, the 
speaker was able to fulfill his purpose and to meet the 
needs of his hearers.
Emotional Appeals
According to some authorities in the field of public 
address, emotional or pathetic proof "includes all those 
materials and devices calculated to put the audience in a 
frame of mind suitable for reception of the speaker's 
ideas. Usually listeners are not content to be logical
and realistic; they often desire emotional stimulation.
With this in mind, this section examines the emotional or 
pathetic proof in Marshall's speech before the Federal Bar 
Association.
In this particular speech, Marshall's pathetic proof 
can be characterized as follows: (1) appeals to justice and
fair play; (2) appeals to social responsibility; (3) appeals 
to professional pride; and (4) appeals to patriotism.
Speaking to the Federal Bar Association, Marshall 
seems to appeal to the listeners' sense of justice and fair 
play many times. For example, at one point Marshall remarked
^^Thonssen, Baird and Braden, p. 358.
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that there have been flagrant violations of basic human
rights specifically protected by the Bill of Rights.
Speaking of the Supreme Court's efforts to expand First
Amendment guarantees, specifically in protecting the right
to criticize the status quo, he said:
Such a measure of protection seems to be an ele­
mentary requirement to the healthy public debate of 
public issues, the particular societal activity 
that the First Amendment was designed to safeguard, 
nay encourage, and the activity which is the life­
blood of any progressive society. Those who cherish 
these values could only hail the d e v e l o p m e n t .46
Expressing concern about the government's power to 
regulate the manner of expression, Marshall seems to appeal 
to the audience's sense of justice, fair play, and profes­
sional responsibility.
Rigor is required . . .  in its application in order 
to assure that the regulation of the manner of 
expression remains neutral as to content. Achieving 
this content-neutrality requires more than 
eliminating uneven regulation, where the proponents 
of one cause are afforded privileges and rights not 
afforded to another. For often the defenders of 
the status quo are prepared to stifle all aggres­
sion, since the burden of persuasion invariably falls 
on reformers. If, for example, we accepted the 
principle that the manner of expression could be 
regulated so that the citizenry would never be 
"forced" to listen to speech they did not want to 
hear— and I use "force" in the mildest sense not the 
blaring sound trucks but the street corner orator 
and peaceful picket line— the promise of the first 
amendment, to provide an effective means of 
criticizing the status quo and proposing radical 
reform, might be broken. This is an expression of 
concern not of fatalism; I am confident that if the 
officials who have taken the oath to uphold the 
Constitution, and this includes more than the ever
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 
(1965), CXI, NO. 198, A5980.
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vigilant justices of the Supreme Court recognize the 
delicate dynamics inherent in trying to achieve 
content-neutral regulation this promise will be
fulfilled.47
Another example illustrates the speaker's appeal to
the sense of justice and fair play:
For example in Powell v. Alabama the petitioners 
stood trial for their lives, in hostile and tense 
atmosphere, and yet were deprived of the effective 
assistance of counsel: The trial judge would have
to do more to assure this assistance than to appoint, 
in a most casual way, "all the members of the bar. " 
And in Brown v. Mississippi the coercion and 
brutality were alarming; as it is related in the 
opinion, some of "defendants were made to strip and 
they were laid over chairs and their backs were cut 
to pieces with a leather strap with buckles on it"
until they confessed.48
Also Marshall invited the members of the Federal Bar Asso­
ciation "to join in this task of reform. His remarks
seem to represent further evidence of his use of appeal to 
professional pride and social responsibility. Marshall 
said:
The Supreme Court's extraordinary posture of 
leadership in reforming the criminal process can 
in part be attributed to a serious default by other 
institutions, and it seems to me that the time has 
come when the burden must be shared. . . .  To be 
sure, this is not only an invitation to the local 
courts and local legislatures— it is also addressed 
to all members of the bar. Through their profes­
sional associations they can initiate and press for 
this reform, and each lawyer engaged in a criminal 
trial, whether as prosecutor or defense counsel, 
possesses a special responsibility and power— the
^'Ibid. ‘*®Ibid.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong, 
(1965), CXI, NO. 198, A5981.
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the power of self-control— to insure that the trial 
conforms to our highest traditions of fairness and
justice.50
Also addressing the FBA Marshall probably appeals to 
the listeners' patriotism and common sense "by quoting a 
revolutionary patriot, Thomas Jefferson:"
"I am not an advocate of frequent changes in 
laws and constitutions, but laws and institutions 
must go hand in hand with the progress of the human 
mind, as that becomes more developed more 
enlightened. . . . Institutions must advance . . . 
to keep pace with the times. We might as well 
require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him 
as a boy as civilized society to remain under the 
regime of their barbarous ancestors."51
Ethical Appeals
Essentially, Marshall's ethical appeals before this 
audience consisting of lawyers and law students emanated from 
the reputation he brought to the speech situation. However, 
the speech per se serves to communicate much about the 
speaker's probity, sagacity, and goodwill.
Evidence of Marshall's use of ethical proof as a 
means of persuasion can be perceived in his ability to 
strengthen his reputation while he spoke. For example, 
speaking on "The Constitution and Social Change," he remarked 
that each interpretation of recent Supreme Court actions 
"reflects the interpreter's special insights and expe­
riences." Continuing, he said that his interpretation of 
recent Supreme Court decisions "is offered merely as one 
interpretation . . . with no pretense that it is the only
51Ibid.
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speaker's practice. Observing that the Supreme Court, 
through its power of invalidation, has wrought fundamental 
change in the structure of our society, Marshall said: "My
point can best be made through example, and I chose the 
example that is closest to me Brown v. Board of Education 
. . . .  In this struggle for racial equality the Supreme 
Court served, at least in 1954, as a voice not of contempo­
rary opinion but of communal conscience, or in Chief Justice 
Hughes' earlier characterization, as 'teachers to the 
citizenry.' The speaker appears to link his accomplish­
ments with others which are virtuous.
Earlier discussion of how Marshall handled his 
materials seems to indicate that the speaker established 
sagacity while he spoke. Specifically, his use of what is 
generally called common sense seems apparent in the 
following example: "Hence the first amendment's guarantee
of freedom of speech and the press, and the right of people 
to assemble peaceably and to petition the Government for 
redress of grievances— these safeguards, it seems to me, 
are the minimal conditions needed for social change in any
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5979.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5980.
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s o c i e t y . Discussing implications of the Court's decision 
regarding First Amendment guarantees, Marshall comments on 
two "developments." The first placed "crisp limits of 
State libel laws" and the second consisted of "the lateral 
expansion of the first amendment protection. . . . Specif­
ics . . . such as freedom of speech and press, have come to 
be referred to as the freedom of expression." Continuing 
Marshall said:
With this lateral expansion, however, must come 
further concession to Government regulation; or to 
express the idea more graphically, the lateral 
expansion is necessarily accompanied by vertical 
contraction, where the peak of the vertical axis is 
the ideal of immunity from all control. Mr. Justice 
Holmes' example of shouting "Fire" in a crowded 
theater presented a compelling case for accepting 
some Government control of speech; and one need not 
be nearly as clever as the Justice to conjure up 
other hypotheticals illustrating, in a compelling 
way, the legitimacy of Government control if the 
relevant activity is not "speech" but expression, 
which can take a great variety of forms, some of 
which have always been sanctioned by criminal law. 
Could an individual refuse to pay taxes of commit 
murder or grand larceny, then claim that his conduct 
was a means of protecting and criticizing govern­
mental policies, and thus seek the immunities of the 
first amendment? I think not. Hence this lateral 
expansion seems to have resulted in the general 
acceptance of the proposition that Government has the 
power to regulate the manner of expression, the 
questions as to "how," "where," "when," though not 
the content of the expression, the "what."
As a general proposition, this development is 
no cause for concern. Rigor is required, neverthe­
less, in its application in order to assure that the 
regulation of the manner of expression remains 
neutral as to content. . . .^^
U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong. 
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5979.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong. 
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5980.
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Apparently, Marshall's good will is revealed through 
his ability to proceed with candor and straightforwardness. 
For example, Marshall noted that recent Supreme Court 
decisions have many different interpretations, each of which 
has a measure of truth and relevancy. He added: "None of
them can be totally dismissed for being impossible; none has 
a claim to absolute correctness; and each reflects the 
interpreter's special insights and experiences. The subject 
of these remarks, 'The Constitution and Social Change,' is 
such an interpretation, suffering from these faults and 
seeking the appropriate immunities. . . ."56
Marshall seems to establish good will by identifying 
himself with the listeners and their problems. He also 
offers necessary rebukes with tact and consideration. For 
example, he said:
We often lose sight of the fact that the courts 
have traditionally engaged in this type of reform. 
The quality of judicial process has always been the 
special province and the special responsibility of 
the courts. Even where other institutions, such as 
the legislature, have participated in this reform, 
it has been as a response to judicial promptings.
For example, those protesting against the imposition 
of the new exclusionary rules often overlook the 
hearsay rule, a massive judge-created exclusionary 
rule designed to protect less worthy interests than 
constitutional rights. Of course, there is a vital 
distinction. Traditionally the judicial reform of 
the judicial process has been initiated and 
effectuated by the courts whose process was being 
challenged; here the reform has emanated from the
°Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 459.
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Federal courts, which some would like to view as the 
courts of another, though supervening, jurisdiction.
It is not difficult to explain this phenomenon, 
and in many respects the explanation resembles that 
offered in connection with analyses of the Supreme 
Court's active use of the power of invalidation. 
First, there had been flagrant violations of basic 
human rights specifically protected by the Bill of 
Rights. . . . Secondly, there was a realization by 
the Justices that State courts defaulted. The state 
judges had state constitutional provisions to deal 
with these injustices, and they had the obligation 
to apply the federal constitution, but they refused 
to exercise their creative power. The Supreme 
Court attempted to fill the void. . . .
There is one very unique facet to this reform. 
The constitutional principle upon which these deci­
sions are based, the principle that no individual 
shall be deprived of his life or liberty without due 
process of law, is an evolutionary principle— its 
contours change with the gradual evolution of our 
communal values. . . .  57
Writing a rhetorical analysis of Marshall's arguments 
before the Supreme Court, Jamye Coleman Williams makes the 
following observation about the speaker's "ethical and 
pathetic appeal:"
I believe Thurgood Marshall's professional 
status as a civil rights lawyer, who had won 
many cases before the high court, served him in 
good stead. His personal integrity, his dedica­
tion to the cause, his own high sense of ethics 
would necessarily create a kind of rapport with 
the Court. In addition, the presence of emotional 
overtones, which would be inherent in any case 
concerning justice and injustice, had some
weight.58
57,U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5981.
of Thurgood Marshall's Arguments Before the Supreme Court 
in the Public School Segregation Controversy" (PhD 
dissertation, Ohio State University, 1959), p. 202.
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Speech of April 27, 1966
Occasion and Audience
Criticism of public address "must be soundly based 
upon a full and penetrating understanding of the meaning of 
the events from which it issues and of the listeners who 
paused to consider what is s a i d . T h e  occasion on which 
Marshall made this speech, "Human Rights— Civil Rights :
From Theory to Practice," is examined in terms of the follow­
ing questions: (1) what events gave rise to the speech;
(2) what factors determined the time and place of the speech;
(3) what elements influenced the speaker in his choice of 
subject and approach to the occasion; and (4) under what 
conditions did the speaker address the listeners?®*^
Regarding the events that gave rise to Marshall's 
address before the Law Day Luncheon of the University of 
Miami School of Law and the local bar association, several 
factors appear pertinent. For instance, reliable sources 
indicate that annually law students and lawyers celebrate 
"Law Day." Generally, these observances may be designed to 
emphasize the significance of law in American life. 
Specifically, it should be noted: "The Congress by joint
resolution . . . designated the first day of May of each 
year as Law Day, USA, to remind us of the fundamental truth 
that our liberty, our rights to pursue our individual 
destinies, and our very lives are dependent upon our system
S^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 349. 
^^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 357.
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of law and independent courts." Further, it has been 
reported that the President of the American Bar Association 
(ABA) set the theme for Law Day— 1966 as follows:
Our nation will celebrate in 1966 two notable 
milestones in the life of our republic. One is the 
175th anniversary of the Bill of Rights. The 
other is the 190th anniversary of the independence 
of the United States.
It is appropriate that on May 1 we also will 
be celebrating Law Day USA with the theme:
"Respect the Law— It Respects You.
Significantly, President Lyndon B. Johnson's official proc­
lamation of 1966 Law Day USA noted that both of the afore­
mentioned occasions "are notable milestones in the life of 
our republic and in man's quest for freedom and justice 
under law." Continuing, Johnson wrote:
These two events in American history serve to 
remind us that the great individual rights we value 
so highly carry with them corresponding obliga­
tions of citizenship: to obey the law— recognize
the rights of others— resolve grievances by lawful 
means— support law enforcement agencies— encourage 
law obedience by others— practice and teach 
patriotism— and defend our country.
Also, Johnson noted that the Law Day theme for 1966 "will
serve to focus attention on the need for every individual to
do his part to help strengthen our national commitment to
the rule of law. " It should be added that publications by
and for lawyers and law students printed the president's
61.U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24643.
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proclamation which urged commemoration of Law Day "with 
suitable programs and ceremonies."®^
To some extent, Marshall's choice of subject and 
approach to the occasion could have been influenced by some 
of the aforementioned matters. For example, the speaker's 
introductory remarks include reference to statement by the 
president of the ABA which established the theme for Law 
Day 1966. Continuing, Marshall said: "In discussing the
theme, I shall dwell on what I consider to be paramount:
'Human Rights— Civil Rights' and more particularly 'From 
Theory to Practice'." Marshall's introduction contains 
evidence of other factors that influenced his choice of 
subject. For example, he stated: "Our world leadership and
struggle for peace is evaluated and re-evaluated by democracy 
as it is practiced at home. " It should be remembered that 
during the mid-1960s America's involvement in Vietnam, had 
produced problems including nationwide resistance to the 
draft, student insurgency on college campuses, embitterment 
of many black leaders who regarded Vietnam as a drain on 
America's obligation to help the poor, and black disillu­
sionment with the hollowness of securing further legal rights 
which was producing violent responses like riots in Watts, 
Chicago, and Cleveland. Concerning the latter, it has been 
reported: "Federal response was not forthcoming, and
^^"Proclamation by the President of the United 
States," Federal Bar News, May, 1966, p. 7.
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24643.
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indeed by 1966 the government was spending more for Vietnam 
than for the entire federal welfare program. Black dis­
content mounted. . . . But [there was] no broad remedial 
legislation for the ghettoes or for more pressing urban prob­
lems such as unemployment, slum housing, and hostile police.
It should be noted that after the riots in Detroit 
and Newark, President Johnson in July 1967 established the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders to investi­
gate. The Commission's report, released in 1968, is dis­
cussed in the following passage:
While submitting detailed recommendations for a 
comprehensive program to insure equality, social 
justice and peace, and warning against resort to 
blind repression or capitulation to lawlessness, 
it also placed major responsibility for the 
nation's racial disorders on white racism and warned 
that "our nation is moving toward two societies, 
one black, one white— separate and unequal. . . .
To continue our present course will involve the 
continuing polarization of the American community, 
and will involve ultimately the destruction of 
basic democratic values.65
On the other hand, the Supreme Court during its 1965-66
session handed down a series of rulings in the civil rights
area. Among other things, in these rulings the Supreme
Court continued its protection of civil rights demonstrators
from unwarranted harrassment, struck further at southern
schemes for noncompliance with school desegregation, opened
public park facilities to equal access, and struck at
divergent of white and Negro patrons of Louisiana public
librairies. However, such federal action often evoked
64,Murphy, p. 415.
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Southern hostility to the civil rights movement. For 
example. Governor Wallace indicated that he was unable to 
protect the marchers in Selma, Alabama, and southern courts 
refused to bring in indictments against whites who assaulted 
and murdered civil rights workers, even when federal offi­
cials provided them evidence of form and nature. 
Unfortunately, at this point in time, the extent of federal 
intervention in such cases was limited by the Constitution. 
In late March, 1966, the Supreme Court issued opinions 
deploring the inability of the federal government to move 
against private citizens who deprived other Americans of 
their basic rights— including their lives.
Significantly, Marshall's speech of April 27, 1866,
Save for Viet Nam and the drive for peace 
throughout the world, public opinion— professional 
and lay— is focused on the so-called Negro revo­
lution in the United States and the War on Poverty. 
Indeed, all three are part of the same cloth. Our 
world leadership and the struggle for peace is 
evaluated and re-evaluated by the democracy as it 
is practiced at home. We can never explain away 
our mistreatment of minorities, whether because of 
race or lack of financial affluence.
Recent demonstrations ranging from the peaceful 
Selma march to the violent riots in Los Angeles, 
California, are dramatic enough to cause all to 
pause and seek out inevitable solutions. Then, too, 
our present judicial process including the present 
method of jury trials in the South— indeed our 
entire judicial system needs more careful study. 
Whichever way you look at it, we must seek the 
removal of all barriers in American life which are 
based on minority status whether racial or 
financial, or both.
^^Murphy, pp. 412-413.
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Additionally, Marshall remarked that understanding present 
problems, first, required a look at our basic statutory 
structure which initially gave legal support to slavery.
He added: "In fact, two worlds were being set up with the
same democracy.
With the preceding discussion in mind, it appears 
that the speaker made a suitable choice of subject and 
approach to the occasion.
Previously, it was mentioned that the Congress 
designated May 1 of each year as "Law Day." However,
May 1, 1966, was a Sunday. According to the Miami News, 
Marshall's speech was delivered "before the Law Day 
Luncheon" on April 27, 1966, at the Everglades Hotel during 
Law W e e k . I t  seems safe to assume that the time and place 
for the speech were appropriate and convenient for 
Solicitor General Marshall as well as the persons sponsoring 
the event.
Further, it is likely that the sponsors selected 
a satisfactory setting for their commemoration of Law Day 
1966. There does not seem to be any evidence to indicate 
that the conditions under which Marshall gave this speech 
were anything but favorable.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24643.
^^"Thurgood Marshall Raps King's War View," Miami 
News, April 27, 1966.
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The forces which shaped the occasion also influenced 
the audience to some degree. This section deals with other 
pertinent factors about the listeners by considering the 
following questions: (1) what was the composition of the
audience; (2) in what ways were the listeners homogeneous ;
(3) what did the listeners know about the speaker ; (4) what
did the listeners know about the speaker's subject; (5) how 
did the listeners stand on the speaker's proposition; (6) 
did a significant portion of the listeners hold attitudes 
favorable to the speaker's point of view; and (7) what atti­
tudes stood in the way of the speaker's achieving his 
objectives?^^
The audience was composed of University of Miami 
Law School students and faculty members along with members 
of the local bar association. According to the University 
of Miami School of Law's catalogue, it was established in 
1928; it is neither controlled nor supported by state, 
municipality, or church; it is a co-educational and 
desegregated; and applicants for admission are accepted or
^^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 358.
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Hearing, 90th Congress,
1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 11.
^^Bulletin— University of Miami School of Law 
1966-1967 (Coral Gables, Florida: Publication of Univer-
sity of Miami, 1966), p. 16.
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same source stipulates the following objectives:
The purpose of the School to fit the student 
for the practice of law and, in a larger sense, for 
his responsibilities in our social, political, and 
economic affairs, is being achieved by a comprehen­
sive curriculum covering a wide range of topics 
using varied teaching techniques. Starting with 
training in basic legal techniques, particularly 
in case and statutory analysis and synthesis, 
students are guided into problem analysis and 
finally into individual research, writing, planning 
and drafting, always directed toward the ideals of 
justice, of good government and free, progressive
society.72
These factors in principle appear to indicate to some extent 
the general nature of the law students and faculty in this 
particular audience. The validity of this assertion rests 
upon the assumption that faculty and students pursued the 
aforementioned objectives. Also, it is presumed that people 
are shaped by their environment.
In terms of the homogeneity of the listeners, it 
seems significant that lawyers and law students assembled 
to commemorate Law Day in 1966. These individuals shared 
or anticipated sharing the same profession. Their presence 
on this occasion suggests other similarities including their 
respect for the occasion, the theme, and the speaker.
It seems that the speaker was well-known and 
respected as an outstanding trial lawyer, judge, and Solicitor 
General. For example, during Senate Hearings on his nomina­
tion, one senator remarked: "He has been a towering figure
in the landmark cases striking down discriminatory
^^Bulletin— University of Miami School of Law 
1966-1967, p. 17.
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practices, in litigation and the decisions which lie at the 
very heart of American life and have brought us closer in 
our everyday life to those principles for which we stand* 
Further, many lawyers agreed that the character and the 
career of Thurgood Marshall embody the best in American life 
and the best in American law. Lawyers have asserted that 
Marshall's "imprint on justice and jurisprudence, once . . . 
on the Court, will without a doubt be as constructive and 
distinctive as that of his previous years of service to his 
fellow man. " ^
These factors, in part, established Marshall's 
status as a respected member of the legal profession and 
as an eminently qualified authority on the subject for this 
occasion. It is conceivable that in 1966 most lawyers and 
law students were acquainted with the speaker's acclaimed 
and widely publicized "exemplary career in the law and in 
the public service.
Obviously, the lawyers and law students who listened 
to Marshall's speech of April 27, 1966, were knowledgeable 
about the subject. During the mid-sixties in America, the 
Civil Rights movement and related matters received attention
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Hearing, 90th Congress,
1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 15.
74u.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Hearing, 90th Congress,
1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 16.
^^Ibid.
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from most Americans. For more than a decade prior to this
address, the Supreme Court had played a powerful role in
eliminating barriers to equality and justice for all. The
Court's leadership in constitutional change and social
reform had generated controversy, particularly in legal
circles. Significantly, it has been reported that these
judicial actions became the focus for scholarly concern.
The results had a major impact in various fields of American
education. It should not surprise anyone that evidence
supports "its impact upon the traditional teaching of
public law in colleges and universities.
The knowledge of some members of the audience was
probably enhanced by innovative law school programs which
many lawyers felt were essential to meet the needs of the
times. For example, David Cavers, Professor of Law at the
Harvard Law School and member of the Executive Committee
of the Association of American Law Schools noted:
Pressures generated by the social discontent and 
governmental malfunctioning in our cities will not 
relent and . . . will lead to major measures and 
programs . . . designed to attack, and hopefully 
cure, the evils we are now belatedly recognizing.
I shall assume that these measures will include some 
services to those who now go without and others 
designed to socialize and civilize the remnant of 
medievalism in our communities, the treatment of
lawbreakers.77
Further evidence that these listeners were familiar 
with the speaker's subject can be offered. For instance. 
Professor Herbert Wechsler, delivering the Oliver Wendell
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Holmes Lecture at the Harvard Law School in 1959, remarked:
On three occasions in the last few years 
Harvard has been hospitable to the discussion of 
that most abiding problem of our public law: the
role of courts in general and the Supreme Court 
in particular in our constitutional tradition; 
their special function in the maintenance, inter­
pretation and development of the organic charter 
that provides the framework of our government, the 
charter that declares itself the "supreme l a w . " 7 8
Wechsler added that previous lectures comprise only a frag­
ment of the serious, continuous attention that the subject is 
receiving at Harvard as well as elsewhere in the nation.
Pertinent faccors seem to indicate how the listeners 
stood on Marshall's proposition: Recent and dramatic con­
ditions in American society give us cause to pause and seek 
out the causes and inevitable s o l u t i o n . F o r  instance, 
in the mid-sixties law students joined the dissident chorus 
on campuses across the nation, voicing feelings of unease 
and discontent. Outstanding law professors identified 
these stirrings as expressive of a generalized dissatisfac­
tion with the course and quality of life in America and/or 
defects in legal e d u c a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y , it has been 
noted that by the mid-sixties a substantial number of able
Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law," Harvard Law Review, 73:1, November, 
1959.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24643.
®°Abraham S. Goldstein, "The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Legal Education," Law in a Changing America (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: The American Assembly, Columbia
University, 1968), p. 157.
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law students did not see a big-firm partnership as a career
goal but sought opportunities for public service, especially
to the disadvantaged, through the legal profession.®^
Increasingly, prominent members of the legal profession
[bench and bar] pursued Continuing Legal Education (OLE)
which was offered in approximately thirty-one states. The
two-fold purpose of CLE has been explained as follows;
To improve the professional competency of lawyers, 
and to bring about greater professional respon­
sibility. By "professional competency" is meant the 
ability of the lawyer to perform services for his 
clients in a technically proficient and sophisti­
cated way as counsellor, planner and advocate. 
"Professional responsibility" . . . refers to other 
duties and obligations the lawyer assumes, reforming 
of both procedural and substantive law; providing 
representation for all persons including the poor 
and unpopular; serving in civic and public affairs; 
participating in the work of the organized b a r . 82
In the mid-sixties, the ABA and the American Assembly of
Columbia University jointly sponsored a CLE program— "The
American Assembly on Law and the Changing Society"— and
considered goals for the legal profession in the years ahead
in light of the social changes of the present and past.
Legal Education," Law in a Changing America (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: The American Assembly, Columbia Uni­
versity, 1968), p. 167.
^^Clifford C. Nelson, "Preface," Law and a Changing 
America (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: American Assembly,
Columbia University, 1968), p. v.
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Additionally, legal scholars admitted that legal education 
seems to be in a process of fission in the bar and law 
schools, a process that reflects changes taking place in our 
society. Fission in the bar would discontinue the practice 
of permitting access to the machinery of justice to remain 
a prequisite of business, organized labor, and the well-to- 
do and relegating the legally indigent to the overloaded 
legal aid services and depending upon the least reputable 
for the administration of criminal justice. Fission in the 
law school would enable each to adapt their programs and 
employ their resources to realize more fully their differing 
alities.
It seems that in the mid-sixties the number of 
lawyers and law students who held attitudes favorable to 
Marshall's position was increasing. Legal scholars observe 
that by this period law school programs became more relevant 
"to the deepening crises in the law which reflected the 
conflicts in the country's political, economic and social 
relationships." Similarly, the spectrum of lawyer roles was 
broadened somewhat by law schools in the design of their 
curricula to meet contemporary needs. By the late sixties 
"a new wave of young lawyers" came out well-tuned not to 
serve power but to shape, distribute, curb, or displace power 
in accordance with their professional allegiance to a just 
legal system. Traditionally such initiatives were not
84
Cavers, pp. 140 and 143.
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considered their responsibility as lawyers. Obviously, the 
traditional school of thought was giving way to the broader, 
system-directed focus of the public interest lawyer. 
Interestingly, such a group expressed their views in the 
book. With Justice for Some (1970). Writing the introduction 
for this book, Ralph Nader remarked:
Most of the topics treated in this volume are 
continuing front page events. They have been 
treated in congressional hearings, court testimony, 
administrative hearings, and other investigations. 
What these young authors are saying is that this 
is the law's moment of truth, that it can no longer 
hide behind the public's ignorance of its failures 
or the complicity of the organized bar's tokenism 
when massive re-developments of legal manpower are 
necessary. And contributors are living their con­
cerns in public interest careers that require a 
stamina of commitment quite beyond perception or 
observation. Unlike past reformist legal schools 
of thought, these young lawyers and increasingly 
more like them are "staying with it." They are 
determined to make the law a force in reducing the 
institutional injustices and in shaping an 
initiatory democratic system of active and skilled
citizens.
Available evidence indicates that audience attitudes 
probably did not prevent the speaker's achievement of his 
objectives. Actually, evidence presented earlier implies 
largely favorable attitudes. Additionally, it should be 
noted that by this period, time had demonstrated several 
pertinent factors. For instance, New Deal assumptions that 
solutions to many pressing problems would come as an 
automatic spinoff from the achievement of economic security
Ralph Nader, "Introduction," With Justice for 
Some, eds. Bruce Wasserstein and Mark J. Green iBoston: 
Beacon Press, 1970), pp. x-xi.
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had proved overly optimistic. Further, it became clear that 
if the individual's social and political rights were to be 
raised to the same level as his economic rights, positive 
governmental action in this connection was essential. Some 
constitutional scholars contend that the accomplishment of 
such action seemed a particularly relevant task for the 
courts. Additionally, the achievement of such rights 
necessitated the clearing out of a legal thicket of archaic 
interpretations, which the legislative and executive 
branches were either ill-fitted or slightly motivated to 
undertake.®®
On the other hand, evidence to some extent reveals 
that for decades law schools neglected or refused to ask 
hard questions, seek hard data, and provide opportunities 
for the students to comprehend and prepare to deal with 
the injustices challenging the pretensions and canons of 
the profession. In fact, law schools did not see the need 
to investigate the politico-economic power that deployed 
the legal system to its special advantage. During the 
fifties, law schools reportedly paid little attention to the 
questions dealing with minorities and indigents which the 
Supreme Court confronted in the sixties. Critics of such 
practices note: "Aristocratic pedagogy flitted before the
students one uncritical image of another of society's 
alignments— big business, big bureaucracies, racial
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oppression, control of information and technology, and 
hypocritical electoral and legislative processes.
Further, it should be remembered that while eliminat­
ing barriers to equality and justice for all Supreme Court 
leadership generated a variety of reactions from lawyers 
as well as the general public. Of particular importance was 
the Court's involvement in constitutional change and social 
reform which drew mixed responses from legal scholars. For 
example, it has been reported that conservative and tradi­
tional legal scholars were somewhat apprehensive about what 
they considered revolutionary departures by the Supreme 
Court. Accordingly, they were inclined to challenge the 
methods used by the Court to attain its ends. Some members 
of the legal profession described judicial decisions of the 
fifties and early sixties as insensitive and heavy-handed.®® 
Professor Herbert Wechsler in the Harvard Law School 
Lecture, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," 
argued that courts have the power to decide all constitu­
tional cases in which the jurisdictional and procedural 
requirements are met. He concluded that in these cases 
decisions must rest on reasoning and analysis which trans­
cend the immediate result and discussed instances in which 
he believes the Supreme Court has not been faithful to this 
principle.®® Constitutional lawyers like Charles L.
®^Nader, p. x. ®®Kurphy, p. 469. 
®^Wechsler, p. 1.
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Black, Jr., of the Yale Law School, acknowledged that the 
significance of the Warren Court particularly was in the 
values it set out to achieve and extend through the courts 
as instruments. By sublimating legal process to moral ends 
and to the goals of meaningful justice, while managing not 
to overlook the latest election returns, constitutional 
lawyers felt that the Court had achieved a new level of 
statesmanship.9^0
Integrity of Ideas
Additional information about the integrity of 
Marshall's ideas was revealed during a press conference held 
June 30, 1954. It should be remembered that in May of 1954 
the Supreme Court had rendered a favorable decision in the 
Brown V. Board of Education case. In other words, separate 
but equal public education had been declared unconstitu­
tional. As NAACP Director-Counsel, he discussed the practice 
of holding lawyers' conferences "for the purpose of getting 
together with lawyers working on the local level and 
schooling them on how to handle civil rights cases."
Marshall added:
This year the conference concentrated on legal 
techniques to bring about implementation of the 
Supreme Court decisions in each community. . . .
A meeting was also held on Tuesday afternoon with 
state conference presidents as the state level is 
the level of implementation of national policy.
A priority schedule was set up . . .  . In each 
state branches will be represented at each hearing
^^Murphy, p. 469.
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accompanied by a lawyer or other expert in working 
out the details of desegregation. Conferences will 
be aimed at getting schools desegregated on a 
voluntary basis. We will urge that it be done as 
soon as possible. We will negotiate as long as the 
school board will negotiate in good faith.91
Marshall's address, "Human Rights— Civil Rights;
From Theory to Practice," was delivered during a period in 
American history in which some progress had been made toward 
guaranteeing equality and justice for all Americans.
However, some conditions which denied constitutional rights 
of minorities for centuries persisted. Many Americans, 
particularly blacks, seemed to be growing impatient with the 
delay of equality and justice under the law.
In recent decades Thurgood Marshall and other law­
yers successfully argued an unprecedented number of civil 
rights cases before the Supreme Court of the United States 
that helped eliminate many barriers to equal rights for 
all. However, other lawyers opposed their views.
Historians tend to agree that the conflicting views on 
civil rights can be found throughout American history.
In the mid-twentieth century the Supreme Court, 
especially the Warren Court, handed down many decisions in 
the area of civil rights and human rights. Significantly, 
legal scholars have observed: "In selecting landmarks in
human rights law, one quickly focuses on the Warren Court
June 30, 1954," NAACP Press Release, Dallas, Texas, June 30, 
1954, p. 1. (Mimeographed.)
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era as the first, and only, era to date in which the United 
States Supreme Court has considered a significant number of 
cases in this field.
To find answers to the human rights issues posed in 
cases coming before them during this period, it is generally 
agreed that the Court turn to constitutional documents. 
Further, it has been explained:
The justices are concerned with three elements 
of human rights— freedom, justice, and equality.
The legal phrases describing these rights are 
"civil liberties," "due process," and "civil 
rights, " and they are protected in a series of 
constitutional amendments :
(1) Protections of freedom and civil liberties 
from interference by the government are found 
mainly in the First Amendment;
(2) Provisions for fair trial and due process 
of law in the courts and before administrative 
agencies are found mainly in the due process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments;
(3) Guarantees of civil rights and equal pro­
tection of laws for all Americans— regardless of 
race, creed, color, nationality, religion, or
sex— are found mainly in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments.®3
The justices of the Warren Court looked out their 
windows at the clamor in the streets, at the rising black 
militance, at the figure America was playing on the world 
stage and reached new, but not easy, decisions. The diffi­
culty experienced by the Court became apparent, in part, 
when difficult cases like Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
Ann Fagan Ginger, The Law, the Supreme Court, and 
the People's Rights (Woodbury, New York: Barron's Educa­
tional Series, Inc., 1973), p. xi.
^^Ginger, p. xxix.
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had to be argued and re-argued by Thurgood Marshall as Chief 
NAACP Counsel. Also, sources agree that the Court demon­
strated uncertainty on how to carry out their decisions, 
especially those that sharply changed existing law by 
returning to the intentions of the framers of the Recon­
struction amendments and statutes.
Pertinent to this discussion seems to be the fact 
that the Court based its famous Brown desegregation decision 
on psychological grounds as well as legal precedents. 
Reportedly, "this approach opened the way for endless attacks 
on the Brown decision, on desegregation, on the Court 
itself." Apparently, this was not the only basis for the 
attack on the Court. If so, the attack would have ceased 
when the Court outlawed discrimination in housing, basing 
its decision solely on legal grounds. In fact, the Court 
cited a clearly worded statute prohibiting housing discrimi­
nation that had been passed in 1866 and never repealed. 
However, the attack did not end then nor when the Court 
ordered southern registrars to obey old voting rights 
statutes that left no room for interpretation. Therefore, 
"many commentators have . . . concluded that the attack was 
based on racism and would have occurred regardless of the 
basis for the school desegregation d e c i s i o n . I n  each of 
these speeches, Marshall acknowledged that the Court's 
involvement in the process of social change, through
^^Ginger, p. 408. ^^Ginger, pp. 408-409.
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protecting the right to criticize the status quo, invalidat­
ing laws and institutions, such as segregation, which fall 
short of central constitutional ideals, and reforming the 
criminal process, provides part of the explanation why the 
Court has found itself in the center of an intense contro-
In each of these speeches, Marshall urged listeners, 
particularly courts and lawyers, to join the Court in 
efforts to initiate reform which guarantees equal rights 
and justice and to ensure meaningful enforcement of 
existing laws. Consistently, Marshall identifies resources 
available to lower courts and lawyers which could not only 
implement existing laws but could also create new laws to 
guarantee equality and justice for all. Interestingly, 
other authoritative sources have expressed similar views: 
"The Warren Court did much to reconstruct the Reconstruc­
tion, but left much to be done by the lower courts. The 
justices seemed anxious to require lower court judges to 
re-read old Reconstruction history and statutes, to rethink 
their attitudes on race and racism and on the meaning of 
the Reconstruction amendments
We should remember that the Congressmen of the 
1960s, unlike the Radical Republicans of the 1800s, were 
not pressing for a new wave of equalitarian legislation.
In fact. Congress failed to follow up on the Court's 1954
^^Ginger, p. 409.
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civil rights decisions until 1957, passing the first Civil
Rights Act since Reconstruction. As previously mentioned,
even the presidents moved cautiously in the area of civil
rights, issuing executive orders on housing and employment
discrimination mainly during election campaigns or when
popular pressure reached a peak.
Numerous constitutional scholars seem to confirm
Marshall's argument that for traditional reasons the Court
was qualified as the agent to reinterpret the meaning of
the constitutional guarantees of the Bill of Rights and
apply them to states and cities in such a way as to produce
uniform national standards of criminal justice in federal
and state courts. Accordingly, it has been explained:
What appellants sought who brought cases in these 
fields was application of a variety of traditional 
principles and values associated with the American 
tradition of democratic government to contemporary 
problems. The Court's historic role had been to 
construe established statutes and legal language in 
the context of both initial meaning and intent and 
current societal demands. The judicial transition 
directed itself naturally not merely to discovering 
the precise locus of the productive language of 
constitutional provisions and statutes, but to 
ascertaining their thrust and deep and enduring 
implications as well as their overall philosophical 
justification for a republican state. Unhampered 
by the same need for compromise and concern for 
constituency expedient for the other two branches, 
the judiciary was able to move quickly and directly 
toward the assuring of abstract public values, such 
as justice, fairness, natural rights, and morality 
in individual and public relationships, in a far 
less qualified way. It was thus in a unique posi­
tion to act, as one commentator put it, as the 
"conscience of the nation.
'ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
266
In this speech, the main premises from which Marshall 
argued emanated from his personal and professional expe­
riences as well as his attitude toward the complex problems 
of this period in American life. Briefly, this speech 
reveals the following major premises :
(1) For centuries our constitutional democracy has 
denied minorities, especially Negroes, equality 
and justice under law.
(2) Recent Supreme Court leadership in the struggle 
for racial equality stems from two profound 
insights: first, the status quo had fallen
short of a central constitutional ideal, the 
egalitarian ideal, and secondly, all other 
societal institutions, especially the more 
representative institutions, refused to assume 
a major responsibility in working toward the 
realization of this ideal.
(3) Lower courts and members of the bar should 
share, not criticize, the responsibilities of 
bridging the gap between equality and justice 
in theory and in practice.
Organization
This section examines the speaker's address in terms 
of rhetorical craftsmanship, considering the speech from 
the point of view of its basic construction and the total 
plan of organization with reference to the peculiar audience 
conditions to which it was presumably accommodated. 
Specifically, the purpose, the proposition and the structure 
of this speech will be considered.
Purpose. If we remember the turbulent conditions of 
this period and if we remember that as Solicitor General 
Marshall resumed involvement in the affairs of this country 
as an advocate, it should not be surprising that Marshall's
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purpose seems to be to convince or persuade. Frequently, 
the speaker who seeks to convince or persuade is an 
advocate, according to some authorities in the field of 
s p e e c h . S t u d y  of this speech reveals that Marshall 
recognized the pressing problems of his time and assessed 
pertinent needs. Hence, the speaker not only provided his 
audience with information but apparently sought belief in 
and action on his proposition.
Proposition. Examination of this speech reveals the 
following proposition: We must seek causes of and
inevitable solutions for barriers in American life which are 
based on minority status whether because of race or financial 
or both. This statement appears to clarify the plan of the 
speech. Further, it seems to indicate the subject matter 
that will be treated. Even if the speaker's proposition 
challenged the beliefs and conduct of some members of this 
audience, it very likely enabled the audience to listen 
intelligently.
Structure. Typically, this speech consists of three 
major divisions. One can easily perceive an introduction, 
a body, and a conclusion.
In this speech, Marshall's introduction (consisting 
of 265 words) seems to be appropriate for three reasons:
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(1) it arouses favorable attention; (2) it establishes 
common ground; and (3) it issues a challenge. For 
instance, Marshall's reference to the occasion, the theme, 
and the issue he considered paramount probably served 
to stimulate the attention of the audience and to prepare 
the listeners for the discussion to follow. Marshall's 
comments about the appropriateness that "we" celebrate 
Law Day USA, his use of words by ABA's president, and his 
reference to "our" judicial system appear to establish 
identification and relationship with the audience. 
Rhetoricians maintain that people naturally listen more 
readily to a speaker they believe is like them, shares 
their feelings and knows their problems.
The body of this speech contains three contentions 
which appear to support the speaker's proposition.
Marshall's main ideas in this speech are somewhat similar 
to those presented in previous speeches. However, 
difference in arrangement and emphasis seems evident.
The main ideas may be summarized as follows :
I. Since the oldest and most consistent example of 
mistreatment of minorities in America has 
focused upon Negroes, a fair understanding of 
our present system requires a glimpse into the 
past.
II. In the last decade, the Supreme Court, through 
its power of invalidation and its involvement 
in reforming the criminal processes, has 
assumed leadership in removing barriers in 
American life based on minority status.
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III. The time has come for local courts, local
legislatures, and all members of the bar to 
share the task of reform which removes barriers 
in American life based on minority status; 
thereby, bridging the gap between theory and 
practice in the area of human rights and civil 
rights.
The body of this speech is one of the longest of those 
covered in this study. It consists of more than 3,000 words.
Essentially, the outline reflects several aspects of 
the problem-solving pattern: (1) review of the problem— its
origin, its growth to urgency, and its present dangers; (2) 
enumeration and analysis of possible solutions ; (3) recom­
mendation of the best solution with support that it will 
solve the problem without creating worse difficulties ; and
(4) appeal to audience to act upon the recommendation.^^^ 
Rhetoricians often contend that logical patterns, 
particularly the problem-solving pattern, are the most 
useful; for questions that commonly occasion the use of 
rhetoric are likely to be problems in need of solution, and 
the dialectic essential to the discovery of solutions may 
furnish the most effective structures for communication.^®^ 
It is not surprising that Marshall employed significant 
aspects of the problem-solving pattern in his speech of 
April 27, 1966.
Bower Aly and Lucile Folse Aly, A Rhetoric of 
Public Speaking (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973),
p. 180.
^°^Ibid.
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Further, the pattern of this speech can be con­
sidered appropriate if it increased the impact of the 
speaker's ideas, enabling the listeners to understand the 
speaker and to share the ideas, whether they agree or dis­
agree. Also, the pattern seems suitable to the speaker's
purpose and central idea.
Marshall's conclusion is typically brief, consisting 
of about 102 words or one paragraph. The speaker said:
The gap between theory and practice is being 
shortened but there is much to do. Much for all of 
us to do. Once a year we stop to evaluate our legal 
framework on Law Day. Too often we consider that 
sufficient to hold us for another year. We return 
to the old rut of "business as usual." Regardless 
of how much our government does or will do in the 
future, we will not close the gap until each of us 
makes Law Day for every day in the year and each 
takes this as his individual personal
responsibility.^02
Marshall uses standard rhetorical devices in this 
conclusion. For example, it seems that he summarizes his 
main points, makes a call for action to enlist support for 
his proposition, and presents a prediction of the future. 
This conclusion appears to be designed to fulfill the 
speaker's purpose and to gain the desired response from most 
listeners.
^°^U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24644.
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Logical Appeals
The validity of Marshall's reasoning in his "Law 
Day" speech can be determined by constructing syllogisms 
from his main points and testing them according to the 










If laws and practices in America 
for centuries largely protected 
rights of the majority, rights 
of minorities, especially Negroes, 
were not protected.
Laws and practices in America for 
centuries largely protected the 
rights of the majority.
Rights of minorities, especially 
Negroes, were not protected.
If Supreme Court actions of the 
last decade have protected some 
rights of minorities, some 
barriers in American life based 
on minority status have been 
removed.
Supreme Court actions of the last 
decade have protected some rights 
of minorities.
Some barriers in American life 
based on minority status have been 
removed.
If new laws, practices, and judi­
cial reform fulfill constitutional 
guarantees of equality and justice 
for all Americans, all barriers in 
American life based on minority 
status can be removed.
New laws, practices, and judicial 
reform fulfill constitutional 
guarantees of equality and 
justice.
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Conclusion) All barriers in American life
based on minority status can be 
removed.
Close examination of this speech reveals that 
Marshall often implied rather than expressed some of his 
premises. However^ the syllogistic reasoning can be con­
sidered valid since in each case the minor premise affirms 
the antecedent and the conclusion affirms the consequent. 
Apparently, the speaker's reasoning is sound.
Having examined the speaker's reasoning, we now 
turn to his use of evidenoe. The critic must determine the 
forms of support used by the speaker to gain understanding, 
acceptance, and action.
Marshall seems to support his oonclusion that for 
centuries the rights of minorities, especially Negroes, 
were not protected by laws and practices. Accordingly, 
he cited specific instances that historically mistreatment 
of minorities has focused upon Negroes. Typically, the 
speaker argues from circumstantial detail:
Since the oldest and most consistent example 
of mistreatment of minorities has focused upon 
Negroes, a fair understanding of our present 
problem requires a glimpse into the past. Being 
a constitutional democracy we first look to our 
basic statutory structure. Beginning with the 
Declaration of Independence we remember that 
Jefferson sought to have slavery condemned in the 
Declaration of Independence. He was unsuccessful- 
Secondly, the constitution of our government 
expressly recognized slavery and gave legal 
support to it. . . .
During the early part of the 19th century, 
despite the great drive of abolitionists and 
others, there was always the recognition of the 
so-called inferiority of the Negro— even the free
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Negro. There were instances of refusal of admission 
of Negroes to abolitionist meetings. . . .
After the Civil War, Congress made its first 
efforts toward removing state imposed racial dis­
crimination by passing the proposed Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Acts. . . .
The supreme effort of the Civil War, the rough 
struggle to get the bills through Congress and the 
urgency of expanding our country to the West Coast, 
exhausted the liberals and the struggle for protec­
tion of the Negroes was abandoned after the 
Reconstruction Era.
The executive branch of government never had any 
intention of moving in. Finally, Supreme Court 
decisions in the Civil Rights cases (1883) and 
Plessy V. Ferguson (1896) were interpreted as final 
abandonment of efforts of the federal government to 
protect the civil rights of Negroes. The states 
resumed much of the pre-war practices of deliberate
racial discrimination.104
Obviously, the speaker's evidence clarified and 
amplified the contention. In all probability, the audience 
was able to understand and possibly to share the speaker's 
conclusion.
The speaker argued deductively using assertions, 
examples, and explanations as supporting materials. For 
example, Marshall remarked that decades into the twentieth 
century "neither the executive nor legislative branches of 
the federal government could be persuaded to move." But 
"the federal courts found a way to fill the vacuum." He 
asserted, "Through its power of invalidation the Supreme 
Court has wrought fundamental changes in the structure of 
our society." Continuing, Marshall chose Brown v. Board of
^^^U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24643-24644.
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Education as an example which he explained in terms of its 
impact. In part, he said that segregation was constitu­
tionally condemned and stripped of all moral predicates.
Marshall asserted that Supreme Court's involvement 
in reforming our criminal processes which began in the 
1900s has intensified recently, removing anachronisms which 
have no place in our society. Then Marshall said, 
"Guaranteeing the right to counsel and protecting the per­
sonal rights of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments through the 
exclusionary rules have been among the most significant 
changes. " Commenting that it is not necessary to add other 
instances rather there exists the need to analyze these 
developments "on a more institutional level," the speaker 
proceeds to explain the traditional and unique aspects of 
judicial reform.
Marshall admits that progress has been made in 
reforming the judicial process but asserts that "gross imper­
fections remain." To illustrate the former, he said, "as a 
national proposition we have come a long way from those 
initial outrages perceived in Brown v. Mississippi and 
Powell V. Alabama." Regarding the latter, he said: "Pre­
arraignment procedures in the station house; bail; pre-trial 
discovery; the admission of evidence dealing with the
^°^U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24644.
lO^ Ibid.
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accused's prior criminal record; the right to counsel in 
specialized proceedings, such as collateral attacks, commit­
ment proceedings, and revocation-of-parole proceedings.
These are just some of the areas in which radial reform will 
take place." Marshall adds that this is not a prediction but 
an invitation to all to join in this task of reform.
Finally, Marshall asserts that the time has come when 
the burden of reforming the criminal process must be shared. 
Then he opined:
Sharing the burden will add to the resources that 
can be used in this enterprise; it will tend to gain 
a more popular backing for the reform when the 
reform is initiated by institutions closer to the 
citizenry. . . . Members of the bar . . . through 
their professional associations can initiate and 
press for this reform, and each lawyer engaged in a 
criminal trial, whether prosecutor or defense 
counsel, possesses a special responsibility and 
power . . .  to ensure that the trial conforms to our 
highest traditions of fairness and j u s t i c e . 108
At this point in his speech before the Miami Law Day 
Luncheon, Marshall acknowledges the controversy surrounding 
Supreme Court decisions in the same words that he used in 
the speech before the Federal Bar Association. However, he 
does not conclude his speech immediately.
The preceding discussion seems to indicate that the 
speech provided a variety of evidence to support his con­
tentions. Also, it can be assumed that his evidence helped 
the listeners understand and respect his ideas. Assuming 
the audience largely agreed with the noble proposition, the
^°" I^bid. ^°®Ibid.
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reasoning and evidence presented by the speaker probably 
earned acceptance of the speaker's ideas and proposal for 
action.
Emotional Appeals
Having examined the speaker's logical appeals, we now 
turn to an examination of his emotional appeals. Brembeck 
and Howell have defined persuasion as "the conscious attempt 
to modify thought and the action by manipulating motives of 
men toward predetermined ends."^®^ With this in mind, this 
section focuses on Marshall's use of emotional appeals.
Generally speaking, Marshall seems to repeat 
pathetic proof in these speeches to lawyers and law students. 
Specifically, his emotional appeals consist of those to 
justice and fair play and those to social responsibility and 
professional pride.
Speaking in Miami, Marshall seems to appeal to the 
listeners' sense of fair play and justice. Asserting that 
history reveals that from the very beginning our system of 
government crystalized the status of Negro Americans,
Marshall adds: "In fact, two worlds were being set up within
the same democracy." Continuing, Marshall says:
During the early part of the 19th century 
despite the great drive of abolitionists and others, 
there was always the recognition of the so-called 
inferiority of the Negro— even the free Negro.
There were instances of refusal of admission of 
Negroes to abolitionist meetings.
^Brembeck and Howell, p. 24.
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All of this was brought about by the propa­
ganda of many southern professors. These men, for 
the sole purpose of continuing slavey, managed to 
convince others that scientific studies actually 
proved the inferiority of Negroes, and it had its 
effect.110
In this speech, Marshall seems to repeat the following appeal
to justice and fair play.
Yet on the constitutional horizon there looms the 
problem.s of the large metropolitan ghettos, both 
a product and a cause of fears and prejudices of 
our generation, and the massive injustices 
inflicted on the poor; the "other America," is 
still with us. The hope is not that the Supreme 
Court will singly take up the burden of eliminating 
these injustices through requiring further reform, 
but that the other social and political institutions 
will make it a joint enterprise, if not their 
special responsibility.m
Addressing the Miami law students and lawyers, 
Marshall appeals to the audience's sense of professional 
pride and social responsibility.
The gap between theory and practice is being 
shortened but there is much to do. Much for all of 
us to do. Once a year we stop to evaluate our 
legal framework on Law Day. Too often we consider 
that sufficient to hold us for another year. We 
return to the old rut of "business as usual." 
Regardless of how much our government does or will 
do in the future, we will not close the gap until 
each of us makes Law Day for every day in the year 
and each takes this as his individual personal 
responsibility.112
., Congressional Record,
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24643.
lllu.S,., Congressional Record,
(1967) , CXIII, No. 140, 24644.
., Congressional Recordj
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24645.
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In these speeches, Marshall consistently implies or states 
the following: "Law cannot only respond to social change but
can initiate it, and lawyers, through their every day work in 
the courts, may become social reformers.
As a successful trial lawyer for more than three 
decades, Marshall obviously realized the significance of 
stimulating the emotions of listeners. Undoubtedly, he 
recognized that the skillful and judicious use of pathetic 
proof can move judges and juries to act in accordance with 
the speaker's recommendation. On this occasion, Marshall 
included pathetic proof which reinforced reason and met 
rhetorical requirements.
Speech of March 8, 1967
Occasion and Audience
Generally, some of the factors which shaped the 
occasion when Marshall delivered his speech on April 27, 1966, 
influenced the speaker's choice of subject, "The Law and the 
Quest for Equality." Equality and justice under law for all 
Americans continued to be more assumption than fact.
Particularly, it should be kept in mind that condi­
tions which denied equality and justice for minorities in 
America had not changed significantly during the mid-sixties. 
The executive and legislative branches of government, in the
llSThurgood Marshall, "Law and the Quest for 
Equality," Washington University Quarterly, Winter, 1967, 
p. 7.
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opinion of many, did little to remedy problems in the area 
of civil rights. For example. President Johnson felt 
military priorities came first and Congress was reluctant 
to act on civil rights matters. However, in 1967 the 
Supreme Court continued its controversial involvement in 
protecting the rights of many Americans. For example, "in 
a series of cases involving the omission of Negroes from 
juries and grand juries, the Court struck consistently at 
discriminatory local practices" and exercised judicial power 
in cases involving equal rights to h o u s i n g . B u t  much 
remained to be done in the area of civil rights. Accordingly, 
peaceful protests continued under the leadership of Dr.
Martin Luther King and others. The "Black Power" movement 
escalated under leaders like Stokely Carmichael.
On this occasion. Solicitor General of the United 
States Thurgood Marshall delivered the nineteenth annual 
Tyrrell Williams Memorial (TWM) lecture sponsored by 
Washington University Law School (established in 1899) in 
St. Louis, Missouri. The TWM Lectureship "was established 
in the School of Law of Washington University by alumni of 
the school in 1949, to honor the memory of a well-loved 
alumnus and faculty member whose connection with and service 
to the school extended over the period 1898-1947. .,115
^^"^Murphy, pp. 417-418.
^^^Thurgood Marshall, "Law and the Quest for
Equality," p. 1.
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Apparently, the TWM Lectureship brought to the Law School a 
distinguished lecturer each year. Previous speakers had 
been well-recognized members of the bar, legal scholars and 
jurists; including Supreme Court Justices Felix Frankfurter, 
William 0. Douglas, and William J. Brennan.
The Washington University Law School employed the 
"case method" of i n s t r u c t i o n . W i t h  this in mind, 
Marshall's speech which utilizes this method to some extent 
appears suitable.
Perhaps, some indication of the general nature of 
the audience that Marshall addressed on March 8, 1967, is 
suggested in the following passages from the school 
catalogue:
The program of the School of Law is designed 
to help students develop an understanding of law, 
the processes by which it operates, and the social, 
economic, and political context in which it func­
tions. Without . . . ignoring technical legal 
knowledge, the School of Law recognizes that legal 
education must be broadly based for its recipients 
to contribute effectively to shaping society's 
goals and developing the means of achieving these
The law is not, and cannot be, static, and the 
man who is "learned in the law" is the man who has 
developed the ability to find sound solutions to 
new problems by adapting and using, rather than 
merely echoing, the teachings of the past.H^
Bulletin of Washington University 1969-197 0: 
The School of Law (St. Louis, Missouri: Publication of
Washington University, 1968), p. 29.
^^^Bulletin of Washington University 1967-1968: 
The School of Law, p. 6.
^^^Bulletin of Washington University 1967-1968: 
The School of Law, p. 9.
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This audience was composed of approximately two hundred 
thirty law students, numerous faculty members, and some 
local attorneys. It seems likely that the selection of 
Marshall as speaker for this special occasion was to a large 
extent based on his illustrious familiarity with current 
problems, on knowledge of his prominence in the legal pro­
fession in general and on his unparalleled success as a 
constitutional lawyer. Evidence presented earlier disclosed 
that many lawyers respected Marshall as an advocate, a trial 
lawyer, a federal judge and as the first black Solicitor 
General of the United States. In 1967, Marshall was des­
cribed as a Supreme Court nominee whose qualifications were 
"dramatically and compellingly e s t a b l i s h e d . F o r  
several decades, Marshall's career seems to have paralleled 
the Supreme Court's new interpretation of constitutional 
amendments. When Marshall spoke to this audience rumors of 
his nomination for Supreme Court Justice were persistent. 
Indeed, a few months later he was nominated for this post 
by President Johnson who emphasized Marshall's exceptional 
qualifications by saying that Marshall had "already earned 
his place in h i s t o r y . T h e  members of the audience like 
most Americans, especially lawyers and the people he
119"The Supreme Court: The First Negro Justice,"
Time, September 8, 1967, p. 16.
^Randall W. Bland, Private Pressure on Public 
Law— The Legal Career of Justice Thurgood Marshall (Port 
Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1973), p. 151.
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represented, undoubtedly were well-acquainted with the 
speaker and his subject.
Specific information about how they stood on the 
speaker's proposition and attitude of audience toward the 
speaker's point of view is not available. However, the 
school's catalogue revealed some data which can be con­
sidered: (1) the law students serve as interns with govern­
mental agencies in St. Louis, Missouri; (2) the faculty 
(seventeen full-time and twelve part-time teachers) received 
legal training in "better known law schools of the country" 
and had wide experience in teaching, practice, governmental 
service and research; and (3) the library was one of the 
few in the country "designated for United States Supreme 
Court B r i e f s . S o m e  other interesting facts about the 
students in attendance include the following: (1) they cam.e
from thirty different states and three foreign countries;
(2) they had been admitted to the law school on the basis 
of their exceptional academic achievement; and (3) while 
attending Washington University Law School the students 
worked for the Legal Aid Society which provided services to 
persons unable to afford an attorney, under the supervision 
of local attorneys. Students who have demonstrated ability 
in the second- and third-year classes are given the fullest 
responsibility consistent with their experience and ability.
^^^Bulletin of Washington University 1967-1968: 
The School of Law, p. 7.
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Further, students in their second and third years who have 
completed the course in Criminal Law participated in the 
Voluntary Defender Program (VDP). Participants in VDP 
assisted attorneys appointed to defend persons charged with 
a crime who are unable to afford legal representation. 
Further, the catalogue reveals: "Participation in this pro­
gram not only gives the student invaluable experience, but 
also gives the attorney additional assistance to ensure that 
every defendant in a criminal proceeding gets a fair trial 
and is adequately represented by vounsel."^^^
Other factors imply that Marshall's point of view 
was acceptable to his listeners. For example, it has been 
noted that by the mid-sixties young lawyers and law 
students were inspired by legal heroes like Justice William 
O. Douglas. Justice Douglas, prior TWM Lecturer, has been 
characterized as a distinguished lawyer who "long kindled 
the hope that our legal system can evolve to be sensitive 
to the needs of all c i t i z e n s . A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  these 
lawyers and law students were taking more active measures, 
by the late sixties to reform the p r o f e s s i o n . A c c o r d i n g
Bulletin of Washington University 1967-1968:
The School of Law, pp. 10 and 38.
^^^Eric E. Van Loon, "The Law School Response: How
to Sharpen Students' Minds by Making Them Narrow," With 
Justice for Some, eds. Bruce Wassestein and Mark Green 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 342.
^^"^Van Loon, p. 343.
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to some lawyers, Marshall had an activist legal out­
look.
Presumably, the TWM Lectures were planned to provide 
the greatest possible benefits for the audience. The speaker 
for this occasion would be one whose proposition and point 
of view those assembled respected very highly. Also, it 
is probable that few, if any, attitudes of hearers would 
interfere with the speaker's achievement of his objectives.
Integrity of Ideas
As explained earlier in this study, Marshall's life 
and career had been dedicated to the pursuit of equality 
and justice under law for all Americans. Marshall's 
preparation, training and experiences apparently equipped 
him to deal effectively with ideas pertinent to this 
subject, "Law and the Quest for Equality."
In this connection several factors seem important.
This man had "captained the long-drawn legal battle for 
equal rights during his 23 years as counsel for the NAACP."^^^ 
This man argued and won an unprecedented number of cases 
before the Supreme Court and whose famous victory in Brown 
V. Board of Education was the Court's ruling that segre­
gated schools are in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This man was appointed federal judge by President Kennedy and 
the first black Solicitor General by President Johnson.
125"The Supreme Court: Negro Justice," Time,
September 23, 1967.
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This man, a few months after this speech, would be nominated 
the first black Associate Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court.
Marshall wrote an article, "Mr. Justice Murphy and 
Civil Rights," published in the Michigan Law Review of 
1950. This article focuses on Justice Murphy's genuine 
devotion to equalitarian principles of our fundamental law, 
particularly in the field of civil rights. His description 
of Murphy resembles characterizations of Marshall by some 
of his associates: "In the field of civil rights, Mr.
Justice Murphy was a zealot. To him, primacy of civil 
rights and human equality in our law and their entitlement 
to every possible protection in each case, regardless of 
competing considerations, was a fighting faith.
Marshall discusses the major cases of the 1940s involving 
fundamental issues affecting civil rights of unpopular 
minorities which "clearly demonstrate Justice Murphy's con­
tribution to the basic law of the l a n d . O f  some 
importance is that this article afforded Marshall an earlier 
opportunity to express beliefs that he repeated in speeches 
as Solicitor General.
Studying Marshall's speeches and his career, one is 
convinced that the speaker believed strongly in the causes
Rights," Michigan Law Review, 48:745, 1950.
l ^ T h u r g  
Rights," p. 746.
^Thur ood Marshall, "Mr. Justice Murphy and Civil
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for which he spoke. Members of the legal profession, as 
well as the general public, have attested to his exceptional 
knowledge and his ability to articulate his ideas skill­
fully whether in the courtroom or on the lecture platform.
In particular, Marshall was renown as an outstanding 
authority on constitutional law and a courageous champion 
in the struggle to achieve equality and justice under law 
for all Americans.
Significantly, the speaker reiterated ideas which he 
had presented in earlier speeches. However, it should be 
noted that the emphasis shifted, from speech to speech, and 
the supporting material varied. These matters are examined 
more closely later in this study.
In this speech, Marshall discusses the Supreme 
Court's involvement in legal reform which eliminated many 
inequalities and injustices in American life. As the Court 
moved actively to extend constitutional protection to 
minorities, scholars of this period turned close attention 
to the impact of Supreme Court decisions.
Further, constitutional historians generally 
agree that the average American of the 1960s was conscious 
of the changing role of the Supreme Court in American life. 
Whether they approved or appreciated the Court's new 
position of prominence, many Americans observed its 
actions closely. To some, the Court seemed to be pushing 
ahead of public opinion, assuming the lead in setting forth
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
new standards of social control and public behavior and 
becoming the most innovative of the three branches of the 
American government.
The evolution of the Court’s new role and its 
ramifications have been explained as follows:
Its attainment of its new position seemed in 
retrospect the inevitable result of the public law 
revolution of the 1930s and its impact on American 
life and institutions. The overwhelming popular 
endorsement, at the ballot box, of the New Deal 
had constituted a clear public acceptance of big 
government. It was the government's task, from here 
on, a majority agreed, to take actions in the 
public interest that in a complex and enormous 
industrial state an individual could not meaning­
fully take for himself. Thus the condition of the 
average individual, his protection, against massive 
impersonal forces such as poverty, unemployment, 
the business cycle, and his general lack of economic 
security, which the depression had demonstrated a 
laissez-faire system could not insure, were now to 
be turned over to government, whose responsibility 
it was to afford remedies and solutions. New Deal 
leaders argued persuasively that only if such 
elemental economic guarantees were achieved could 
man be free to cope with the great range of social 
and political problems chronically confronting him. 
By the 1950s, the permanence of such an approach to 
public policy became clear. Eight years of 
Eisenhower Republicanism demonstrated that even the 
nation's more conservative party was prepared to 
preserve and extend rather than reverse or alter
the basic New Deal p r o g r a m s . ^28
Also, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court's involve­
ment in the area of civil rights and human rights was 
praised and criticized. The extent of the controversy sur­
rounding Supreme Court decisions during the decades 
following the 1930s seems evident in the following passage
^Murphy, pp. 458-459.
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from a magazine article— "What 36 State Chief Justices Said 
About the Supreme Court"— of October 3, 1958:
The chief justices of 36 States recently 
adopted a report critical of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, declaring that the Court "has 
tended to adopt the role of policy maker without 
proper judicial restraint."
This report, approved by the chief justices 
of three fourths of the nation’s States, found that 
the present Supreme Court has abused the power 
given to it by the Constitution. The Court is 
pictured as invading fields of Government reserved 
by the Constitution to the S t a t e s . ^29
It seems particularly significant that this entire article
was included as an appendix to Senator Sam Ervin's (D-North
Carolina) views in the 1967 Report Together with Minority
Views of Hearings on Nomination of Thurgood Marshall to be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States. It should be remembered that Ervin had opposed
Marshall’s nomination saying "Judge Marshall will align
himself with the judicial activists now serving on the
Supreme Court.
As the Supreme Court's decisions drew sharp and mixed
responses, the Court responded that this was its purpose.
Specifically, the response of the Warren Court has been
explained as follows:
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judi­
ciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Executive Report 
No. 13, 90th Congress, 1st Sess., August 21, 1967 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 18.
^^ % . S . , Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judi­
ciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Executive Report 
No. 13, 90th Congress, 1st Sess., August 21, 1967 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 16.
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There was no reason, its majority felt, why his­
torically professed American ideals and their 
practice could not be harmonized and why the 
hypocrisy and immorality that had pervaded the 
behavior of earlier generations of Americans—  
Americans who while professing deep belief in 
liberty and equality found innumerable ways to 
qualify and destroy each— could not be eliminated. 
Thus, while the Court was conscious of playing a 
new power role, and acting as a balance wheel in 
protecting the rights of the individual against 
the power of business, big labor, and big govern­
ment, it was also conscious of its obligation to 
make American traditions and values operative in 
the context of a modern industrial society even in 
face of the reluctance or obstruction of the two 
branches.131
The merit of Marshall's ideas, in part, can be 
measured by the fact that other successful lawyers and 
distinguished legal scholars expressed similar views. 
Although some of these persons and their views have been 
mentioned earlier in this study, perhaps others should be 
added here. For example, in the late 1960s, Justice Tom C. 
Clark wrote:
Although the Bill of Rights was included in 
the Constitution by ratification as early as 1791, 
some Amendments . . . are not enjoyed by all 
citizens today. . . . Although the Fourteenth 
Amendment is now in its 101st year, many of the 
fruits of its clauses are not enjoyed by millions 
of our citizens. Indeed, the news media report 
every day of the many anguished cries for equal
justice.^32
In 1967, Chief Justice Earl Warren said:
pp. 461-462.
  _ _ ______ American Law: The Case for
Radical Reform (Toronto: The MacMillan Company, 1969),
pp. xiii-xiv.
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In a century which has been characterized by 
growth and modernization in science, technology and 
economics, the legal fraternity is still living in 
the past. We have allowed the mainstream of 
progress to pass us by. . . . Our failure to act 
becomes alarming when a competent district judge 
must admit in testimony before a Senate committee 
that unless something new and effective is done 
promptly in the area of judicial research, 
coordination, and management, the rule of law in 
this nation cannot endure. VThen justice is denied 
to any of our citizens because of faulty adminis­
tration, our failure to act becomes i n e x c u s a b l e . 3
Writing American Law: The Case for Radical Reform (1969),
John P. Frank, described by Justice Clark as a distinguished 
scholar and author, an effective advocate, and a most 
successful lawyer and well qualified to speak on the short­
comings of our judicial system and to suggest methods for
If we are to have a new agenda . . .  in the balance 
of this century, we must develop far more radical 
ideas than we have been exploring of late. We 
need to reconsider our legal system from the ground 
up. We need to develop plans
1. To reconstruct the institutions of the law.
2. To reconstruct the job we expect the law
to do.
3. To reconstruct the way we do that job.
In this speech, Marshall seems to repeat major
premises mentioned earlier in this study. The extent to which
the speaker shifts emphasis and varies support should become
apparent as this discussion proceeds.
^^^Frank, pp. 2-3. 
134
Frank, p . xix. 
^^^Frank, pp. 32-33.
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Organization
The disposition of this particular speech will be 
explored in terms of the speaker's purpose, his central idea 
and structure.
Purpose. Previewing the main points to be covered 
in the body of his lecture at Washington University Law 
School, Marshall implies that his purpose is to inform. 
However, upon close examination one is inclined to assume 
that once more the speaker used information to persuade his 
listeners to act in accordance with his recommendation which 
he makes at the end of this address. Assuming that the 
speaker's purpose met the needs of the audience and the 
occasion, it can be considered acceptable.
Central idea. Perhaps, Marshall implies the central 
idea of this speech, "Law and the Quest for Equality," when 
he said: "Actually the subject involves several themes:
the synergy of law and social patterns; the promotion of 
reform through and by means of existing legal means and 
doctrine; and the changing role of a lawyer in society.
Study of this speech reveals that these were the general 
topics that Marshall developed in the body of this address. 
This information in all probability enabled the audience 
to listen intelligently to his message.
Equality," p. 1.
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On the other hand, he makes statements in the con­
clusion of this speech which appear to represent his 
central idea. In part, he remarked:
I am sure you will agree that the force of law— its 
capacity to initiate and mold change— is a major 
force in society, a force which lawyers are most 
called upon to shape. From the early days in this 
country's history, it has been the traditional 
task of lawyers to mediate between principle and 
practice, between man's heritage and his h o p e s . 137
But these remarks seem to recapitulate the main points.
Maybe, the speaker decided not to state the central idea ini­
tially.
For purpose of this study, it seems that Marshall's 
central idea or proposition might be stated as follows: 
Historically, and traditionally, lav/s and lawyers have pro­
duced far-reaching social changes which coincided with and 
created a climate conducive to new legal and social 
relationships; the possibilities of social change and legal 
reform today are even greater; but we must dedicate our­
selves to the task of ensuring equality and justice for all 
Americans. With this in mind, perhaps Marshall decided not 
to include a central idea that would be so lengthy.
Structure. Generally speaking, this speech contains 
an introduction, a body, and a conclusion.
Specifically, Marshall's introductory remarks seem 
to promote friendliness and respect, to lead into the
Equality," p. 7.
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subject quickly, and to reveal the direction the speech is 
going to take. Of particular importance is the fact that 
in this relatively brief introduction, containing about 135 
words, Marshall employs common devices for beginning a 
speech. For instance, Marshall refers to a previous speaker 
and to the occasion. Also, the speaker extends an honest 
compliment to the audience and establishes common ground 
coupled with a personal reference. For example, Marshall 
said:
Dear Lesar, ladies and gentlemen.
I was happy to accept Dean Lesar's invitation 
to deliver the nineteenth Tyrrell William Memorial 
Lecture. Unlike your lecturer of last year, I did 
not have the pleasure of knowing Professor 
Williams; however, from my own experience with 
inspiring teachers, I can understand the feeling 
which prompted you to establish a lectureship in 
the professor's memory, and I hope that I can meet 
the standards of those who have occupied this
podium previously.138
Continuing, Marshall identifies the subject of his address 
and previews his main points: "I have defined my subject
as 'Law and the Quest for Equality.' Actually the subject 
involves several themes: the synergy of law and social
patterns; the promotion of reform through, and by means of, 
existing legal means and doctrine; and the changing role of 
a lawyer in society.
for Equality," Tyrrell Williams Lecture by Honorable 
Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General of the United States, 
St. Louis, Missouri, March 8, 1967, p. 1. (Mimeographed.)
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In terms of word distribution, the body of this 
speech consisted of about 3,000 words. In the body of this 
speech, Marshall apparently develops the topics that he 
mentioned in the introduction. However, it seems that this 
part of the speech, largely, follows a chronological 
pattern. The following sentence outline reveals how the 
main ideas in the body of this speech supported the pre­
viously mentioned central idea:
I. Pertinent cases and legislation during the nine­
teenth century disclose legal recognition of 
equality for legitimization of inequality.
A. In the Dred Scott case (1857), the Supreme 
Court decided that Scott could not be a 
"citizen" of a state within Article III of 
the federal Constitution, and that, in any 
event, he was not free by his having lived 
in free territory because Congress had no 
power to deprive slaveowners of "property" 
rights by prohibiting slavery in certain 
territory.
B. After much travail and a costly war, the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend­
ments were adopted; each of which contained 
an innovative provision, giving Congress the 
power to enforce the amendments "by appro­
priate legislation" . . . which the Recon­
struction Congresses exercised in various 
civil rights legislation but the Supreme 
Court struck down some of those provisions 
in the Civil Rights cases in 1883.
C. In Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the Supreme 
Court upheld a state statute prescribing the 
racial separation of railroad passengers 
within the state; it reasoned that estab­
lishing "separate but equal" facilities did 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment; the 
Court legitimized and gave impetus to the 
myriad laws and customs, described as "a per­
vasive, official system of segregation which 
carries from cradle to grave. . . ."
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D. Some indication of hope for the quest for 
equality through the courts was evident in 
decisions rendered in the Strauder case 
(1880), which in effect held unconstitu­
tional as state statute prescribing that 
white males only could serve on a jury, and 
Yick Wo V. Hopkins (1887), which condemned 
administrative discrimination against 
Chinese as a class.
During the twentieth century equality and
social reform have been promoted largely by
litigation in the courts.
A. The NAACP's participation in the struggle 
for equality and justice was evident in 
Quinn V. United States (1915), in which the 
grandfather restrictions on voting were 
struck down; Buchanan v. Warley (1917), in 
which racially restrictive zoning ordinances 
were declared unconstitutional; Nixon v. 
Herndon (1927), which held state laws 
barring Negroes from primary elections to be 
a violation of the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment; and Moore v. 
Dempsey, the mob-dominated trial of a Negro 
in which the Supreme Court decided that a 
new trial must be held.
B. In the 1930s, NAACP lawyers argued cases for 
the elimination of inequality and dis­
crimination not without occasional setbacks; 
but the Supreme Court continued to rule 
against discrimination in the selection of 
grand and petit jurors and, in various 
ways, to insure the fairness of criminal 
proceedings against Negroes ; it struck
down abhorrent police practices, such as the 
beating of Negroes suspected of a crime in 
order to obtain confessions in Brown v. 
Mississippi (1936); in the Scottsboro cases 
(1932 and 1935), the Court first ruled that 
the trials were unfair because the defend­
ants did not have effective assistance of 
counsel and later that the trials were 
unfair because of discrimination against 
Negroes in the selection of juries.
C. During the next decades. Supreme Court 
rulings eliminated discriminatory practices 
in numerous aspects of life, including dis­
franchisement of Negroes through the
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ingenious white primary (Smith v.
Allright; 1944), gerrymandering 
(Gomillron v. Lightfcot; 1960), and other 
such schemes; nullifying "sophisticated as 
well as simple-minded modes of discrimina­
tion" (Lane v. Wilson; 1939) , striking down 
peonage laws (Taylor v. Georgia; 1942) , 
maintenance of separate dining cars under 
the Interstate Commerce Act (Henderson v. 
United States ; 1950), declared enforcement 
of racially restrictive covenants to be 
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(Shelley v. Kraemer; 1948 and Barrows v. 
Jackson; 1953), discrimination in higher 
education (McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents (1950) .
D. During the early 1950s, many states had 
undertaken to eliminate racial discrimina­
tion, and . . . the executive branch of the 
federal government had not only supported 
the petitioners in several cases but had 
affirmatively sought to eliminate dis­
crimination in the services, in govern­
mental employment, and in the insurability 
of homes in mixed neighborhoods through FHA, 
indicating that the impetus for change 
stimulated by . . . things other than the 
Court decisions . . . mentioned.
E. Finally, in the School Segregation Cases 
of 1954 and 1955, the Supreme Court held 
segregated public education unconstitutional, 
eliminating one of the two pillars of the 
caste system (the other being disenfranchise­
ment) but the decision was not an easy one
to enforce.
F. The story of the quest for equality does not 
end with the School Segregation cases; it 
branches out in several directions, most 
notably to legislation: the Civil Rights
Acts of 1957, I960, and 1964, and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.
The role of lawyers in society is changing to 
include responsibility for social reform and the 
quality of legal services for the poor, which 
ensures equality in access to justice.
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A. Lawyers have a duty in addition to that of 
representing their clients; they have a duty 
to represent the public, to be social 
reformers.
B. Lawyers can provide the quality of legal 
services for the poor, which ensures equality 
in access to justice.
Marshall begins this discussion with an historical 
background of pertinent cases, social patterns and 
legislation which have contributed to the racial discrimina­
tion and inequality in America for several centuries. Next 
Marshall discusses endeavors of the NAACP and the three 
branches of the government, particularly the judicial 
branch, to eliminate discrimination and to promote social 
reform from 1915-1967. Marshall's third main idea asserts 
the need for lawyers to become social reformers to ensure 
equality in access to justice. This discussion presumably 
strengthens beliefs of the listeners at times and at 
other times it seems to attempt to get any undecided 
hearers to make up their minds. The speaker appears to 
seek belief and ultimately overt behavior.
Marshall's conclusion seems to meet rhetorical 
requirements. The speaker summarizes the main ideas and 
presents a final admonition. He said:
Some of you may undoubtedly disagree with some 
of the recent changes in social patterns and in 
the law. Well-considered dissent is, of course, 
an intimate part of the process of society. But I 
am sure you will agree that the force of law— its 
capacity to initiate change and its flexibility to 
accept and mold change— is a major force in 
society, a force which lawyers are most often called
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upon to shape. From the early days in this country's 
history, it has been the traditional task of lawyers 
to mediate between principle and practice, between 
man's heritage and his hopes— that is the message 
of Law and the Quest for Equality— and that task and 
message we must never f o r g e t . ^^0
It appears that Marshall organized this message with 
his purpose in mind. Further, the speaker arranged his 
arguments in a manner that probably contributed significantly 
to the listener's ability to understand the message. It can 
be concluded that Marshall's organization fulfilled tradi­
tional requirements of rhetoric.
In summary, it is evident that Marshall organized 
these speeches in patterns which combine both inductive and 
deductive processes. Further, his lines of argument can be 
easily converted into syllogisms. He demonstrates a prefer­
ence for such deductive tools as explanation and restatement. 
He also utilized comparison and causal inference. Among 
the conclusions which can be drawm from close examination of 
Marshall's support, Lbe first is that he was determined to 
convince his listeners that equality and justice under law 
for all Americans is a realistic goal; the second is that 
lawyers must assume the largest responsibility for 
guaranteeing equality and justice for all.
Logical Appeals
This section will examine Marshall's reasoning and 
evidence in his lecture before law students and lawyers in
^^^U.S. Department of Justice, "Law and the Quest
for Equality," p. 7.
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St. Louis, Missouri. To analyze his reasoning, three 
hypothetical syllogisms can be constructed:
(Major Premise) If Supreme Court decisions for 
decades largely legitimized 
inequality, some Americans, partic­
ularly Negroes, did not enjoy 
equality and justice under law.
(Minor Premise) Supreme Court decisions for decades 
largely legitimized inequality.
(Conclusion) Some Americans, particularly Negroes,
did not enjoy equality and justice 
under law.
(Major Premise) If litigation and Supreme Court deci­
sions during recent decades changed 
some racially discriminatory laws 
and practices, segregation and dis­
crimination in some areas have been 
diminished. .
(Minor Premise) Litigation and Supreme Court deci­
sions during recent decades changed 
some racially discriminatory laws 
and practices.
(Conclusion) Segregation and discrimination in
some areas have been diminished.
(Major Premise) If equality and justice under law 
must be achieved, lawyers must 
assume responsibility for social 
reform and the quality of legal 
services for the poor, which 
ensures equality in access to 
justice.
(Minor Premise) Equality and justice under law must 
be achieved.
(Conclusion) Lawyers must assume responsibility
for social reform and the quality of 
legal services for the poor, which 
ensures equality in access to 
justice.
In each of the above hypothetical syllogisms, the 
minor premise affirms the antecedent and the conclusion
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affirms the consequent. Accordingly, the syllogistic 
reasoning can be considered valid.
Now, we analyze the forms of support. This section 
will deal with the nature of the evidence Marshall pre­
sented and the effectiveness of that evidence.
Typically, when addressing lawyers and law students, 
Marshall cites legal cases and explains circumstances to 
support his contentions. This practice is apparent in the 
speaker's address at Washington University. For example, 
offering proof that for decades Supreme Court decisions 
largely legitimized inequality, Marshall refers to three 
specific cases. He remarks that in the Bred Scott case 
(1857) the Supreme Court ruled that Scott could not be a 
"citizen" of a state within Article III of the Constitu­
tion and that he was not free by having lived in free 
territory because Congress did not have power to deprive 
slaveowners of "property" rights by prohibiting slavery in 
certain territory. He added in the Civil Rights Cases 
(1883), the Supreme Court struck down some provisions of 
the Civil War Amendments which "tolled the death-knell" 
for civil rights legislation but by this time "the act had 
already fallen into desuetude." In Plessy v. Ferguson 
(1896) the Supreme Court upheld a state statute prescribing 
the racial segregation of railroad passengers within the 
state, reasoning that establishing "separate but equal" 
facilities did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
speaker documents thoroughly the impact of Plessy quoting
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from L. Poliak's The Constitution and the Supreme Court,
C. Vann Woodward's The Strange Career of Jim Crow, brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae . . . Griffin v. 
Maryland (1963) and Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy, 
and finally asserts: "But Plessy marks the nadir of con­
stitutional protection for minorities.
To support his second contention about the quest 
for equality through the courts, Marshall refers to the 
Strauder case (1880) which in effect held unconstitutional 
a state statute prescribing that only white males could 
serve on juries and Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) which con­
demned administrative discrimination against Chinese as a 
class. To prove that in the twentieth century the quest 
for equality has proceeded largely through the courts with 
some victories and some defeats, Marshall cites practically 
every legal case and court decision. He also mentions 
legislative acts and executive orders. Arguing inductively, 
perhaps, the speaker assumed that if he built a pre­
ponderance of instances his conclusions would be inevitable. 
This method of argument is familiar to lawyers and law 
students. The speaker's success as a trial lawyer 
certainly verifies his skill with this and other methods 
of argument. His evidence probably led his listeners to 
share his conclusion.
^^^Thurgood Marshall, "Law and the Quest for 
Equality," Washingto.i University Law Quarterly, 1:1-3, 
1967.
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Having offered proof that the Negro who was once
enslaved by law and emancipated by law is achieving equality
through it, he adds that "law is often in response to social
change; but Brown v. Board of Education demonstrates law
also can change social patterns. Provided it is adequately
enforced, law can change things for the better. . . ."^42
To prove his final contention again Marshall argues
from circumstantial detail, he employs rhetorical questions
and he adds his authoritative opinion. The following
passage illustrates his method of argument.
The lawyer has often been seen by minorities, 
including the poor, as part of the oppressors in 
society. Landlords, loan sharks, businessmen 
specializing in shady installment credit schemes—  
all are represented by counsel on a fairly permanent 
basis. But who represents and speaks for tenants, 
borrowers, and consumers? Many special interest 
groups have permanent associations with retained 
counsel who seek and sponsor advantageous legisla­
tion. But who represents and speaks for the sub­
stantial segment of the populace that such 
legislation might disadvantage? Outside of the 
political processes, I think the answer is clear. 
Lawyers have a duty in addition to that of repre­
senting their clients; they have a duty to be social 
reformers in however small a way.
The cases I have mentioned show what can be done 
by private lawyers through the courts. And the 
possibilities of social change and reform today are 
even greater. The lawyer's image as solely the pro­
tector of vested interests is changing.
For years the bar responded to the need for 
legal services for the poor through legal aid, but 
even the most ardent supporters of the legal aid 
movement never claimed that the needs of the poor 
were fully met. Now we have at hand the tools with
^^^Thurgood Marshall, "Law and the Quest for 
Equality," p. 8.
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which to provide those services in an organized and 
more complete way. . . . Like any reform 
scheme . . . the success . . .  is directly related 
to the quality of people, especially the lawyers, 
who become active in it. . . . It involves the 
quest for equality, no longer racial, but rather 
equality in access to justice.143
The specific instances were probably considered
sufficient, typical, and reliable. The sources of historical
data and testimony were identified. The testimony came
from authority that was experienced in the field, known to
the audience, and well qualified to discuss it. In all
probability, the evidence proved the points and won the
audience's acceptance.
Emotional Appeals
In this lecture some emotional appeals are evident 
also. It should be remembered that without distorting or 
vitiating the integrity of his ideas, practical wisdom 
often decrees that speakers expound their views with fore­
thought of the emotional makeup of the audience.
Specifically, Marshall made emotional appeals to 1) consti­
tutional and egalitarian ideals; 2) professional pride and 
social responsibility; and 3) justice and fair play.
Marshall's appeal to constitutional and egalitarian 
ideals can be illustrated. Having presented an historical 
narrative of practically all noteworthy cases involving the 
quest for equality through the courts, Marshall said:
Equality," pp. 8-9.
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Moreover, these cases do not appear in 
Shepard * s Citations with an asterisk to limit their 
precedential value to race relations. They concern 
us as lawyers, lay professors, citizens, and 
government officials because the principles they 
announce quite transcend the immediate controversy 
which occasioned them. Thus, Powell v. Alabama, the 
first Scottsboro case, gave rise to an important 
principle in the administration of justice announced 
finally in Gideon v. Wainwrighty the due process 
right to a fair trial includes representation by 
counsel and the appointment thereof for the 
defendant who cannot afford to retain counsel. The 
same is true, of course, of the early coerced con­
fession cases; they too have spawned many offspring. 
In short, these decisions go far to prove the truth 
of Dean Pound ' s statement that what he called 
"justice according to law" . . . insures that the 
more valuable interests, social and individual, will 
not be sacrificed to immediate interests which are 
more obvious and pressing but of less real
weight.144
Another example illustrates the speaker's practice ; it also
seems to appeal to the sense of justice and fair play;
Gratified by the ad hoc victories but dissatisfied 
in its quest for equality, the organization 
[NAACP] decided that it would press on every pos­
sible front for the elimination of inequality and 
discrimination. The means selected was through use 
of the courts, partially because other avenues of 
redress appeared to be closed, and partially 
because of the deep and abiding faith the planners 
had in the rule of law, and the efficacy and 
feasibility of instigating social reform through 
reliance upon the Constitution— which after all was 
designed to insure the protection of the basic 
values of our society.145
Marshall's speeches also included appeals to social 
responsibility. For example, he says that the quest for
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equality is an ongoing search, "as our ideas and hopes are 
transmitted into reality.” He added remarks made by 
President Lyndon Johnson: "For the work that lies ahead is
demanding, and involves far too many lives in urgent need of 
help, to be parceled out by race. Tomorrow's problems . . . 
will not be divided into "Negro problems" and "white prob­
lems ." There will be only human problems and more than 
enough to go around.
Of particular importance is the fact that in 
Marshall's addresses to law students and members of the legal 
profession he repeated the following appeal to the 
listeners' professional pride and social responsibility. In 
this connection, Marshall said:
I am sure all agree that the force of law— its 
capacity to initiate change and its flexibility 
to accept and mold change— is a major force in 
society, a force which lawyers are most often 
called upon to shape. From the early days in this 
country's history, it has been the traditional task 
of lawyers to mediate between principle and prac­
tice, between man's heritage and his hopes— that 
is the message of the Law and the Quest for Equality—  
and that task and message we must never forget.
Orators frequently furnish their listeners with
pathetic proof. Pathetic proof employed as adjuncts to,




" ^Thurgood Marshall, "Law and the Quest for
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Indeed pathetic proof is often essential to induce 
belief and to produce action. It is suitable to assume 
that the preceding examples of Marshall's pathetic proof 
meet these requirements.
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CHAPTER VI
STYLE AND DELIVERY
Analysis of oratory must give some attention to the 
speaker's style and delivery. This chapter examines 
Marshall's style and delivery with particular emphasis on 
the five speech situations treated in this study.
Style
Classical rhetoricians refer to style as elocutio.
As a part of rhetoric, elocutio refers largely to the way 
in which the speaker clothed his ideas with language.^ 
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden establish the essential components 
of style as follows; "An effective style— that is, one 
capable of preparing and opening the minds of the listeners 
for a particular subject— depends upon a speaker's having 
(1) an idea worth presenting, (2) an unmistakably clear 
conception of the idea, (3) a desire to communicate it, (4) 
a willingness to adapt it to a particular set of circum­
stances, and (5) a mastery of language adequate to express
Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W. 
Braden, Speech Criticism (2d ed.; New York: Ronald Press
Company, 1970), p. 489.
^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 515.
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public address and rhetoric summarize the chief means of 
enhancing style as communication: "There are two sets of
materials which are more likely to open the listeners* minds 
to the ideas of the speaker: (1) elements that make for
clearness, and (2) elements that make for impressiveness in 
discourse.
This section deals with the elements of clarity, 
correctness, vividness, and appropriateness which reveal 
significant features of the speaker's style.
Marshall probably enhanced the clarify of his 
speeches when he employed specific historical facts and 
figures. This stylistic endeavor was impressive when he 
traced the history of the struggle for equality in America 
from the seventeenth century to the mid-twentieth century.
Marshall's thorough knowledge or familiarity with 
the content of his messages apparently promoted the clarity 
of his speeches. The first black Solicitor General of the 
United States, who was chief NAACP lawyer for more than 
twenty years and a federal judge for four years, spoke about 
matters related to his personal and professional expe­
riences.
Of particular importance is Marshall's perceptive 
word selection and types of examples. His words before
Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech 
Criticism: The Development of Standards for Rhetorical
Appraisal (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1948) , p. 430.
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general audiences were distinctively different from words 
selected for audiences made up of lawyers and law students. 
Addressing the latter, Marshall's vocabulary reflected his 
exceptional legal mind. For example, in these speeches he 
discusses the Court's posture interpreting, or reinterpret­
ing, that guarantee of the First Amendment protecting the 
right to criticize the status quo. Also, Marshall asserts: 
"Through its power of invalidation, the Supreme Court has 
wrought fundamental change in the structure of our 
s o c i e t y . F u r t h e r ,  Marshall explains the contrast between 
this use of the power of invalidation and that which con­
fronted the early welfare and New Deal legislation.
Marshall also contends that "Powell v. Alabama (287 U.S. 45)
. . . and Brown v. Mississippi (297 U.S. 278 (1936)— these 
two decisions heralded a new Supreme Court supervision 
radically reforming the State criminal processes. . . . "  
Explaining that courts had traditionally initiated and 
effectuated judicial reform of the judicial process,
Marshall remarks : "For example, those protesting against the 
imposition of the new exclusionary rules often overlook the 
hearsay rule, a massive judge-created exclusionary rule 
designed to protect less worthy interest than constitutional 
rights."^ Commenting on the unique facet of this reform
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5980.
^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5981.
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and the constitutional principle upon which these decisions 
are based, Marshall refers to the "doctrine of stare 
decisis" and the "Due Process Clause." Marshall's selec­
tion of words and use of examples can be illustrated in the 
following passage:
Even though, as a national proposition, we have 
moved a long way from those initial outrages per­
ceived in Brown v. Mississippi and Powell v.
Alabama, gross imperfections still remain, if the 
standard of judgment is contemporary communal 
values. Pre-arraignment procedures in the station 
house; bail; pretrial publicity; the right to a 
speedy trial; pretrial discovery; the admission of 
evidence dealing with the accused's prior criminal 
record; the right to counsel in specialized 
proceedings, such as collateral attacks, commitment 
proceedings, and revocation-of-parole proceedings. 
These are just some of the areas that will come 
under particular scrutiny in the years to come, 
and the areas in which radical reform will take
place.6
Perhaps it should be added that Marshall used phrases such
as follows: "as a national p r o p o s i t i o n , " a s  a general
p r o p o s i t i o n , a n d  "as a logical p r o p o s i t i o n . F o r
example, speaking of the necessity to reform the criminal
process, Marshall remarks :
While, hopefully, only a minority of the population 
would come in contact with law enforcers, this 
enterprise could hardly be considered specialized: 
as a logical proposition all citizenry was
^U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1965), CXIII, No. 140, 24644.
^Ibid.
®U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5980.
^U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24644.
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susceptible to the abuses, for it was impossible 
to insure against being included in the minority, 
and the enforcement of criminal laws is one of the 
most direct or immediate confrontations between 
the individual and the state.10
Marshall's speeches to general audiences contained 
little legal terminology which is replete in his speeches 
to lawyers and law students. On the other hand, it appears 
that Marshall used words that are familiar when addressing 
general audiences. His words seemed to convey their 
intended meaning as accurately as possible.
It has been mentioned that Marshall frequently used 
long sentences. According to Jamye Williams, "He uses a 
large number of long, loose sentences. His transitions, 
nevertheless, are especially clear and well defined.
On the other hand, it should be added that the speaker's 
transitions contribute to the coherence of the message. 
Often, Marshall's assertions are cumulative. For example, 
at the Indianapolis Housing Conference he said: "There are
some people, and we should never forget or ignore it, who 
would say 'Yes, that can be suitable living environment. '
And then there are some who really haven't thought about it 
because, they believe, it doesn't affect them. Finally, 
there are those who know, without doubt or reservation, that
Jamye Coleman Williams, "A Rhetorical Analysis of 
Thurgood Marshall's Arguments Before the Supreme Court in 
the Public School Segregation Controversy" (PhD disserta­
tion, Ohio State University, 1959), p. 199.
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such an environment is suitable neither for the individual 
nor for the coinmunity. " In the same speech we find further 
evidence of Marshall's transitions:
Surely then, this . . . separation of one 
group, one race, from another [must be] 
repaired. . . .
To do that requires. . . .
And to do that, we must. . . .
First of these. . . .
And with these factors established. . . .
If we are to succeed in this effort. . . .
Discussing Marshall's sentence structure in Brown v.
Board of Education, Jamye C. Williams notes :
His sentences which, when transcribed, appear long 
and involved obviously were effective when 
delivered. . . .  An examination of Marshall's 
sentences revealed that some of them are extremely 
short, being merely answers to the interrogations 
of the judges; others are inordinately long, 
following the pattern of conversation. That the 
sentences, short and long, satisfy the criterion 
of clearness is evidenced by the Justices' indica­
tion that they comprehend his argument. Mr. 
Marshall's answers to the interrogations, with his 
now simple, now diffuse style, show the meeting 
and the understanding of legal minds.13
Making an "overall evaluation" of Marshall's style, Williams
concludes: "It is, according to Aristotelian standards,
both clear and appropriate. Clearness was secured through
diction, the collocation of words, and the embellishment.
Marshall's suiting of his language— its proportion and
emotion— to the occasion also contributed to his effective-
89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
^^Williams, pp. 179-180 ^^Williams, p. 183.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Marshall frequently used specific instances to
support general statements. For example, he said:
It was the Northern states that did much to deny 
free Negroes their rights after the Civil War. . . . 
A mob drove eight Negroes out of Portsmouth,
Ohio. . . . Bands of whites in Cincinnati took the 
law in their own hands and ran out of the city 
those Negroes who did not have the bonds required 
by law. In New York state, there were riots in 
Utica, Palmyra, and New York City. . . .  In 1834, 
a mob of whites marched down into the Negro section 
of Philadelphia and committed numerous acts of 
violence. They wrecked the African Presbyterian 
Church, burned homes, and . . . beat up several 
Negroes.
Often Marshall tried to clarify abstract concepts 
by including parenthetical expressions: "The force of
law— its capacity to initiate change and its flexibility 
to accept and mold change— is a major force in society. 
Parenthetical remarks frequently provided the audience 
additional information as follows: "Two years later— again
at the urging of the Solicitor General, who took issue with 
I.C.C.— the Supreme Court outlawed segregation in railroad 
dining cars.
"Address of Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall, 
Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To Fulfill 
These Rights" (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1966), p. 43.
^^Thurgood Marshall, "Law and the Quest for 
Equality," Washington University Law Quarterly, 1:9, 
Winter, 1967.
"Address of Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall, 
Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To Fulfill 
These Rights," p. 51.
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Marshall's speeches contained accurate grammar and 
acceptable sentence structure with only a few exceptions. 
Each speech included a suitable mixture of simple, compound, 
complex, and compound-complex sentences which added variety. 
Lengthy sentences were followed by short sentences. The 
shortest sentence contained only three words, while the 
longest sentence contained eighty-eight words. Each speech 
revealed a predominance of complex sentences, illustrated 
in the following paragraph:
If we are to fulfill these rights, if we are 
promptly and effectively to bridge the gap between 
theory and practice, we must first realize fully 
the depth of the problem of racial prejudice and 
discrimination in this country. There are today 
two groups of Americans sincerely interested in 
the problems. One group believes we have made 
tremendous progress in the last two decades and 
thinks little more is needed— that, given time, 
the problem will solve itself. The other group 
recognizes the progress that has been made, yet 
views the present achievement as no more than a 
firm base from which to launch the final attack on 
the causes of racial and religious prejudice. Both 
groups need to pause for a consideration of the 
background history of this p r o b l e m . 18
The speaker incorporated figurative language which
enhanced the vividness and the forcefulness of his ideas.
For example, he said: "Perhaps there were some who
philosophized that since things could not get worse, they
would get better. But they were wrong. This was a dark
"Address of Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall, 
Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To Fulfill 
These Rights," p. 39.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
hour indeed; yet a blacker night would come, and the sun 
would not come out for a very long time.
Marshall frequently employed questions that prob­
ably helped direct the listeners' attention to a specific 
phase of his subject. In each case the question was 
followed by a clear and concise answer. This stylistic 
device contributed to the overall vividness of each speech. 
Within a single paragraph, he posed three questions: "Of
what relevance is all of this to my second theme : the role 
of lawyers in society? . . . Landlords, loan sharks, 
businessmen specializing in shady installment schemes— all 
are represented by counsel. . . . But who represents and 
speaks for tenants, borrowers, and consumers? . . . But 
who represents and speaks for the substantial segment of 
the populace that such legislation might disadvantage? . . . 
I think the answer is clear. Lawyers have a duty. . . .
They have a duty to represent the public, to be social 
reformers. . .
Other examples of figurative language characterized 
Marshall's speeches. He often employed terms such as: 
"struck down;" "the darkest days;" "outlawed;" "dead 
letter;" and "kindled a flame." Vivid expressions were
"Address of Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall, 
Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To Fulfill 
These Rights," p. 47.
^^Marshall, "Law and the Quest for Equality," 
Washington University Law Quarterly, pp. 8-9.
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included: "These decisions were a long time bearing
fruit;" "disfranchising laws . . . separating races from 
cradle to grave;" "massive resistance;" "The New Deal
[did not] bring dramatic relief;" "The Negro could not . . .
appreciate . . . being dealt a new hand;" "Again, he seemed 
. . . left out of the d e a l ; " T h e  Supreme Court served, 
at least in 1954, . . . as a voice of communal conscience;
and "two worlds were being set up within the same
democracy."23
Another significant aspect of Marshall’s style 
was his appropriate use of a quotation to stress an 
important point. To emphasize the importance of the Brown 
decision, the speaker remarked to general audiences that one 
author called the day of that decision "That Great Gettin’
Up Morning. Marshall quoted excerpt from this
spiritual:
There's a better day a ’ cornin'
Fare thee well, fare thee well.
In that great gettin' up morning 
Fare thee well, fare thee w e l l . 25
"Address by Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall," 
Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To Fulfill 
These Rights," pp. 44-51.
^^Thurgood Marshall, "The Constitution and Social 
Change," Federal Bar News, September, 1965, p. 287.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24632.
^^Marshall, "Law and the Quest for Equality," 
Washington University Law Quarterly, p. 6.
^^Ibid.
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Addressing audience of lawyers and law students, Marshall 
occasionally quoted Supreme Court Justices. He quoted 
President Lyndon Johnson in his speech to the Federal Bar 
Association. Marshall concluded by quoting Thomas 
Jefferson.
In his Chicago speech, Marshall also employs per­
sonification. Commenting on Supreme Court decisions which 
marked a new era in First Amendment doctrine, Marshall 
observes: "The first amendment's protective cloak was
spread wide enough to safeguard the right to criticize from 
suppressive actions of the s t a t e s . I n  this speech, one 
finds additional examples of Marshall's capacity to employ 
imagery and vivid language. For instance, Marshall 
described the effect of recent Supreme Court decisions:
"What crumbled was not merely a network of legal rules; it 
was a whole social system bent on keeping the Negroes in a 
position of inferiority, a social system which relied on 
and was inspired by the Jim Crow laws. Segregation was con­
stitutionally condemned, and it was thus stripped of all 
moral p r e d i c a t e s . F u r t h e r ,  addressing the Federal Bar 
Association, Marshall contends : "One of the most dis­
tinguished features of American society is that it began 
with a bang, not a whimper— with a revolution packed with
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5980.
^^Ibid.
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economic, social, and political significance."^® Dis­
cussing practices of deliberate racial discrimination in 
America prior to the 1930s, Marshall says: "Whether by
action of the states or inaction by the federal government, 
they both recognized two classes of citizens divided by 
color— two worlds within o n e . M a r s h a l l ' s  first speech as 
Solicitor General of the United States before the Annual 
Convention of the Federal Bar Association contains an 
illustration of the speaker's ability to utilize the simile. 
For example, Marshall begins his address on "The Constitu­
tion and Social Change" as follows: "The recent history of
the Supreme Court is, in one respect, like a contemporary 
abstract p a i n t i n g . I n  this same speech, Marshall remarks 
that the Supreme Court's efforts to ensure equality and 
justice, specifically in terms of reforming criminal pro­
cesses, have been evident for about thirty years but most 
recent decisions indicate that the Court's involvement has 
greater intensity. Figuratively, Marshall adds: "The
brush strokes have been getting broader and broader, and the 
result has been, in my opinion, to prove anachronisms which
have no place in our society. «31
2®Ibid., A5979.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24644.
U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.30]
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5979.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5978).
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Marshall seems to have a penchant for parallelism. 
Evidence of this particular aspect of his style can be 
found in speeches to lay and legal audiences. For example, 
speaking to the Indianapolis Housing Conference, Marshall 
observes the scope of inadequate housing: "It is not a
problem just of the poor. . . . It is not a problem just of 
the Negro. . . . It is not a problem of a particular 
religious or nationality group. . . . "  Commenting on the 
"varying and divergent assessments about housing— its 
adequacy, its ready accessibility by all, its character and 
quality," Marshall repeats "there are those. . . . "  Each 
speech contained evidence of interrogation which seems to 
be a favorite construction. In his Indianapolis address he 
said: "Let us assume that all housing in our urban areas
met the standard of decency [guaranteed in the Housing Act 
of 1949]." Then he queried: "Would we then have satisfied
our goals, even though some— a very sizeable some— would be 
restricted to certain areas by deliberate design, confined 
to a section not by choice but by influence beyond their 
own desire and will, prohibited, as if by law of apartheid, 
from, the exercise of freedom, of mobility, which is a right 
enjoyed and utilized by others with varying degrees of 
flexibility?"^^ Presumably, these devices helped him to 
maintain interest and to promote clarity. Probably, the most
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
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impressive effect of this device was its appropriateness to 
the speaker, the audience, the subject, and the occasion.
In his speeches to legal audiences, some of the 
cases cited included: "Dred Scott case;" "Civil Rights
Cases" of 1883; "Plessy v. Ferguson;" Strauder case;"
Yick V. Hopkins;" "Guinn v. United States;" "School Segrega­
tion Cases ;" "Brown v. Mississippi;" "Scottsboro cases;" 
"Powell V. Alabama;" and "Gideon v. Wainwright. On the 
other hand, Marshall’s speeches to general audiences did 
not include these citations. Addressing general audiences 
or listeners who are law students and/or members of the 
legal profession, Marshall seems to impart knowledge, 
judgment, or counsel for the benefit of his hearers and to 
present material within their comprehension, phrased in- 
language they could understand.
Each speech appears stylistically similar in that 
specific features of clarity, correctness, vividness, and 
appropriateness were evident. Marshall's oral style seems 
to have been well-suited to the speaker, his purpose, his 
message, his audience, and the occasion. He used language 
that was consistent with his education, status, profession, 
and the listeners' expectations. One might conclude that
^^Marshall, "Law and the Quest for Equality," 
Washington University Law Quarterly, pp. 2-8.
^^Bower Aly and Lucile Folse Aly, A Rhetoric of 
Public Speaking (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1973), p. 110.
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these elements of style met the requirements of effective 
oral style and contributed significantly to the listeners' 
understanding and overall impact of each message.
Delivery
This section examines significant aspects of 
Marshall's delivery that enhanced his communicativeness.
His method of presentation, appearance, bodily action, and 
vocal characteristics are considered.
Newspaper articles about the five speeches of this 
study contained no specific references to Marshall's 
delivery. However, information about his activities as legal 
defense counsel for the NAACP, comments by persons who 
observed him in other speech situations during the fifties 
and sixties, and the texts of five selected speeches pro­
vide important information.
A colleague remarked that Marshall's cases and 
speeches were prepared with habitual thoroughness.^^ Sub­
stantial evidence supports the fact that Marshall believed 
in being well-prepared when he argued a case or delivered a 
speech. These factors probably enhanced his effectiveness.
As legal counsel for the NAACP, Marshall frequently 
addressed local chapters and other groups around the 
country. Most of his speeches dealt with the struggle for
Alexandria, Louisiana, September 21, 1978.
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equality and justice. Marshall was acclaimed as a brilliant 
and successful lawyer who devoted most of his career to the 
legal struggle for civil r i g h t s . T h o r o u g h l y  familiar with 
his subject, Marshall did not need to rely heavily upon 
notes or manuscript.
Reliable sources provide additional evidence that 
Marshall delivered his speeches without a manuscript. 
Columnists testified at confirmation hearings when Marshall 
was nominated to be Solicitor General of the United States 
that Marshall did not use a manuscript. While addressing 
local chapters of the NAACP in several states, Marshall's 
secretary reports that he usually spoke from notes.
The texts of Marshall's speeches provide clues about 
his delivery. The White House Conference text suggests 
that he probably utilized a manuscript for part of his 
historical review "of the struggle for racial equality in 
this country," which covered three centuries. Marshall 
acknowledged his indebtedness to the well-known historian 
John Hope r-anklin for materials "up to 1900"^^ as mentioned
Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall 
to Be Solicitor General of the United States, Hearing, 89th 
Congress, 1st Sess., July 29, 1965 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1965), pp. 8-9.
Telephone conversation 
Secretary to Thurgood Marshall, NAACP Director-Counsel, 
November 5, 1977.
"Address by Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall," 
Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To Fulfill 
These Rights," p. 39.
^^Ibid.
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earlier in this study. The speaker's message to each 
audience, lay or professional, contained ideas and issues he 
addressed often. It seems safe to assume that Marshall's 
experiences and knowledge prepared him to deliver most of 
each speech extemporaneously.
Several aspects of Marshall's appearance were sig­
nificant. His distinguished and commanding presence 
impressed audiences. In June of 1967, a Washington reporter 
described Marshall as "an immensely attractive fellow and 
c h a r m i n g . P h o t o g r a p h s  of Marshall taken during the 
sixties reveal that he was tall, well-groomed, and handsome. 
Sidney Zion, New York Times columnist, noted: "The six-
foot-two jurist insists that his weight has remained steady 
daring the past five years— between two hundred and two 
hundred ten. While not exactly fat, Marshall is comfortably 
thick. The National Review noted that "he is affable,
outgoing, an highly attractive human being. One senator
remarked that Marshall had an "almost occult power over the
'^°U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judi­
ciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Executive Report 
No. 13, 90th Congress, 1st Sess., August 21, 1967 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967) , p. 45.
^^Sidney E. Zion, "Thurgood Marshall Takes a New 
'Tush-Tush' Job," The New York Times Magazine, August 22, 
1965, p. 69.
^^James T. Kilpatrick, "Term's End," National 
Review, July 25, 1967, p. 804.
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Supreme C o u r t . M a r s h a l l ' s  appearance and personality 
probably contributed to the overall effectiveness of his 
delivery. Rhetoricians agree that these factors often 
"figure prominently in the judgments of men.
Marshall's legal training and his public speaking 
experiences seem to have equipped him to use appropriate 
bodily action to reinforce his message. Eric sevareid, 
observing Marshall on several occasions in 1960, reported 
that Marshall's greatness was manifested "in every expres­
sion and g e s t u r e . M e m b e r s  of Louisiana audiences 
remarked that he maintained good eye contact and used a 
variety of gestures to emphasize his ideas. They noted that 
he moved from one side of the lectern to the other side as 
he talked. Occasionally, he clasped his hands behind his 
back as he walked. Sometimes, introducing a quotation or 
a list of facts, he removed note cards from his pocket.
This device is commonly used by speakers to heighten the 
importance and the accuracy of the material cited. Lerone 
Bennett, Jr., Johnson Publishing Company editor, observed 
Marshall numerous times when Marshall addressed NAACP
^Randall Bland, Private Pressure on Public Law 
(Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1973),
p. 116.
^"^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 525.
Louisiana, October 25, 1977.
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chapters around the country. Bennett noted: "He dramatized
litigation, made it understandable and gave Negroes a new 
vision of battle. Because of him, the Fourteenth Amendment 
became as real and meaningful to Lennox Avenue as the cop 
on the beat. . . . The man . . . made the Supreme Court 
comprehensible to Lennox Avenue, and Lennox Avenue com­
prehensible to the Supreme Court. " '  Similarly, Jamye C. 
Williams, who was a member of the audiences when Marshall 
delivered a speech at Central State College and a speech 
in Miami, Florida, in 1956^® wrote the following comment on 
the speaker's bodily activity:
As to his bodily action, one observes, first of all, 
his excellent eye contact. He is both physically 
and mentally direct. While he does not gesticulate 
unduly, he makes one aware of his expressive hand 
movements. The manner in which Marshall walks to 
the platform . . . shows that he is poised, self- 
confident, and in control of his physical 
machinery. His facial expressions connote clearly 
the mood and the emotion of his words. On the 
whole . . . Thurgood Marshall's delivery is 
characterized by coordinated use of the voice and 
the body.49
Numerous news articles acknowledge Marshall's 
exceptional vocal skills. The National Review noted that 
in court he was a r t i c u l a t e . E r i c  Sevareid observed that
History of the Negro in America 1619-1966 (Chicago: 
Johnson Publishing Company, 1966), p. 310.
^^Williams, p. 208.
^^Williams, p. 186.
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Marshall was impressive "in everything he s a i d . Time 
Magazine disclosed that he argued law "in meticulously 
scholarly tones" and that he was "equally comfortable drawl­
ing Negro d i a l e c t . S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  his St. Louis lecture 
included one quotation with Negro dialect. In many speech 
situations, listeners observed that Marshall varied his 
pitch, rate, volume, and quality to suit the message, the 
audience, the speaker, and the occasion. Marshall's clear 
and distinct articulation probably fulfilled the audience's 
expectations. His education and professional experiences 
very likely contributed to his correct pronunciation. 
Listeners report that he used distinct articulation and 
correct pronunciation when he addressed Texas college 
students and Louisiana e d u c a t o r s . A m o n g  others. United 
States Congressman Andrew Jacobs describes Marshall's 
speech in Indianapolis as "eloquent.
Having observed Marshall's delivery of speeches at 
Central State College, April 14, 1956, and at the A.M.E. 
General Conference, Miami, Florida, May, 1956, Jamye C.
^^Bland, p. 117.
^^"The Supreme Court: Negro Justice," Time,
June 23, 1967, p. 18.
Interview with Dr. J. K. Haynes, former Executive 
Secretary of the Louisiana Education Association, October, 
1976.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
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Williams makes the following comment about the speaker's
vocal skills:
His voice is deep and resonant, there being no 
irritating qualities to distract the listeners.
The resonance of t'Ir. Marshall's voice results in 
appropriate volume for the occasion, the room, and 
the speech itself. Not only is the volume ade­
quate, but also is his speech distinct. One 
notices too that Marshall's voice possesses emo­
tional color which reveals him as now earnest and 
impassioned, now ironic and indignant. His genuine 
feelings seem to permeate his voice to such an 
extent that a responsive chord is struck with the 
audience. The tempo of his speech is usually slow 
and deliberate. One may note particularly the 
restrained way in which he is able to handle emo­
tionally loaded material. Mr. Marshall's use of 
variations in force aids him in effectively com­
municating his ideas.55
Marshall apparently possessed the knowledge and the 
ability to use a variety of vocal techniques appropriately. 
His vocal skills probably enhanced his effectiveness in 
the speech situation.
Substantial evidence supports the fact that 
delivering addresses to general audiences and to audiences 
consisting of lawyers and law students Marshall fulfilled 
the traditional standards of rhetorical effectiveness.
In each speech situation, Marshall probably gained and 
maintained the attention of his audience. Marshall's theme 
was clearly established and his main points were valid 
and supported with an abundance of evidence. As pointed out 
earlier, his method of delivery was chiefly extemporaneous 
and his vocal skills were varied and appropriate. The
55,’williams, pp. 185-186.
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structure of each speech met the technical requirements of 
rhetoric as noted earlier in this study.
Although it is impossible to estimate the exact 
number of listeners persuaded by Marshall's message, it is 
safe to assume that Marshall communicated his ideas 
effectively. It has been reported that before the Federal 
Bar Association Marshall "delivered a stimulating interpre­
tation of recent Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s , A s  a speaker, 
Marshall apparently demonstrated that he possessed vision 
and the capacity to understand the meaning of current 
happenings. Also, he possessed integrity and revealed the 
social utility of his message in each speech situation.
In part, a speaker's greatness is measured in terms of his 
ability to foresee the effects of a contemporary action 
upon the destinies of men. Marshall's speeches demon­
strated his perception, his competence, and his overall 
effectiveness as an orator. In fact, it has been noted 
that few living individuals have had greater effect than 
Marshall on the social fabric of America.
Program Reaches New High," Federal Bar News, October, 1965, 
p. 339.
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CHAPTER vll 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study has been to examine, 
analyze, and evaluate five speeches delivered by Thurgood 
Marshall during his tenure as Solicitor General of the 
United States 1965-1967.
In appraising Marshall's advocacy of equality and 
justice for all, it seems desirable to consider two broad 
but poignant questions: (1) What kind of man was he? and
(2) What is the overall effectiveness of his speakir._,?
Thurgood Marshall's career as Solicitor General was 
highlighted by his unparalleled number of legal victories 
before the Supreme Court, earning him the title, "The 
Court's Tenth Member."^ Perhaps of greatest significance 
is the fact that Marshall's speeches outside the courtroom 
afforded him impetus as a speaker of national prominence.
Throughout most of Thurgood Marshall's career, 
Americans had little difficulty perceiving his role in the 
American Negro's struggle to secure equality and justice.
His name was synonymous with civil rights. His speeches and 
press statements reflect his philosophy and commitment to 
equal justice for all.
^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No- 32, A985.
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By the time Marshall became Solicitor General he 
had won acclaim and respect for his skill as a trial 
lawyer possessing a "brilliant and forceful mind with few 
peers in the legal profession,"^ and his knowledge of and 
contributions to constitutional law. Marshall was "a man 
whose work symbolized and spearheaded the struggle of 
millions of Americans for equality before the l a w . F o r  
example, as Director-Counsel of the NAACP he became 
synonymous with their legal attacks on inequality and 
injustice in America. Perhaps, it should be added that 
Marshall attributes "his passion for argument and his ability 
at it to his father. " It has been frequently reported that 
Marshall was born into "a naturally argumentative family, 
in fact, and one used to fighting for its rights. As a 
law student at Howard University, he accepted the challenge 
to become a "social engineer." These experiences 
apparently shaped his overall conduct and philosophy. 
Obviously, his attitudes and convictions must be considered 
as determinants in structuring his pattern of life. For 
instance, his concern for the human element seems to take
ciary. Nomination of Thurgood Marshall to Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing, 90th 
Congress, 1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967) , p. 2.
(1966), CXII, No. 32, A985.
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precedence over statistics, reason outweighs formality, and 
intelligence supersedes blind technicality. Further, he 
believed "that human rights must be satisfied through the 
orderly process of law.
An analysis of his effectiveness is appropriate and 
essential to complete the concept of the man. Six measures 
of effectiveness have been recommended by Thonssen, Baird 
and Braden and are applied to the speeches examined in this 
study. Generally, the standards of effectiveness may be 
summarized as follows: (1) the test of readability; (2)
the technical perfection; (3) the honesty and integrity of 
the orator and the social utility of his message; (4) the 
character of the immediate response; (5) the orator's 
wisdom to judge trends of the future ; and (6) substantial 
responses producing the desired changes in belief or atti­
tude, which may come hours, days or weeks after the delivery 
of the speech and the long-range effects of oratory upon 
society.®
According to some authorities in the field of 
speech readability of speech is sometimes perceived as a 
negative indication of effectiveness on the assumption that 
a speech must have been unsatisfactory to the listeners 
if it reads well in print. Since numerous exceptions to
With Mr. Marshall on the Supreme Court," U.S. 
News and World Report, June 26, 1967, p. 12.
Braden, Speech Criticism (2d ed.; New York: Ronald Press
Company, 1970), pp. 540-545.
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this criterion have emerged, the validity of this position 
seems doubtful. Applying this criterion to copies of 
Marshall's speeches, one can detect what some have described 
as Marshall's "appeal to common sense and logic rather than 
to legal technicalities."^ Marshall's speeches are notable 
for the quality of their prose and in this writer's 
opinion read well. It could be concluded that this aspect 
verifies the fact that Marshall's style almost equaled his 
ideas in determining his overall effectiveness as a 
speaker.
The technical or artistic excellence of a speech 
is accepted as a measure of merit. Marshall's addresses 
to legal scholars and laymen are praiseworthy in terms of 
inventive conception, structure and stylistic composition. 
Marshall's speech organization consistently conformed to 
the classical divisions of introduction, body and conclu­
sion. The structural aspects of his speeches were adapted 
in content and length to the knowledge and interests of the 
audiences. In terms of style, Marshall's speeches were 
lucid, stimulating, impressive, and appropriate. He 
utilized familiar terms, figures of speech and thought 
which suited the particular audience. Marshall tends to 
prefer the logical pattern of organization whether address­
ing a general audience or law students and lawyers. The
^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 32, A985.
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speeches treated in this study indicate that he often 
utilizes the problem-solution pattern effectively. Of 
some importance is the fact that Marshall varies his 
types of examples to suit the needs of each type of 
audience. Marshall's contentions were supported by sound 
reasoning.
Marshall's legal training contributed to his 
effective inventive skill. His ability to think clearly 
and to reason cogently was demonstrated on each speech 
occasion. This capacity combined with his exceptional 
talent for choosing effective and appropriate arguments 
and supporting them logically strengthened his oratory. 
Marshall demonstrates the ability to establish the accept­
ability of a conclusion with the aim of securing belief 
or action.
Marshall's arguments usually centered on social 
and moral forces. These arguments required proofs demon­
strating the existence of universal tendencies. Marshall 
fulfilled this requirement by presenting a body of data, 
incidents, and statements correlated and synthesized so 
that his conclusions about their importance seem unques­
tionable. Further, Marshall sought to arouse listeners and 
to urge the correction of immediate and pressing wrongs.
Marshall's address at the White House Conference 
represents a typical example of his preference for 
narration of historical and contemporary events as a method
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of development. His proposition rested chiefly upon 
historical narratives and examples. In this address,
Marshall devoted most of the speech to narration and develop­
ment of historical and contemporary incidents, analogies, 
and examples which inform the audience about the persistent 
denial of equality and justice to American Negroes. Members 
of the audience obviously found listening easier and ideas 
understandable because of the speaker's mode of development. 
Among others, Genung has described the rhetorical advantages 
of this method of presentation:
When we inquire what ordinary men . . . are 
interested in and talk about, we find it is almost 
to be some manifestation of action. . . . Such 
things can be observed without learning and 
without painful thought; moreover, the very 
progress of them is a stimulus to sustained atten­
tion. The spirited account of such things, 
accordingly, is the kind of literature that appeals 
most easily to all classes of men.8
Marshall's audiences, for the most part, were
favorably disposed toward his premises. Addressing general
audiences, in particular, Marshall needed to amplify and
vitalize his principles of judgment and conduct. To some
extent, he was able to impel his hearers to act upon these
principles with vigor and without delay by the proofs which
he included to support his urgings, as well as by the
manner in which he applied those supports. Evidence of the
Marie Kathryn Hochmuth, ed., A History and Criti­
cism of American Public Address (New York: Russell and
Russell, 1955), pp. 159-160.
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latter can be found in the published report following the 
White House Conference. Following Marshall's speech in 
Indianapolis, newspaper accounts of statements by 
public officials and a list of recommendations by the 
conferees represent, in part, the extent to which Marshall 
achieved his goal.
It is not surprising that addressing audiences of 
lawyers and law students Marshall uses mode of develop­
ment which demonstrates his briefmaking skills. For 
example, the brief is divided into three parts— introduc­
tion, discussion, and conclusion. The introduction 
includes the background material needed for understanding 
the discussion to follow; the main points of the discus­
sion correspond to the points of partition in the 
introduction; the outline is logical, with points supported 
by reasoning and evidence; refutation is clearly pre­
sented; and the conclusion summarizes the main points and 
affirms the proposition.
Evaluating Marshall's overall effectiveness, the 
critic also considers his honesty and integrity and the 
social utility of his message. In this connection, the 
critic may query: Does the speech reflect high moral
intent? Does it express ideas and feelings that are ethi­
cally praiseworthy? In short, is a good man using his art 
to do good things?
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As an orator, Marshall did not rely upon his engag­
ing presence and prominent position. His addresses con­
sistently appear to epitomize an active intelligence 
energetically at work.
During and following the period that Thurgood 
Marshall served as Solicitor General of the United States 
and made the five speeches treated in this study, we find 
substantial evidence that Marshall meets the following 
requirements: "One who speaks . . . suasive discourse may
thus be making— or at least declaring— policy. He propounds 
a course of action to be taken, often in troubled circum­
stances, where even the wise and the prudent may hold 
differing opinions. The rhetorician is concerned typically 
with concerting and advocating a judgment, with reaching and 
defending a decision in areas that may be controversial."^
Marshall’s oratory which essentially focused on 
themes dealing with equal rights and justice or generally 
speaking civil rights may be characterized or classified as 
rhetoric of reform; i.e., he urges his listeners 1) to 
utilize legal and creative means, 2) to share responsibility 
for eliminating inequality and injustice, and 3) to mobilize 
all available resources which promote social reform in 
keeping with constitutional guarantees.
^Bower Aly and Lucile Tolse Aly, A Rhetoric of 
Public Speaking (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973),
p. 2.
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Part of Marshall's heritage from his father was his 
propensity for argumentation and debate which led to his 
pursuit of a career as a lawyer. As a law student at 
Howard University we discover that Marshall not only acquired 
academic skills which enabled him to become a trial lawyer 
with few peers but helped to mold his faith in the law as 
the instrument of social change and his concept of members 
of the legal profession as social engineers.
Marshall joined his former mentor Charles L.
Johnson as an NAACP lawyer. Marshall, along with other NAACP 
lawyers, argued and usually won cases which not only defined 
the constitutional rights of the Negro as a citizen but 
broadened the interpretation of constitutional rights for 
all citizens and extended civil liberties for white citizens 
as well. These activities and their goals were reported in 
newspapers throughout this nation. Of the hundreds of 
comments, the following remarks published in The Crisis may 
be viewed as among the best:
While it may be true that laws and constitu­
tions do not right a wrong and overturn established 
folkways overnight, it is also true that the 
reaffirmation of these principles of democracy 
build a body of public opinion in which rights and 
privileges of citizenship may be enjoyed, and in 
which the more brazen as well as the more 
sophisticated attempts at deprivation may be 
halted.10
lOrhurgood Marshall, "Equal Justice Under the Law," 
The Crisis, July, 1939, p. 201.
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During the late 1950s and early 1960s numerous 
studies reveal that a minority of American Negroes had 
entered a growing affluent black middle class more than in 
prior decades. On the other hand, many reports substantiate 
the fact that the condition of the majority of American 
blacks had not improved significantly. Millions of blacks 
continued to live in the grinding poverty and the 
deepening despair of the urban ghettos. There is evidence 
that the lot of these neglected and alienated people had 
not been altered. In fact, evidence supports the fact that 
the gap between the haves and the have-nots was widening.
When signs of an activist civil rights movement 
emerged, the government took steps to improve the lot of 
American Negroes. In the first five years of the 1960s, 
executive orders and legislation passed by Congress 
represented some attempts. During the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations the War on Poverty was accompanied by an 
economic boom. However, riots in Watts, Detroit, Harlem 
and other northern cities erupted during the summers of 
1965-1967. It seems the civil rights laws had not eradi­
cated the de facto economic and social segregation in the 
North. The War on Poverty had not fulfilled the goals and 
the economic prosperity of the 1960s had not reached those 
in the lower economic strata. For instance, reports show
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that the average Negro family's income had decreased during 
this period in comparison to the average white family's 
income.
This was a period in America when there existed the 
need to determine anew. At the same time there emerged 
demands for political and economic self-determination, the 
call for "Black Power" and what has been called the Black 
Revolution. In short, it seems that America was confronted 
with the most serious and potentially dangerous domestic 
situation since the Civil War.
Evidence presented earlier substantiates the fact 
that Thurgood Marshall's honesty and integrity were widely 
acclaimed time and time again by supporters and opponents as 
well. Further, these speeches provide additional evidence 
that Marshall was in close contact with problems related 
to inequality and injustice, was qualified to speak of the 
need for social reform and the capacity of the Supreme 
Court and all other Americans to make equality before the 
law a reality, and was an authority on constitutional law 
capable of recommending specific actions to be taken by the 
audience to accomplish desired goals.
Regarding the immediate response given to a speech, 
it has been noted that this is sometimes superficial but 
often it is considered an accurate indicator of merit.
-^Joseph Parker Witherspoon, Administrative 
Implementation of Civil Rights (Austin! University of 
Texas Press, 1968), pp. 5-32.
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Articles in law journals and eye witness accounts provide 
evidence that the audience reaction to Marshall's speaking 
was almost universally favorable. Applause and cheers were 
among the overt signs of approval which substantiate the 
fact that as a speaker Marshall gained and maintained the 
attention of his audiences. As far as one can determine 
there were no exceptions. For example, the Federal Bar News 
of October, 1965, contained the following comment: "The
Honorable Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General of the United 
States . . . delivered a stimulating interpretation of 
recent Supreme Court decisions in an .address, 'The Constitu­
tion and Social C h a n g e M e m b e r s  of the audience when 
Marshall spoke in Indianapolis comment that his remarks 
were eloquent and that they consider his ideas as great as 
his reputation. Significantly, newspaper accounts of his 
addresses tended to report more about his ideas than about 
his delivery. Typical examples of such accounts appeared 
in the Indianapolis Star and the Chicago Daily News.
Michael B. Scanlon of the Indianapolis Star wrote:
Marshall also warned against the total 
physical destruction of the ghetto. "Remove the 
conditions which require certain people to live 
in it involuntarily," he said.
"This society of two worlds must be merged, 
this widening gulf between affluence and poverty 
bridged, this separation of one group, one race
Thomas Rowland and Joseph Fontana, "Conven­
tion Program Reaches New High," Federal Bar News, October, 
1965, p. 339.
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from another repaired and healed once and for 
all," he said.13
Edmnnd J. Rooney of Chicago Daily News wrote:
Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General of the 
United States, said Thursday that the United States 
Supreme Court should not end its involvement with 
social change.
Marshall said he hopes the Supreme Court 
will not singly try to eliminate these injustices 
but that other social and political institutions 
will make it a joint enterprise.14
Substantial evidence provided earlier in this study supports
the theme that Marshall's popularity as a speaker on
college campuses and before conferences and conventions
reached its zenith during this period. His popularity
generated increasing demand for his services particularly by
law schools and legal associations. Finally, according to
rhetorical standards, Marshall can be considered an effective
speaker.
His speeches were reprinted in their entirety with 
complimentary comments in law journals, professional 
magazines, and the Congressional Record. Leading news­
papers contained these speeches in part. The audiences were 
large and responsive. According to his secretary, he 
received more requests than he could possibly fill.
^^Michael B. Scanlon, "Don't Bulldoze Slum; Fix It 
Up, Conference Told," Indianapolis Star, June 16, 1966.
Edmund J. Rooney, "Negro Asks Court to Stay 
Involved," Chicago Daily News, September 16, 1965.
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In mid-1967 Marshall's nomination as Supreme Court 
Associate Justice occasioned many comments and appraisals. 
His professional career as an NAACP lawyer and as an advo­
cate of equal rights and justice for all, victories before 
the Supreme Court, his knowledge of and reverence for the 
Constitution, his personal traits of character and 
temperament were analyzed and reviewed.
Appraisal of Marshall's wisdom in anticipating 
future trends essentially tests his vision, his capacity 
to understand the meaning of current happenings, and his 
foresight in appreciating their probable effect upon the 
course of history. Thonssen, Baird, and Braden note:
"With such a test, we link the concepts of statesmanship 
and oratory; we measure a man's greatness as a speaker in 
terms of his competence in gauging the effects of a con­
temporary action upon the destinies of men."
Accordingly, Marshall's abilities have been lauded time 
and time again. The following excerpt from a letter dated 
July 14, 1967, endorsing Marshall's nomination 
summarizes : "Both in private practice and in public
office he has demonstrated those qualities which we admire 
in memh>ers of our highest judicial tribunal; i.e., 
moderation, reasonableness, a judicial temperament, and
^^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 542.
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a balanced approach to controversial and complicated 
national problems.
Many scholars and orators agree that it is a 
travesty upon the American creed that Negroes have had to 
fight for their rights at all. Presumably, the meaning of 
civil rights implies that they are guaranteed to all 
without regard to race, color, creed, or class. Signifi­
cantly, many Americans, Negro Americans in particular, feel 
that achievement of rights through the courts is expensive 
and slow but few will disagree with the fact that in the 
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, there has been "a 
tide moving slowly but inexorably in the direction of the 
achievement of first-class citizenship by N e g r o e s . I n  
other words, while the processes of the courts are slow, 
cumbersome and costly, generally the victories w^ on this way 
have tended to be solid and enduring. It is not sur­
prising that Marshall's victories before the Supreme Court, 
arguing cases dealing with civil rights, provided the 
foundation for his position that the Supreme Court should 
stay involved in the struggle for equal rights and 
justice. Put another way, the Supreme Court should continue
^S.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on the 
Judiciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall to Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing, 
p. 198.
^^Donald B. King and Charles W. Quick, Legal 
Aspects of the Civil Rights Movement (Detroit; Wayne State 
University Press, 1965), p. 2.
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social reform designed to eliminate inequality and injustice. 
Marshall's belief in the Constitution as a "living 
d o c u m e n t " a n d  in the capabilities of members of the 
legal profession and other branches of the federal govern­
ment gave rise to his argument that these groups, in 
particular, should share the responsibility for securing 
equality and justice for all. Marshall contends that the 
Supreme Court should remain active "in the process of social 
change of requiring that our social living conform to our 
social ideals. He maintains that the elimination of 
inequality and massive injustices require that other 
branches of the federal government, other social and 
political institutions, and lawyers in particular make 
solving the related problems a joint enterprise.
Authorities in the field of speech criticism advise 
the critic to measure an orator's effectiveness by sub­
stantial responses associated with possible changes in 
belief, attitude, or action which come hours, days, or 
months after the delivery of the speech. For example, 
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden remark: "But the fundamental
test will be: Did these speeches have an effect upon the
Judiciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall to Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing, 
p. 49.
19
U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24644.
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subsequent disposition of the question? Did they produce 
the delayed response? Did they create a readiness in the 
listeners to act in a certain way when the right stimulus 
came along? (This is a legitimate end of persuasive dis­
course.)" In this connection, these authorities also 
comment: "By extension, this criterion or measure tries to
assay the long-range effects of oratory upon society. Over 
a period of years, did the speech or a series of speeches 
exercise a discernible influence upon the course of 
events?"
Thurgood Marshall's speech to the Greater 
Indianapolis Housing Conference June 15, 1966, focused on 
the need to resolve the problem of inadequate housing and 
discrimination in housing or unfair housing practices. On 
the same day, the Indianapolis News reported the following 
statements from Marshall's conclusion: "The massive and
urgent task of correcting the problems must be done and in 
the doing we will have made a lasting contribution toward 
fulfilling the American purpose and redeeming the American 
promise. There is no higher function of citizenship than 
that," he [Marshall] said.
Of some interest is the fact that earlier in this 
speech Marshall had remarked that the provisions of the 
Housing Act of 1949, particularly the one guaranteeing a
^^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, pp. 542-543.
"Marshall Cites Flaming Distrust," Indianapolis 
News, June 15, 1966.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
decent home for every American, had not been realized. 
Marshall's address contained specific prerequisites to 
ensure adequate [decent] and fair housing for all. The 
Indianapolis Star of June 16, 1966, the day after 
Marshall's address before the Greater Indianapolis Housing 
Conference, reported that the conferees had drafted fif­
teen recommendations that would be presented to city and 
state officials. According to this article, "Paying 
replacement value for some owner-occupied homes in the 
path of interstate highways was one [of the recommenda­
tions]." The article continues by listing five other 
recommendations :
1. Add at least five representatives to advisory 
councils in areas slated for urban renewal
to the housing committee of the Greater 
Indianapolis Progress Committee. The 
committee provides the "citizens participa­
tion" required by the 1949 Housing Act to 
qualify the community for public housing.
2. Enlarge staffs and budgets of both the 
Indiana Civil Rights Commission and the 
Indianapolis Housing Rights Commission to 
enforce fair housing laws.
3. Amend the Indiana Civil Rights Law to permit 
licenses of real estate brokers and salesmen 
to be revoked if they violate fair housing
4. Co-ordinate neighborhood associations by 
formation of a council to exert maximum 
political pressure on city and state officials.
5. Organize an Indiana Department of Housing 
through which the state might build housing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in Indianapolis to repay city taxpayers for 
loss of taxable land to be used for highways.
Also significant is the fact that in June, 1966, 
Congressman Andrew Jacobs, Jr. (D-Indiana) who heard 
Marshall's address introduced a bill in the House of 
Representatives "to assure homeowners of getting replace­
ment value and not just fair market price for their homes 
when forced to sell for federally supported public works 
p r o j e c t s . I t  should be added that Congress passed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968. According to the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development; "Title VIII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Fair Housing Title, 
declares a national policy to provide for fair housing 
throughout the United States." The "Fair Housing Law" 
protects Americans from such acts as refusal to deal, 
discrimination in the terms or conditions of sale or rental 
of a dwelling, and discriminatory advertising, where such 
acts are based on discrimination on account of race, color, 
religion, or national origin.
Edgar F. Kaiser, Chairman of the President's 
Committee on Urban Housing, in a letter to the president
^^Scanlon, June 16, 1966.
Federal Housing Administration, Fair Housing 1968— An 
Interpretation of Title VIII (Faxr Housing) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, Ï969).
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dated December 11, 1968, which accompanied the Committee's
report wrote;
We have learned that no single new development in 
technology or in social and economic organization 
will solve at a stroke this pressing problem. We 
have learned, also, that although the responsi­
bility of the Federal government is great.
Federal action alone cannot build the needed 
housing. Instead, there must be creative new 
action by many institutions and agencies, by 
government at the state and local level as well as 
in Washington, and especially by private enter­
prise. We have proposed many specific improve­
ments in Federal housing programs which are 
intended to encourage greater business participation 
in the field of low income housing. We have also 
proposed a specific new instrument— the National 
Housing Partnership— to provide another route for 
business entry into the production of housing.
We are pleased that this Partnership has now 
become a reality.25
Among others the following recommendation was made by this
Committee: "A 10-year goal of 26 million more new and
rehabilitated housing units, including at least six million
for lower-income families. Attainment of this goal should
eliminate the blight of substandard housing from the face
of the nation's cities and should provide every American
family with an affordable, decent home." This report
included two specific reasons why the committee strongly
believed that the goal is necessary and justified: (i)
"Decent housing is essential in helping lower income
families help themselves achieve self-fulfillment in a free
^^ h e  Report of the President's Committee on Urban 
Housing: A Decent Home (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1969), p. ii.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
349
and democratic society;" and (2)"Public expenditures for 
decent housing for the nation's poor, like public expendi­
tures for education and job training, are not so much 
expenditures as they are essential investments in the 
future of American society.
The United States Commission on Civil Rights wrote 
a letter of transmittal dated February, 1978, and 
addressed to the President of the United States, the 
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives. This letter preceded the second in a 
series of Annual Commission Reports described as follows: 
"Each report reviews executive, legislative, and judicial 
actions, and other developments, favorable and unfavorable, 
that the Commission considers critical to the national 
goals of eliminating discrimination and enhancing equal 
opportunity for all Americans in fundamental aspects of our 
national life." Of particular significance, the report 
presents the status of housing, political participation, and 
the need for continued commitment in the area of civil 
rights.
In housing, the rising costs of housing and 
various subtle patterns of discrimination continued 
to limit fair housing opportunities in 1977.
Federal programs continued to fall far short of 
providing additional housing needed by low- and 
moderate-income groups and thus contributed to 
the lack of any measurable progress toward 
achieving the national goal of decent housing for 
all Americans.
^ The Report of the President's Committee on Urban 
Housing: A Decent Home (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1969), p. 3.
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In political participation, the administration 
promised the appointments of significant numbers 
of minorities and women to important positions in 
the Federal Government. Although movement toward 
this goal has been slower than expected, various 
top-level posts have in fact been filled by 
representatives of these groups. Voting rights 
of minorities were also strengthened by several 
Supreme Court decisions. Full participation in 
the Nation's political process remains a distant 
goal, however, and vigilance must still be 
exercised to ensure voting rights of minorities.
Following firm Presidential commitments, 
steps were taken in 1977 to reorganize the Federal 
civil rights enforcement effort. It is antici­
pated that these efforts will result in more 
effective enforcement efforts in 1978.
While important beginnings were registered 
during this past year, it is hoped that 1978 will 
be marked by a determined commitment, fully 
shared by executive and legislative branches of 
government, to follow through on the encouraging 
first steps noted in this report and to undertake 
new and greater efforts to eliminate obstacles 
to the full protection of civil rights and equal 
opportunity for all.
We urge your consideration of the facts 
presented in this report and ask for your further 
leadership to guarantee equal opportunity for all 
the citizens of this country.27
Assuming the audience complies with Marshall's
pleas for action, in the distant future it will
undoubtedly appear strange to look back upon these days
and observe that a segment of this nation's population
had to fight so long simply for equal treatment.
Although Thurgood Marshall's exact place among
mid-twentieth century orators may be debatable, few will
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The State of 
Civil Rights; 1977— A Report of the United States Com­
mission on Civil Rights (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1978), pp. i-ii.
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argue the fact that Marshall, like other great orators, 
came forward to meet recurring crises in American society 
and uttered words which helped to gain support for social 
reform and to secure constitutional guarantees for 
millions of Americans. Marshall certainly expressed the 
aspirations of many Americans to realize first-class American 
citizenship in dignified, honest speech. Each of 
Marshall's speeches represents "a venture in the communica­
tion of ideas and feelings to a specific audience." In 
fact, substantial evidence corroborates the effectiveness 
of Marshall's addresses in terms of bringing out the moral 
and intellectual character of the speaker, eliciting some 
sort of immediate response, bearing the stamp of artistic 
craftsmanship within the limitations set by the speech 
situation, contributing to the common good, and to some 
degree exercising influence upon subsequent events since 
they certainly indicate concern for man and his manifest 
destiny.
In terms of the extensiveness of his speaking, in 
the power of his ideas and communication of them, in the 
success he achieved gaining support for the causes he 
represented, in the degree to which he used the courtroom 
and the public platform to assert humanitarian and 
equalitarian principles to motivate others to share his 
beliefs and to act accordingly thereby bringing about
28,Thonssen, Baird and Braden, p. 545.
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social and political reforms; one is convinced that 
Thurgood Marshall must be included as one of America's 
mid-twentieth century orators.
For centuries other orators in America have 
addressed the problems related to the inequality and 
injustice as Marshall did in the five speeches of this 
study. Certainly, the problems to which Marshall dedi­
cated his life, his professional career and his personal 
concern have not at this point in time been settled. 
Presumably, Marshall's efforts must be evaluated in terms 
of the effectiveness with which he asserted his sincerest 
convictions.
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